Cette thèse propose une analyse de l’emploi informel en RDC sous l’hypothèse d’une segmentation. Partant d’un questionnement qui se réfère aux conditions d’émergence et de prolifération d’emplois informels amplifiés par la crise structurelle que traverse ce pays, laquelle a détruit l’emploi formel, cette thèse réfute l’unicité de l’informel à l’intérieur du marché du travail de la RDC et analyse plutôt son hétérogénéité, en s’appuyant sur les analyses de Lautier (2004), Maloney (2004), Fields (2005) et Bacchetta et al (2009).Cette évidence a justifié la combinaison des théories de l’informalité et de la segmentation, suivie d’une exploitation de deux types de données mutuellement enrichissantes : les données quantitatives de l’enquête 1-2-3 et les données qualitatives collectées sur le terrain d’une activité spécifique : le marché des matériels d’occasion d’Europe, appelés « bilokos » en RDC. Les résultats de cette double exploitation ont permis de caractériser l’informalité d’emplois segmentée, notion forgée et mise en œuvre dans le cadre d’une analyse empirique de l’emploi informel reposant sur deux niveaux : les Caractéristiques de l’Activité (C.A.), et les Profils des Entrepreneurs (P.E.) représentant les variables explicatives d’analyses faites dans cette thèse. Les méthodes mixtes qualitative et quantitative utilisées dans cette thèse valident l’existence d’une segmentation en quatre types au sein des Unités de Production Informelles en RDC, selon plusieurs critères, dont le volume du chiffre d’affaires de leurs activités, en particulier. / This thesis analyses informal employment in the DRC under the assumption of a segmentation. We start with a description of the underlying conditions explaining the emergence, and then spread of informal jobs, which is mainly driven by a structural crisis and the destruction of formal employment in the DRC. The thesis then proposes to reject the uniqueness of the informal sector within the DRC labor market and analyzes its heterogeneity, based on the analyzes of Lautier (2004), Maloney (2004), Fields (2005) and Bacchetta et al. (2009).The thesis therefore highlights the relevance of combining the theories of informality and of segmentation to analyse informal employment in DRC, and applies this framework to two mutually enriching datasets: the 1-2-3 survey, which is quantitative, and qualitative data that we collected in the field and focused on a specific activity: an emerging market for second-hand equipment coming from Europe and called "bilokos" in DRC.The results from these two types of data allow to characterize what we call “the informality of segmented jobs”, a concept that we empirically apply with two levels of analysis: the Characteristics of the informal Activity (C.A.)., and the Profiles of the informal Entrepreneurs (P.E.). Mixed qualitative and quantitative methods allow us to characterize a segmentation in Informal Production Units along four types ranging from lower income to higher income.

This thesis is an investigation into the microeconomic mechanisms that govern some of the occupational choices faced by workers in Sub-Saharan Africa, and into the monetary and non-monetary returns to their decisions. Chapter 1 begins by exploring the decision process that leads workers to allocate themselves to different occupations within the economy. In particular, I investigate the role of risk-aversion in the allocation of workers between formal and informal jobs in Ghana, hence attempting to explain a fundamental dimension of duality through an investigation into workers' preferences. In my model of sectoral allocation risk-averse workers can opt between entering the free-entry informal sector and queuing for formal occupations. Conditional on identifying the riskier option, the model yields testable implications on the relationship between risk-aversion and workers' allocation. My testing strategy proceeds in two steps. First, using the first three waves of the Ghana Household Urban Panel Survey (GHUPS) dataset, I estimate expected income uncertainty and find it considerably higher in the informal sector than in formal employment. Second, using experimental data to elicit risk-attitudes I estimate the effect of risk-aversion on occupational choices and I find that, in line with the first result, more risk-averse workers are more likely to queue for formal jobs and less likely to be in the informal sector. The conclusion of the first chapter is that attitudes to risk should feature more prominently in models of sector allocation and in the design of labour market policies, in particular when those policies aim to impact workers' vulnerability to risk and uncertainty. Chapter 2 focuses on the largest occupational category in the Developing world, self-employed workers with small productive activities, and it tries to estimate the returns to different productive assets, namely physical capital, labour and human capital. These are the workers that form most of the informal sector analysed in chapter 1, which allows me to draw a direct link with the analysis so far. The chapter begins by specifying a model for the income-generating process grounded in the literature on firms' production and hence abridging the gap between the analysis of individual earnings and the study of firms' value added. Identification in the empirics is achieved by means of panel estimators that are suitable to address the endogeneity of input choices, which derives from both time-varying and time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. The use of these estimators is made feasible by the length of the Ghanaian Household Urban Panel Survey dataset at CSAE. I also explore issues of endogeneity in the selection of different technologies, defined by their relative capital and labour intensity. Finally, I analyse the shape of returns to capital, with the aim to detect potential non-convexities in technology. The results show that capital and work-experience play the strongest role in income-generation, while the shares of value added attributed to labour and to formal schooling are low. Marginal returns to investment are high at low capital levels and they decrease very rapidly, pointing against the existence of non-convexities due to minimum scale requirements, but implying that real income gains resulting form micro-investment are modest. Chapter 3 returns to the issue of earnings uncertainty and risk-aversion explored in Chapter 1, but it now takes the allocation choice as given and explores the direct welfare implications of income uncertainty for worker's well-being. Namely, the chapter explores the relationship between income and welfare, with a particular attention on the link between income vulnerability and happiness. Using unique longitudinal data on life-satisfaction and labour market outcomes, I estimate an individual measure of vulnerability (defined as the probability of falling below a low-income threshold) and investigate its effect on well-being. After controlling for unobservable individual fixed effects, work-satisfaction, relative income and other relevant worker characteristics, I find a sizable impact of vulnerability, over and above the income effect. When I explore the mechanisms behind my results, I find that aspiration adaptation to current income may result in a transitory income effect. Moreover, using my direct measure of attitudes to risk from field-experiments (already used in chapter 1), I can test directly the hypothesis that more risk-averse agents suffer more heavily from a given increase in income vulnerability. Overall, my findings support policy interventions that aim to reduce vulnerability, as I expect such policies to have a 'direct' impact on agents' happiness given the prevailing attitudes to risk and uncertainty in the population. Finally, from the point of view of overall social welfare, my results suggest that non-Rawlsian growth models, whereby 'someone may be left behind', may fail to enhance general welfare, for high enough levels of risk-aversion in the population, if the risk of falling behind is sufficiently widespread.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-18T18:55:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MONICA DAMOUS DUAILIBE.pdf: 759187 bytes, checksum: 71eff885f72709de471abf76b62b66f8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-27 / This dissertation presents a study on labor inspection carried out by the Ministry of Labor and Employment to reduce the level of informal employment in Brazil, focusing on the case of state of Maranhão in the present time. Specialized literature on formation and structuration of Brazilian´s labor market between the thirties and the nineties is reviewed, focusing on the following aspects: state intervention for the purpose of regulation of workplace relations, evolution of remuneratory patterns, impact of paid work force at the occupation´s overall and labor unions performance. It is analyzed the origin, dynamics and characteristics of informal work segment presence in the national productive structure. Then it is examined the labor conditions that emerge from the kind of small business and informal entrepreneurs this segment generates, which are not organized following the typical capitalistic way. A synthesis of the Maranhão´s economic history is then presented along with the current situation of labor market in Brazil and particularly of the northeastern state, through comparative analysis of figures on distribution of occupations among economic active population, formality labor level among paid work force and selfemployed workers, income levels and distribution of informal sector. The informality of employment relations presents three different contexts that need to be identified in order to reflect on efficiency and effectiveness of labor inspection work: the informal segment of productive structure, flexibilization and deregulation of the labor market´s regulatory framework and inefficiency and inadequacy of human natural resources as well as organizational conditions for the labor inspection activities development Regarding labor inspection as a policy, brief considerations will be taken on conditionalities of formulation and implementation of public policies in capitalists societies, determined by organic relation between state and capital. These conditionalities and the correlation of forces between workers and capitalists, regulated by the state, will generate a labor inspection that be or well or poorly organized, trained and equipped in order to fight informality on employment relations to ensure effectiveness of the employment protection norms. / Estudo sobre a atuação da Inspeção do Trabalho para a redução da informalidade nas relações de emprego no Brasil e, em especial, no Maranhão contemporâneo. Resgata-se parte da literatura especializada sobre a formação e estruturação do mercado de trabalho brasileiro, entre as décadas de 1930 a 1990, tendo como eixos analíticos: a intervenção do Estado na regulação do mercado de trabalho, a evolução do padrão remuneratório, a participação do trabalho assalariado no total das ocupações e a atuação dos sindicatos. Analisam-se a origem, a dinâmica e as características do segmento informal da estrutura produtiva, no qual se estabelecem pequenos negócios e produtores autônomos que não estão organizados em moldes tipicamente capitalistas e examinam-se as condições de trabalho prevalecentes. Apresenta-se uma síntese da trajetória recente da economia maranhense e da situação atual do mercado de trabalho no Brasil e no Maranhão, mediante a análise comparativa de indicadores sobre a distribuição ocupacional da população economicamente ativa, o grau de formalização dos assalariados e trabalhadores autônomos, os níveis de renda e a composição do segmento informal. A informalidade das relações de emprego apresenta três contextos originários, cuja identificação é necessária para a reflexão sobre a eficácia e efetividade da Inspeção do Trabalho para a sua redução: o segmento informal da estrutura produtiva, a flexibilização e desregulamentação do marco regulatório sobre o mercado de trabalho e a ineficiência e inadequação dos recursos materiais, humanos e das condições organizacionais para o desenvolvimento das ações de fiscalização. Considerando-se a Inspeção do Trabalho como uma política pública, tecem-se breves considerações sobre os condicionantes da formulação e implementação de políticas públicas nas sociedades capitalistas, determinados pela relação orgânica entre Estado e capital. No limite desses condicionantes, a correlação de forças entre trabalhadores e capitalistas, mediada pelo Estado, resulta em uma Inspeção do Trabalho mais ou menos organizada, capacitada e aparelhada para o enfrentamento da informalidade das relações de emprego e para a garantia da efetividade das normas de proteção do trabalho.