Com a implantação do Plano Real em julho de 1994, o setor bancário brasileiro se deparou com o fim das receitas de floating que eram obtidas através de um ambiente inflacionário. Apesar das adaptações operacionais na busca por novas fontes de receitas, a redução no número de bancos no país foi uma das conseqüências mais notáveis, sendo que este processo teve incentivo até mesmo do governo (federal e estadual) através de programas como Proer e Proes. Aliado a isso, as altas taxas de juros cobradas sobre empréstimos, os elevados spreads, os significativos reajustes das tarifas de serviços, o escasso crédito e os altos lucros do setor, fizeram surgir conjecturas sobre o grau de concentração e poder de mercado dos bancos no Brasil. Contudo, a maioria dos estudos sobre a estrutura de mercado do setor bancário no país não indicaram estruturas extremas (oligopólio ou concorrência perfeita), sendo que em vários trabalhos o mercado de crédito se tornou menos concentrado de 1995 até começo da década seguinte, mas não se chegando ao consenso sobre a situação do mercado bancário no país. Além do que, os trabalhos apresentados na revisão bibliográfica utilizaram em sua maioria variáveis como ativo, patrimônio líquido, crédito e depósito para o cálculo do grau de concentração de mercado, sendo que dessa forma os bancos possuiriam o mesmos focos de atuação. A partir disso, o presente trabalho visa atualizar essa temática, tendo como referência o período de 2001 a 2007. Utilizando-se das divisões e subdivisões das contas do Plano Contábil das Instituições do Sistema Financeiro Nacional Cosif, procurou-se mensurar o grau de concentração e desigualdade das rendas obtidas por cada instituição, agrupadas em contas do mercado bancário e de crédito, através dos Índices Herfindahl-Hirschmann - HHI e T de Theil respectivamente. Adotando essa abordagem, procurou-se considerar que nem todas as instituições financeiras atuam com a mesma intensidade em todos os segmentos de mercado e são concorrentes entre si. Os resultados obtidos por este estudo mostraram que o mercado bancário brasileiro, quando considerado separadamente por contas, apresentou diferentes graus e distintas evoluções de concentração e desigualdade das rendas. Destacando-se o mercado de crédito, que quando subdividido, além de já apresentar-se concentrado no ano de 2001 na grande maioria de suas contas, mostrou crescimento do grau de concentração e de desigualdade no período 2001-2007. / Following the implementation of the Plano Real in July 1994, the banking system in Brazil was deprived of income derived from floating which was obtained through a highly-inflated environment. In spite of the operational adaptations aiming at alternative income sources, the reduction of the number of banks in Brazil was one of the most noteworthy consequences, once this process even received incentives from the government through programs such as Poer and Proes. Moreover, high interest rates applied to loans, elevated spreads, significant rises of service rates, credit scarcity and high profits of the sector, generated conjectures regarding levels of income concentration and market power of banks in Brazil. However, most studies on banking market structure in the country did not show extreme structures (oligopoly or perfect competition scenario), once several works on credit market became less concentrated from 1995 up until early 2000s; nevertheless, a consensus on the banking market situation was not reached. Besides, research studies cited in the bibliographic reference utilized variables such as assets, net equities, credit and deposit for calculating the level of market concentration, which means that, in this case, all banks had the same market focus. Based on this context, this study aims to update the issue, having as reference the period from 2001 to 2007. By using the divisions and sub-divisions of accounts from Cosif Financial Institutions Accounting Plan, it aimed to measure the level of income concentration and unbalance for each institution clustered according to banking market and credit accounts, through Indexes Herfindahl-Hirschmann - HHI and T of Theil, respectively. In adopting this approach, it was attempted to consider that in all market segments are competitors among one another. Results show that the Brazilian banking market, whenever analyzed separately in terms of accounts, presented different levels and distinct evolutions of income concentration and disparity. Focusing on the credit market, which, when individually considered, besides presenting itself concentrated in 2001, in most of its accounts, showed increase in the level of income concentration and disparity in the period between 2001-2007.

There is a particular class of products where people must visit the point of production in order to be consumers, and these products are normally lifestyle, tourism or leisure services. Examples include environmentally-based leisure facilities, housing, and tourist accommodation. Frequently the assertion is made that location makes one product 'superior' to another, in terms of both its production and consumption. This study enquires into the asserted significance of location in product differentiation, with special reference to hospitality and tourism products. The study is particularly concerned with commercially tradeable products offered to a consumer market by a number of competitive firms, rather than being concerned with one-off markets for assets for exclusive use, such as houses. By the use of characteristics theory, this study shows that the role of geographic location within a product such as hotel accommodation is that of a product-differentiating characteristic, or set of characteristics. However, the location of such a product is an example of a fixed, or unalterable, characteristic, once a supplier has entered a market. With most product-differentiating characteristics, a supplier can attain an optimal business position by enhancing the differentiation for as long as customers' willingness to pay 'the extra' (marginal revenue) exceeds or equals the cost (marginal cost) of product enhancement. However, a supplier cannot easily do this for a fixed characteristic. So what is the value of a particular location to a supplier of this type of product? This study develops a model to identify the specific elements of a location that are important to consumers, and then to estimate their values. It is argued that the values of each specific element (locational characteristics) should contribute in a predictable way to the overall price of each product in the market place. It is also shown in this study that individual suppliers who cannot identify, or who incorrectly set, prices based on locational characteristics face a measurable variation in demand from the mean in the market place. The model and methodology are tested empirically in the market for international-standard hotel accommodation on the Gold Coast, Queensland. It is shown that this constitutes a single, coherent market as a tourist destination, where a limited number of producers compete with differentiated products. Those product characteristics that are important to the market are identified, and it is shown that elements of location and other characteristics can be valued accurately across the market. The relationship between suppliers' 'overpricing' or 'underpricing' of their product characteristics and variations in demand from the market average is explored. This study therefore has implications for pricing strategy, as well as for land valuation and planning. The study can be seen as contributing primarily to the economics literature, in the area of industrial economics, but also to the marketing, and hospitality and tourism literature.

<p>The foundation of OPEC (Organization of Oil Exporting Countries) was laid in the early 1960‟s by the five major oil exporters, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, in Baghdad, Iraq. OPEC is supposed to allocate its production level among its member countries based on cartel- dominant firm model, for profit maximization.</p>

The foundation of OPEC (Organization of Oil Exporting Countries) was laid in the early 1960‟s by the five major oil exporters, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, in Baghdad, Iraq. OPEC is supposed to allocate its production level among its member countries based on cartel- dominant firm model, for profit maximization.

Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

This thesis explores the impact of sectoral competition on inflation in Turkey. To this end, panel data analyses investigating the determinants of deviation of sectoral price inflation from the consumer price inflation, and the resulting effect of the changes in the level of sectoral competition on this deviation measure are conducted in both static and dynamic frameworks. The empirical analyses covers the 1995-2001 period and 62 manufacturing sectors classified according to International Standard of Industrial Classification (ISIC) Rev. 2 at 4-digit level. The findings of the empirical analyses are particularly important for the assessment of the theoretical foundations and empirical basis of the recent proposals favoring enhancement of competition with disinflationary motives. The static analyses suggest that sectoral concentration is insignificant in explaining deviations of sectoral inflation from consumer inflation, while dynamic analyses suggest enhancing competition may lead to higher levels of sectoral inflation. The interpretation of the results indicates that enhancing competition may not be a viable tool for disinflationary purposes in Turkey.

Venture capital finances high-risk, high-return projects. In addition to financing, venture capitalists provide advice and expertise in management, commercialization, and development that enhance the value, success, and marketability of projects. Venture capitalists also have skills in selecting projects with potentially high returns. The first chapter investigates the contracting relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in a setting where the venture capitalist and entrepreneur contribute intangible assets (advice and effort) to a project that are non-contractible and non-verifiable. In general, in the private market equilibrium, advice provided by the venture capitalist and the number of projects funded are lower than the social optimum. Government tax and investment policies may alleviate these market failures. The impact of a capital gains tax, a tax on entrepreneur’s revenue, an investment subsidy to venture capitalists, and government run project enhancing programs are evaluated. Finally, we analyze the effects of a government venture capital firm competing with private venture capital. The second chapter focuses on competition in venture capital markets. We model a three-stage game of fund raising, investment in innovative projects and input of advice and effort, where fund raising is used as an entry deterrence mechanism. We examine the impacts of taxes and subsidies on venture capital market structure. We find that a tax on venture capitalist revenue and a tax on entrepreneur revenue increase the likelihood of entry deterrence and reduce the number of projects funded in equilibrium. A subsidy on investment reduces the likelihood of entry deterrence and increases the number of projects funded. The third chapter examines the venture capitalist's choice of investment in project selection skills and investment in managerial advice. We model, separately, a private venture capitalist and a labour-sponsored venture capitalist (LSVCC) with different objectives. A LSVCC is a special type of venture capitalist fund that is sponsored by a labour union. The private venture capitalist maximizes its expected profits, while the LSVCC maximizes a weighted function of expected profits and returns to labour. Consistent with empirical evidence, the quality of projects, determined by project selection skills and managerial advice, is higher for the private venture capitalist.

Com a implantação do Plano Real em julho de 1994, o setor bancário brasileiro se deparou com o fim das receitas de floating que eram obtidas através de um ambiente inflacionário. Apesar das adaptações operacionais na busca por novas fontes de receitas, a redução no número de bancos no país foi uma das conseqüências mais notáveis, sendo que este processo teve incentivo até mesmo do governo (federal e estadual) através de programas como Proer e Proes. Aliado a isso, as altas taxas de juros cobradas sobre empréstimos, os elevados spreads, os significativos reajustes das tarifas de serviços, o escasso crédito e os altos lucros do setor, fizeram surgir conjecturas sobre o grau de concentração e poder de mercado dos bancos no Brasil. Contudo, a maioria dos estudos sobre a estrutura de mercado do setor bancário no país não indicaram estruturas extremas (oligopólio ou concorrência perfeita), sendo que em vários trabalhos o mercado de crédito se tornou menos concentrado de 1995 até começo da década seguinte, mas não se chegando ao consenso sobre a situação do mercado bancário no país. Além do que, os trabalhos apresentados na revisão bibliográfica utilizaram em sua maioria variáveis como ativo, patrimônio líquido, crédito e depósito para o cálculo do grau de concentração de mercado, sendo que dessa forma os bancos possuiriam o mesmos focos de atuação. A partir disso, o presente trabalho visa atualizar essa temática, tendo como referência o período de 2001 a 2007. Utilizando-se das divisões e subdivisões das contas do Plano Contábil das Instituições do Sistema Financeiro Nacional Cosif, procurou-se mensurar o grau de concentração e desigualdade das rendas obtidas por cada instituição, agrupadas em contas do mercado bancário e de crédito, através dos Índices Herfindahl-Hirschmann - HHI e T de Theil respectivamente. Adotando essa abordagem, procurou-se considerar que nem todas as instituições financeiras atuam com a mesma intensidade em todos os segmentos de mercado e são concorrentes entre si. Os resultados obtidos por este estudo mostraram que o mercado bancário brasileiro, quando considerado separadamente por contas, apresentou diferentes graus e distintas evoluções de concentração e desigualdade das rendas. Destacando-se o mercado de crédito, que quando subdividido, além de já apresentar-se concentrado no ano de 2001 na grande maioria de suas contas, mostrou crescimento do grau de concentração e de desigualdade no período 2001-2007. / Following the implementation of the Plano Real in July 1994, the banking system in Brazil was deprived of income derived from floating which was obtained through a highly-inflated environment. In spite of the operational adaptations aiming at alternative income sources, the reduction of the number of banks in Brazil was one of the most noteworthy consequences, once this process even received incentives from the government through programs such as Poer and Proes. Moreover, high interest rates applied to loans, elevated spreads, significant rises of service rates, credit scarcity and high profits of the sector, generated conjectures regarding levels of income concentration and market power of banks in Brazil. However, most studies on banking market structure in the country did not show extreme structures (oligopoly or perfect competition scenario), once several works on credit market became less concentrated from 1995 up until early 2000s; nevertheless, a consensus on the banking market situation was not reached. Besides, research studies cited in the bibliographic reference utilized variables such as assets, net equities, credit and deposit for calculating the level of market concentration, which means that, in this case, all banks had the same market focus. Based on this context, this study aims to update the issue, having as reference the period from 2001 to 2007. By using the divisions and sub-divisions of accounts from Cosif Financial Institutions Accounting Plan, it aimed to measure the level of income concentration and unbalance for each institution clustered according to banking market and credit accounts, through Indexes Herfindahl-Hirschmann - HHI and T of Theil, respectively. In adopting this approach, it was attempted to consider that in all market segments are competitors among one another. Results show that the Brazilian banking market, whenever analyzed separately in terms of accounts, presented different levels and distinct evolutions of income concentration and disparity. Focusing on the credit market, which, when individually considered, besides presenting itself concentrated in 2001, in most of its accounts, showed increase in the level of income concentration and disparity in the period between 2001-2007.

Abstract The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate a design to profit procedure and its implementation in industrial case environment. The procedure is demonstrated as a way to improve profits in a global company. The essential elements of the procedure are product business case calculations and profit consciousness of employees. This study utilizes a combination of product life cycle analysis, advanced costing methods and multidimensional data processing for the product business case calculations. The combination is necessary for solving the research task. The need of proactive design is emphasized in the telecommunications industry due to shorter and shorter product life cycles. However, traditional accounting methods do not support proactive design work sufficiently during the life cycle of the products. The design to profit procedure has been created to help business managers to solve following problems: 1. How to proactively ensure the growth of business profits in the future? 2. How to prevent suboptimal decisions from being made in functional units and to promote overall profitability? 3. How to judge the profitability of new product programs within a company? 4. How can we ensure an adequate level of cost consciousness and profitability-driven targets for the company's key employees? This study presents and discusses the construction of the procedure and describes its elements, implementation and use in practice. The argumentation is illustrated by case studies. This method has benefits, especially when the product life cycles are short and the market competition strong. The design to profit procedure is a proactive mind set or thinking pattern. This system makes the employees aware of the importance target profitability and especially target costing. There is no decision support system that could guarantee the profitability of business. Cautious utilization of the system results and common sense are required to achieve continuous growth of business profits.