Despite the rich literature on theories of stock splits, studies have omitted public utility firms from their analysis and only analyzed split by industrial firms when examining managerial motives for splitting their stock. I examine the liquidity-marketability hypothesis, which states that stock splits enhance the attractiveness of shares to individual investors and increase trading volume by adjusting prices to an optimum trading range. Changes in the regulatory process, resulting from EPACT, have opened a window of opportunity for the study and comparison of the two traditional motives for splitting stock --signaling versus liquidity-marketability motives. Public electric utility firms provide a clean testing ground for these two non-mutually exclusive theories as liquidity/marketability hypothesis should dominate before the enactment of the EPACT since the conventional signaling theory of common stock splits should not apply given the low levels of information asymmetry in regulated utility companies. In the post-EPACT period, however, the signaling effect is expected to play a more dominant role. Based on both univariate and multivariate analyses, my results are consistent with the hypothesis posed. For the pre-EPACT period, liquidity motive seems to predominate in explaining the abnormal announcement return of utility stock splits. On the other hand, the results support the signaling motive as a leading explanation of abnormal returns in the post-EPACT period.

This dissertation consists of three essays on the role of asymmetric information in economics. The central theme is on how asymmetric information, which can arise either exogenously or endogenously, have important implications on welfare and market design. Chapter 1 is entitled Within-Household Selection in the Health Insurance Market. This chapter studies the existence of adverse selection in Vietnam's Social Health Insurance program and how household decision making affects individual enrollment into insurance. I find that while there is a strong evidence of adverse selection at the individual level, selection into insurance happens both \emph{across} and \emph{within} households. I then explore different household factors that affect the selection of health insurance within the household such as the household's ability to share risk and within-household bargaining power. These findings have important policy implications for two reasons. First, in the presence of household decision making, price discrimination policy to reduce adverse selection at the individual level such as age-based pricing might not always be welfare improving. Second, any policy that attempts to generate pooling beyond the level sustained by the private market can distort the household's incentive to buy health insurance and worsen adverse selection for the rest of the market. Chapter 2 is entitled Household Bundling to Reduce Adverse Selection: Application to Social Health Insurance. This chapter explores the use of bundling to reduce adverse selection in insurance markets and its application to social health insurance programs. When the choice to buy health insurance is made at the household level, bundling the insurance policies of household members eliminates the effect of adverse selection \emph{within} a household since the household can no longer select only sick members to enroll. However, this can exacerbate adverse selection \emph{across} households, as healthier households might choose to drop out of the insurance market. The net effect of this trade-off depends on the characteristics of the household demand for medical care and risk preferences. I explore this issue using individual survey data on insurance enrollment and medical spending in Vietnam that contain detailed information about the structure of the household. I develop and estimate a model of household insurance bundle choice and medical utilization that accounts for these features. The results suggest that much of the adverse selection is concentrated within the household. Counterfactual analysis reveals that under optimal pricing, household bundling yields significantly higher consumer surplus and insurance enrollment than individual purchase. Furthermore, the insurance market is less susceptible to complete unraveling under household bundling. Chapter 3 is entitled Information Control in the Hold-up Problem, and it is a joint work with Teck Yong Tan. In this chapter, we study the use of information control to mitigate hold-up risks. Our main result identifies a separation between information that creates ex-ante investment incentive and information that causes ex-post inefficiency, which then allows ex-post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex-ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the investment levels and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold-up risks.

The motivation of this thesis is the study of markets in which consumers are under-informed concerning the quality of any given product and in which the quality of consumers also matters to producers of products. This study has resulted in a primary application paper, comprising the first chapter which focuses on the market for training lawyers, as well as a second technical chapter exploring theory which can prove useful in analyzing these markets. The first chapter is based on the observation that the number of lawyers being produced at high cost combined with the relative lack of job options has recently created significant concern. In order to partially explain this phenomenon, I propose a game of incomplete information modeling the strategic interaction between law schools as they compete for potential students. The information asymmetries come from the fact that any given law school is better informed about the quality of its education than its potential students. Using a change in market information structure generated by student placement reporting requirements, I use the model to estimate the dynamic effect of increased information on distributions of tuition rates, incoming student ability, class sizes, and the rate at which law schools open and potentially close. Using these estimates, I show that there have not necessarily been too many law schools or students, but rather an equilibrium enforced mismatch between students and their optimal schooling choices. The new information has acted as a forced collusion mechanism to partially overcome this mismatch, which has differentially decreased school welfare, strictly increased student welfare, and resulted in a positive total welfare gain of $685 million. The second chapter provides a thorough exploration of the microeconomic foundations for the multi-variate linear demand function for differentiated products that is widely used in industrial organization. A key finding is that strict concavity of the quadratic utility function is critical for the demand system to be well defined. Otherwise, the true demand function may be quite complex: Multi-valued, non-linear and income-dependent. The solution of the first order conditions for the consumer problem, which we call a local demand function, may have quite pathological properties. We uncover failures of duality relationships between substitute products and complementary products, as well as the incompatibility between high levels of complementarity and concavity. The two-good case emerges as a special case with strong but non-robust properties. A key implication is that all conclusions derived via the use of linear demand that does not satisfy the law of Demand ought to be regarded with some suspicion.

This dissertation consists of three stand-alone but interrelated empirical studies investigating various aspects of the well-documented ??home bias anomaly?? in international investment. The findings help to understand the international investment allocation behaviour of mutual funds as well as their implications for asset pricing and mutual fund evaluation. The first study investigates the roles of various firm attributes that encapsulate the deadweight costs in determining firm level investment bias. The main findings suggest that firm characteristics related to transaction costs, corporate governance and information asymmetry create significant barriers for fund managers. In addition, foreign funds are more constrained than domestic funds by information asymmetry, even in developed and liberalized markets. Moreover, this study stylises the international investment allocation model in Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) with a quadratic cost function, which reveals the marginal influence of market level deadweight costs on the relationship between firm characteristics and investment bias. It is found that when market level cross-border barriers are exacerbated, as in the case of emerging and restricted financial markets, foreign fund managers become more sensitive to market level deadweight costs and ignore firm characteristics. In general, these findings imply that the market level ??home bias anomaly?? is an outcome of the complementary effects of investment barriers at both firm and market levels. The second study examines the role of firm level investment bias in predicting future stock returns. It is found that both firm level foreign and domestic biases contain valuable information with respect to firm prospects. However, domestic bias is more informative than foreign bias in terms of subsequent stock returns, partially because of information asymmetry. The third study explores the determinants of fund level investment bias and its ability to predict fund performance. It is found that fund portfolio attributes determine fund level investment biases after controlling for market and fund investment objective specific effects, and fund level investment bias is positively related to fund performance due to lower deadweight costs. Moreover, good macroeconomic environments foster the development of the mutual fund industry.

Prior relative studies document that the initial underpricing and long-term underperformance of IPOs are due to information asymmetry and investors¡¦ misevaluations. However, these studies rarely identify the source of information asymmetry. The purpose of this study is to identify the contribution of R&D to information asymmetry. We then discuss the influence of R&D on initial underpricing of IPOs, and examine whether the long-term underperformance exists in R&D-intensive companies or not. Based on a sample of 702 Taiwen IPOs issued during 1991-2003, this study identify the source of information asymmetry ¡X the R&D activities of issuers. Our findings indicate that these activities significantly affect both the initial underpricing of IPOs and their long-term performance. The results can be summarized as follows. (1) R&D is positively correlated with underpricing. (2) R&D is positively related to long-term performance.

This thesis studies information in financial markets from three perspectives: the role of information asymmetry in alleviating dividend payers’ seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement returns, the leading behavior of equity analysts who collect and process information, and the pricing of productivity-related information. More specifically, Chapter 1 studies whether the market reacts less negatively to dividend payers’ SEO announcements. Using US data from 1975 to 2002, I find that prior to SEO announcement dates, dividend payers have less information asymmetries than non-dividend payers. This difference was not large before the mid-1980s, but increased dramatically since then. This finding, together with the disappearing dividend puzzle documented in Fama and French (2001), suggests that a firm’s dividend status was not an important signal for SEOs prior to the mid-1980s, but became important since then. The market reacts less negatively to dividend payers’ SEO announcements since the mid-1980s. Chapter 2 studies equity analysts’ leading behavior in equity recommendations. I develop a measure of leading recommendations based on the observation that other recommendations move towards those of the leader. I find that analysts who are more likely to lead are past leaders, past All-American stars, analysts from large brokerage houses, and analysts with fewer recommendations. I find that the market reacts more strongly to recommendations of leaders and leaders are less likely to be terminated from their jobs. Chapter 3 examines the link between productivity and the cross-section of security returns. The CAPM and CCAPM have had problems finding empirical validations. In contrast, by creating factor mimicking portfolios with respect to productivity, I introduce a stock market factor that mimics the driving force behind the CCAPM. First, I find that the productivity factor affects the overall market return and that on average it contributes 0.75 to 2.41 percent annually, for the range of productivity factors I construct. Further, I show that productivity is priced even when the market excess return and factors based on size and book-to-market are included in standard asset pricing tests. However, the market excess return and the book-to-market factor still explain asset returns.

We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-ance affects a firms voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as measured by Gompers et al.s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms with moderate and strong corporate governance. <p> To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level.

This thesis studies information in financial markets from three perspectives: the role of information asymmetry in alleviating dividend payers’ seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement returns, the leading behavior of equity analysts who collect and process information, and the pricing of productivity-related information. More specifically, Chapter 1 studies whether the market reacts less negatively to dividend payers’ SEO announcements. Using US data from 1975 to 2002, I find that prior to SEO announcement dates, dividend payers have less information asymmetries than non-dividend payers. This difference was not large before the mid-1980s, but increased dramatically since then. This finding, together with the disappearing dividend puzzle documented in Fama and French (2001), suggests that a firm’s dividend status was not an important signal for SEOs prior to the mid-1980s, but became important since then. The market reacts less negatively to dividend payers’ SEO announcements since the mid-1980s. Chapter 2 studies equity analysts’ leading behavior in equity recommendations. I develop a measure of leading recommendations based on the observation that other recommendations move towards those of the leader. I find that analysts who are more likely to lead are past leaders, past All-American stars, analysts from large brokerage houses, and analysts with fewer recommendations. I find that the market reacts more strongly to recommendations of leaders and leaders are less likely to be terminated from their jobs. Chapter 3 examines the link between productivity and the cross-section of security returns. The CAPM and CCAPM have had problems finding empirical validations. In contrast, by creating factor mimicking portfolios with respect to productivity, I introduce a stock market factor that mimics the driving force behind the CCAPM. First, I find that the productivity factor affects the overall market return and that on average it contributes 0.75 to 2.41 percent annually, for the range of productivity factors I construct. Further, I show that productivity is priced even when the market excess return and factors based on size and book-to-market are included in standard asset pricing tests. However, the market excess return and the book-to-market factor still explain asset returns.

We examine whether corporate governance affects the level of information asymmetry in the capital market. We hypothesize that firms with stronger corporate gov-ernance would be more likely to voluntarily disclose corporate information using public rather than selective methods, and that this would be associated with lower levels of in-formation asymmetry. We carefully establish the path through which corporate govern-ance affects a firms voluntary disclosure method based on previous literature. Surpris-ingly, in full sample analysis we find that firms with stronger corporate governance (as measured by Gompers et al.s, 2003, G index) are associated with higher levels of infor-mation asymmetry (as measured by Easley et al.s, 1996, PIN). In subsample analysis, we find that, consistent with our hypothesis, for the most weakly governed firms, stronger corporate governance is associated with lower information asymmetry, and the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry is more pronounced than that of firms with moderate and strong corporate governance. <p> To further test our hypothesis, we consider the external effect of Regulation Fair Disclosure on the disclosure method to examine the corporate governance-information asymmetry relationship. Consistent with our hypothesis, our evidence suggests that by forbidding the practice of selective disclosure, the regulation significantly decreases the impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry level.

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