Thesis (Master's). / Naval Postgraduate School technical report Title from cover. "NPS-OR-99-002." "February 1999." Includes bibliographical references (p. 13).

Thesis (M.S.)--School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, 2008. / "June 2008." Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 56-59). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems and Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. / Title from title screen (viewed Jan. 31, 2006). "June 2005." Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-63). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Technology Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010. / Thesis Advisor(s): Buettner, Raymond ; Second Reader: Herrera, Michael. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 14, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Immersive Virtual Environment, IVE, Information Operations, IO, Influence, Virtual World, China, Information Warfare, Avatar, Transformed Social Interaction, TSI, Captology, Massively Multi-player Online Roll-Playing Game, MMORPG, Cyberspace, Cyber-Warfare. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-65). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2005. / "13 May 05." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-81).

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "17 May 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-71).

The master thesis analyses the perception of Information Warfare and Russia among German politicians. By using the Qualitative Content Analysis by Schreier, speeches given in the German Bundestag relating to Information Warfare, and Russia were analyzed from January 2015 until December 2018. Using International Relations (IR) theories and political psychological approaches, a theoretical framework was developed in order to determine factors which have an impact on the perception of politicians. The thesis divides this perception into three categories - friend, partner, and threat. Each category is analyzed in depth resulting in support for two of the four hypotheses. The thesis demonstrates that it is not only the political orientation, but also economic interests which determine if a state and its warfare tactics are perceived as a danger. Moreover, the deductive part of the analysis reveals that Russia's behavior which can be perceived as aggressive, irrational, and power-seeking, also determines whether the regime is perceived as threatening. Information Warfare per se is no issue of concern in the Bundestag. However, information warfare tactics such as disinformation campaigns, the spread of fake news and propaganda, and Russia's meddling in western politics are perceived as a danger to...

The increasing use of information warfare by authoritarian states to promote a multipolar order, coupled with a growing rapprochement between Russia and China, can lead to synergies that undermine international security. In response to the problem, this thesis aims to unpack and examine the Russia-China disinformation nexus to address the implications of the relationship on international security. To do so, the thesis employs a mixed-methods approach to analyze Russian and Chinese disinformation on Twitter following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, using the concepts of sharp power and policy transfer as a framework of analysis.  The results indicate that while joint aims to undermine US hegemony provides fertile grounds for synergetic effects, the aims and objective of each state is the driving factor behind overlapping disinformation. The primary process of convergence was China emulating some features of Russian disinformation, with some evidence suggesting that Russia and China engage in a reciprocal policy transfer of information warfare. The findings further indicate that China formats its disinformation to appear neutral in the Ukraine war, despite the declared no-limit partnership with Russia. These findings offer insights into the complex evolving ’no-limit’ partnership developing between Russia and China and are thus significant for policymakers to counter these states’ influence efforts.

On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, framed as a limited “special military operation”, rather than the largest invasion in Europe since World War II. Although Ukraine put up fierce resistance, the Kremlin doubled down on their “special military operation”, using the Russian information space to insulate their population from the realities of the catastrophic invasion. However, as the months passed, Ukrainian capabilities grew, and a new threat to the carefully cultivated image of the invasion as limited emerged: strikes on military bases on territory that had been held by Russia before February 24. This study looks at the Russian media space’s reaction to four drone attacks on Russian held territory through mainstream media. The study uses the method “Naming, Blaming, Claiming” with the aim of showing how Russian media identified the problem (naming), who was responsible (blaming), and what was done to mitigate the issue (claiming). It will be shown that the blame for these attacks shifted with time, from Ukraine to the West. Additionally, it provides insight into how the Russian information space, specifically news media, behaves during such events.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / SOF members must be fully capable (fluent and adept) at operating in, through and upon networks to maximize the leverage of information technologies. Military information operators must possess the components of network capital (access to technology, computer literacy, and social networking ability), a strong tendency to engage in trusting behavior, high cognitive ability and a formal education. Virtual communities offer a mosaic of social behaviors and practices that provide models for virtual organization(s) within the military. Computermediated communications technologies (CMCTs) provide an inherently neutral but polymorphic forum for human social interaction (cyberspace). Specific emergent social topology (real or virtual) depends on the local social needs of individuals and/or bounded groups (communities). Because differences in topology are emergent, topological models have little predictive value. Virtual communities are better understood and predicted through analysis of their metadata. Virtual communities can be characterized as open or clandestine, according to their purpose, accessibility, level of trust, and primary mode of connectedness (bonding or bridging ties). Both open and clandestine communities offer methods of ensuring high levels of efficiency, trust, and security within military computer-mediated communications networks, as well as providing models of organizational flexibility that can be adapted to SOF missions and roles. / Captain, United States Air Force