The issue of depositary receipt gets more attention in investors in recent year because of the explosion of Taiwan Depositary Receipt (hereafter, TDR) in Taiwan. The depositary receipts should equal to the value of primary listing stocks because they are represent the same value to a company. Therefore, we would discuss the price relationship between TDR and the primary listing stock it represents at first. In addition, because all the TDRs in Taiwan have the price spread (i.e. the price difference between TDRs and the primary listing stocks) with its original stocks, we discuss what the reasons to cause the price spread from a point of market segment. And we find it is because of liquidity, demand, information asymmetry, and stock price manipulation to lead to the price spread. After we takes market emotion into account, the market index has significant influence on price spread and individual investors also have a large influence on price spread. Finally, we try to find that whether the market has the arbitrage opportunity from the price spread after we consider the transaction cost. And the result shows that when TDR is in discount, it really has the arbitrage opportunity in market after we use the close price as the transaction price. Furthermore, if we use the open price in the next day as the transaction price, it still has excess return in market, but the profit will be lower than the strategy using the close price as the transaction price.

We use an information asymmetry index , which is based on measures of adverse selection developed by market microstructure literature rather than on ex-ante firm characteristics, to measure the level of information asymmetry . Then we want to test how the information asymmetry, the sole and principal determinant of the pecking order theory, basically affects capital structure decision. During the period 1995-2005, We find that information asymmetry does affect firm¡¦s debt issuance positively and significantly, especially when firms¡¦ size are large and when firm¡¦s financing needs are high. Furthermore, we find there are some other determinants have important influence on firms¡¦ financing decision. This result can explain why the literatures are always only partially successful in interpreting firms¡¦ financing decisions. It also suggests that if we test models under basic assumptions, we can find some support in any theory.

No description available.

no

none

<p>According to theory, trading volume decreases in information asymmetries, i.e. when there are differences in information. This is due to the fact that uninformed investors delay their trades when they are facing adverse selection. When the asymmetry is resolved there should be a corresponding increase in trading volume. Around earnings announcements (scheduled an-nouncements) this asymmetry is greater than normal, hence one can expect a decrease in trading volume. Around unexpected announcements such as acquisition announcement (unscheduled announcements) a total increase is instead expected because of an increase in trading by informed investors. All these effects are likely to be greater for smaller stocks.</p><p>The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the trading volume before- and after scheduled announcements and the trading volume before unscheduled announcements in order to investigate how informed- and uninformed investors behave in information asymmetries on Stockholmsbörsen.</p><p>The method is quantitative with secondary data from the Stockholm Stock exchange from 1998-2004. The method is the same as Chae (2005) uses with paired-samples t-tests. It tests whether the change in trading volume is different from a benchmark consisting of an average of the trading volume 30 days before the announcement.</p><p>We found a statistically significant decrease in trading volume in 6 of 10 days before a scheduled announcement and an increase also on 7 of 10 days after the announcement. For unscheduled announcements we found an increase before it was released but were not able to prove it statistically. We conclude that uninformed investors behave strategically before scheduled announcements in order to avoid adverse selection. We could not conclude that the effects are greater for smaller stocks.</p>

<p>Background: According to theory, trading volume decreases in information asymmetries, i.e. when there are differences in information. This is due to the fact that uninformed investors delay their trades when they are facing adverse selec-tion. When the asymmetry is resolved there should be a corresponding in-crease in trading volume. Around earnings announcements (scheduled an-nouncements) this asymmetry is greater than normal, hence one can expect a decrease in trading volume. Around unexpected announcements such as acquisition announcement (unscheduled announcements) a total increase is instead expected because of an increase in trading by informed investors. All these effects are likely to be greater for smaller stocks.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the trading volume before- and after scheduled announcements and the trading volume before unscheduled announcements in order to investigate how informed- and uninformed in-vestors behave in information asymmetries on Stockholmsbörsen.</p><p>Method: The method is quantitative with secondary data from the Stockholm Stock exchange from 1998-2004. The method is the same as Chae (2005) uses with paired-samples t-tests. It tests whether the change in trading volume is different from a benchmark consisting of an average of the trading volume 30 days before the announcement.</p><p>Conclusion: We found a statistically significant decrease in trading volume in 6 of 10 days before a scheduled announcement and an increase also on 7 of 10 days after the announcement. For unscheduled announcements we found an in-crease before it was released but were not able to prove it statistically. We conclude that uninformed investors behave strategically before scheduled announcements in order to avoid adverse selection. We could not conclude that the effects are greater for smaller stocks.</p>

The commitment required of a university or business school to gain international accreditation is significant, both in dollar terms and staff time. This thesis seeks to explain the motivations for business schools to seek accreditation with three major accrediting bodies, AACSB International, EFMD and AMBA, using a multiple-case study methodology underpinned by the frameworks of institutional isomorphism, bandwagon pressures and information asymmetry. Interviews were carried out with 17 business school deans; five deans of accredited schools in Europe, five deans of accredited schools in the United States of America and seven business school deans in New Zealand. All the New Zealand schools were either accredited, formally in the process of seeking accreditation or about to enter the application stage. The results provide supporting evidence for the notion that business schools are seeking accreditation in order to achieve legitimacy benefits rather than performance benefits, and that intangible benefits are seen as having more importance than the costs involved with achieving accreditation. It was also found that where the focus is at an international level, accreditation is found to be underpinned by information asymmetries whereby schools are seeking to gain legitimacy by providing signals to the market regarding their quality. At a regional or national level information regarding quality is more well known and, instead, isomorphic and bandwagon pressures become evident as the pathway towards legitimacy. This study will be of value to business school deans in understanding the forces they are being subjected to when considering the value of seeking international accreditation. The results provide an understanding of why, in the absence of a formal business case, a school may consider such a move, or may have entered the process without the hard data that identifies the costs and estimates the benefits in a measurable way. In this regard it will also be of value to all staff of business schools, and of the wider organisation, to understand the phenomenon that is accreditation.

Online equity crowdfunding is a way for entrepreneurs to raise capital that has exploded in popularity in recent years. Information asymmetry and poor investor protection are threats for the long-term legitimacy of equity crowdfunding. In this study we examine the quality of the financial information shared on the crowdfunding platforms, since it is what investors have to rely on when making investment decisions. We evaluate the financial information both quantitatively and qualitatively to assess the quality in terms of accuracy and adequacy. More specifically we examine the financial forecasts primarily with quantitative methods and valuation primarily with qualitative. In total, we examine 22 companies on the Swedish equity crowdfunding platform FundedByMe. The financial forecasts are compared with the outcome from the income statements to find out if they are systematically biased. The results show that the financial forecasts are systematically overestimated. Based on previous research we have suggested two explanations for the overestimations; either overconfidence bias and/or strategic behavior. We also find the information regarding assumptions and methods used in the valuation to be inadequate. We perceive that investors needs higher quality financial information in terms of accuracy and adequacy to make well-formed investment decisions. Our recommendations are therefore to regulate equity crowdfunding further and impose higher demands on information quality. Otherwise equity crowdfunding will possibly end up as a market of “lemons”.

abstract: This paper examines how equity analysts' roles as information intermediaries and monitors affect corporate liquidity policy and its associated value of cash, providing new evidence that analysts have a direct impact on corporate liquidity policy. Greater analyst coverage (1) reduces information asymmetry between a firm and outside shareholders and (2) enhances the monitoring process. Consistent with these arguments, analyst coverage increases the value of cash, thereby allowing firms to hold more cash. The cash-to-assets ratio increases by 5.2 percentage points when moving from the bottom analyst-coverage decile to the top decile. The marginal value of $1 of corporate cash holdings is $0.93 for the bottom analyst-coverage decile and $1.83 for the top decile. The positive effects remain robust after a battery of endogeneity checks. I also perform tests employing a unique dataset that consists of public and private firms, as well as a dataset that consists of public firms that have gone private. A public firm with analyst coverage can hold approximately 8% more cash than its private counterpart. These findings constitute new evidence on the real effect of analyst coverage. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Business Administration 2012