In the past few years, the study of critical infrastructures and the interdependencies amongst them in the context of an emergency situation has become a priority for many countries, including Canada. Governments, universities, and private companies all over the world are spending vast amounts of money and effort trying to better understand how infrastructures and humans react in the time stages before, during, and after a disruptive event. Analyzing complex systems such as those formed by infrastructure networks and decision makers is not a simple task and requires a multidisciplinary holistic approach. The field of research in infrastructure interdependencies is fairly new, and lies in the intersection of areas of knowledge such as emergency management, geography, simulation modeling, planning, and safety engineering. Analyzing interdependencies between infrastructure networks is not only a complex problem in terms of its formalization, but also in terms of the intricacy required to test and validate that formalization. Furthermore, identifying and having access to the data necessary to validate the formal system is probably an even more complicated issue to resolve. It is, however, only through the study of these interdependencies that certain failures or weaknesses in the systems can be discovered; weaknesses that could not be studied through the analysis of a single isolated system. Not only is it a challenging task to analyze the interconnections between infrastructure systems, but studying these at moments of stress, when the interdependencies become dynamic, is even more difficult. In this thesis I explore the intersection between three main themes: Critical infrastructure interdependencies, Emergency Management, and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Furthermore, I analyze the different types of interdependencies between infrastructure systems, I describe some of the challenges that have to be dealt with when modeling interdependencies, and I explore the possibility of modeling and visualizing some of these interdependencies by constructing an Infrastructure Geographical Information System of the UBC campus.

In the past few years, the study of critical infrastructures and the interdependencies amongst them in the context of an emergency situation has become a priority for many countries, including Canada. Governments, universities, and private companies all over the world are spending vast amounts of money and effort trying to better understand how infrastructures and humans react in the time stages before, during, and after a disruptive event. Analyzing complex systems such as those formed by infrastructure networks and decision makers is not a simple task and requires a multidisciplinary holistic approach. The field of research in infrastructure interdependencies is fairly new, and lies in the intersection of areas of knowledge such as emergency management, geography, simulation modeling, planning, and safety engineering. Analyzing interdependencies between infrastructure networks is not only a complex problem in terms of its formalization, but also in terms of the intricacy required to test and validate that formalization. Furthermore, identifying and having access to the data necessary to validate the formal system is probably an even more complicated issue to resolve. It is, however, only through the study of these interdependencies that certain failures or weaknesses in the systems can be discovered; weaknesses that could not be studied through the analysis of a single isolated system. Not only is it a challenging task to analyze the interconnections between infrastructure systems, but studying these at moments of stress, when the interdependencies become dynamic, is even more difficult. In this thesis I explore the intersection between three main themes: Critical infrastructure interdependencies, Emergency Management, and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Furthermore, I analyze the different types of interdependencies between infrastructure systems, I describe some of the challenges that have to be dealt with when modeling interdependencies, and I explore the possibility of modeling and visualizing some of these interdependencies by constructing an Infrastructure Geographical Information System of the UBC campus.

In the past few years, the study of critical infrastructures and the interdependencies amongst them in the context of an emergency situation has become a priority for many countries, including Canada. Governments, universities, and private companies all over the world are spending vast amounts of money and effort trying to better understand how infrastructures and humans react in the time stages before, during, and after a disruptive event. Analyzing complex systems such as those formed by infrastructure networks and decision makers is not a simple task and requires a multidisciplinary holistic approach. The field of research in infrastructure interdependencies is fairly new, and lies in the intersection of areas of knowledge such as emergency management, geography, simulation modeling, planning, and safety engineering. Analyzing interdependencies between infrastructure networks is not only a complex problem in terms of its formalization, but also in terms of the intricacy required to test and validate that formalization. Furthermore, identifying and having access to the data necessary to validate the formal system is probably an even more complicated issue to resolve. It is, however, only through the study of these interdependencies that certain failures or weaknesses in the systems can be discovered; weaknesses that could not be studied through the analysis of a single isolated system. Not only is it a challenging task to analyze the interconnections between infrastructure systems, but studying these at moments of stress, when the interdependencies become dynamic, is even more difficult. In this thesis I explore the intersection between three main themes: Critical infrastructure interdependencies, Emergency Management, and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). Furthermore, I analyze the different types of interdependencies between infrastructure systems, I describe some of the challenges that have to be dealt with when modeling interdependencies, and I explore the possibility of modeling and visualizing some of these interdependencies by constructing an Infrastructure Geographical Information System of the UBC campus. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

The smooth and reliable operation of key infrastructure components like water distribution systems, electric power systems, and telecommunications is essential for a nation?s economic growth and overall security. Tragic events such as the Northridge earthquake and Hurricane Katrina have shown us how the occurrence of a disaster can cripple one or more such critical infrastructure components and cause widespread damage and destruction. Technological advancements made over the last few decades have resulted in these infrastructure components becoming highly complicated and inter-dependent on each other. The development of tools which can aid in understanding this complex interaction amongst the infrastructure components is thus of paramount importance for being able to manage critical resources and carry out post-emergency recovery missions. The research work conducted as a part of this thesis aims at studying the effects of fire (a calamitous event) on the electrical distribution network of a city. The study has been carried out on a test bed comprising of a virtual city named Micropolis which was modeled using a Geographic Information System (GIS) based software package. This report describes the designing of a separate electrical test bed using Simulink, based on the GIS layout of the power distribution network of Micropolis. It also proposes a method of quantifying the damage caused by fire to the electrical network by means of a parameter called the Load Loss Damage Index (LLDI). Finally, it presents an innovative graph theoretic approach for determining how to route power across faulted sections of the electrical network using a given set of Normally Open switches. The power is routed along a path of minimum impedance. The proposed methodologies are then tested by running numerous simulations on the Micropolis test bed, corresponding to different fire spread scenarios. The LLDI values generated from these simulation runs are then analyzed in order to determine the most damaging scenarios and to identify infrastructure components of the city which are most crucial in containing the damage caused by fire to the electrical network. The conclusions thereby drawn can give useful insights to emergency response personnel when they deal with real-life disasters.

The interdependencies that exist within and between infrastructures can cause unexpected system properties to emerge when their components fail due to large disruptions. As witnessed following emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina, the complexities of these interdependencies make it very difficult to effectively recover infrastructure because of the challenges they create in prioritizing the most critical components for repair. The Joint Infrastructure Interdependencies Research Program was initiated by Public Safety Canada (PSC) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) in 2005 to research methods for remedying this problem. As a part of this research, the University of British Columbia (UBC) is developing an infrastructure interdependency simulator, named I2Sim, to simulate disasters and develop strategies for dealing with emergencies. Part of this development is to construct a model of the UBC electrical distribution system and interface it with I2Sim. In this research, a general methodology for such a model is presented, which employs an off-the-shelf powerflow modeling tool. In addition, a model of the UBC information technology infrastructure is developed to provide a second infrastructure model to demonstrate the electrical model's usefulness in multi-infrastructure disaster recovery simulations. Simulations with these models have shown that the recovery of this two-infrastructure system can be carried out more effectively following an earthquake if both infrastructures are considered together in the repair approach, rather than individually. This difference was on the order of thirty percent. To extend this research from electrical distribution systems to electrical bulk systems, an interdependency model of the British Columbia Transmission Corporation bulk power network and its communications system was also developed, along with a post-blackout restoration procedure. Using these, simulations of a post-blackout recovery were carried out to study the level of risk that communications outages may pose to the electrical network's recovery. These simulations revealed a correlation between restoration time and the number of communication points lost. This research also demonstrates there is value in combining the results of such simulations with risk evaluation tools. Together these results provided a clearer indication of where vulnerabilities exist.

The interdependencies that exist within and between infrastructures can cause unexpected system properties to emerge when their components fail due to large disruptions. As witnessed following emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina, the complexities of these interdependencies make it very difficult to effectively recover infrastructure because of the challenges they create in prioritizing the most critical components for repair. The Joint Infrastructure Interdependencies Research Program was initiated by Public Safety Canada (PSC) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) in 2005 to research methods for remedying this problem. As a part of this research, the University of British Columbia (UBC) is developing an infrastructure interdependency simulator, named I2Sim, to simulate disasters and develop strategies for dealing with emergencies. Part of this development is to construct a model of the UBC electrical distribution system and interface it with I2Sim. In this research, a general methodology for such a model is presented, which employs an off-the-shelf powerflow modeling tool. In addition, a model of the UBC information technology infrastructure is developed to provide a second infrastructure model to demonstrate the electrical model's usefulness in multi-infrastructure disaster recovery simulations. Simulations with these models have shown that the recovery of this two-infrastructure system can be carried out more effectively following an earthquake if both infrastructures are considered together in the repair approach, rather than individually. This difference was on the order of thirty percent. To extend this research from electrical distribution systems to electrical bulk systems, an interdependency model of the British Columbia Transmission Corporation bulk power network and its communications system was also developed, along with a post-blackout restoration procedure. Using these, simulations of a post-blackout recovery were carried out to study the level of risk that communications outages may pose to the electrical network's recovery. These simulations revealed a correlation between restoration time and the number of communication points lost. This research also demonstrates there is value in combining the results of such simulations with risk evaluation tools. Together these results provided a clearer indication of where vulnerabilities exist.

The interdependencies that exist within and between infrastructures can cause unexpected system properties to emerge when their components fail due to large disruptions. As witnessed following emergencies such as Hurricane Katrina, the complexities of these interdependencies make it very difficult to effectively recover infrastructure because of the challenges they create in prioritizing the most critical components for repair. The Joint Infrastructure Interdependencies Research Program was initiated by Public Safety Canada (PSC) and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) in 2005 to research methods for remedying this problem. As a part of this research, the University of British Columbia (UBC) is developing an infrastructure interdependency simulator, named I2Sim, to simulate disasters and develop strategies for dealing with emergencies. Part of this development is to construct a model of the UBC electrical distribution system and interface it with I2Sim. In this research, a general methodology for such a model is presented, which employs an off-the-shelf powerflow modeling tool. In addition, a model of the UBC information technology infrastructure is developed to provide a second infrastructure model to demonstrate the electrical model's usefulness in multi-infrastructure disaster recovery simulations. Simulations with these models have shown that the recovery of this two-infrastructure system can be carried out more effectively following an earthquake if both infrastructures are considered together in the repair approach, rather than individually. This difference was on the order of thirty percent. To extend this research from electrical distribution systems to electrical bulk systems, an interdependency model of the British Columbia Transmission Corporation bulk power network and its communications system was also developed, along with a post-blackout restoration procedure. Using these, simulations of a post-blackout recovery were carried out to study the level of risk that communications outages may pose to the electrical network's recovery. These simulations revealed a correlation between restoration time and the number of communication points lost. This research also demonstrates there is value in combining the results of such simulations with risk evaluation tools. Together these results provided a clearer indication of where vulnerabilities exist. / Applied Science, Faculty of / Electrical and Computer Engineering, Department of / Graduate

abstract: This dissertation advances the capability of water infrastructure utilities to anticipate and adapt to vulnerabilities in their systems from temperature increase and interdependencies with other infrastructure systems. Impact assessment models of increased heat and interdependencies were developed which incorporate probability, spatial, temporal, and operational information. Key findings from the models are that with increased heat the increased likelihood of water quality non-compliances is particularly concerning, the anticipated increases in different hardware components generate different levels of concern starting with iron pipes, then pumps, and then PVC pipes, the effects of temperature increase on hardware components and on service losses are non-linear due to spatial criticality of components, and that modeling spatial and operational complexity helps to identify potential pathways of failure propagation between infrastructure systems. Exploring different parameters of the models allowed for comparison of institutional strategies. Key findings are that either preventative maintenance or repair strategies can completely offset additional outages from increased temperatures though-- improved repair times reduce overall duration of outages more than preventative maintenance, and that coordinated strategies across utilities could be effective for mitigating vulnerability. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Civil, Environmental and Sustainable Engineering 2019