This paper examines the impact of a new Central Bank mandate on agricultural competitiveness and on the ability of the agricultural sector to articulate its policy interests within Argentina’s policymaking process. Reforms to Argentina’s Central Bank charter, passed into law in April 2012, loosened restrictions on Central Bank lending to Argentina’s Treasury and authorized the Central Bank to act to reduce unemployment and spur economic development. The Central Bank carries out its new mandate within a policymaking process characterized by strong presidential authority, weak political institutions, powerful provincial governments, and a budget system that politicizes the transfer of fiscal resources from the federal government to the provinces. Within these policymaking dynamics, this paper analyzes the actions of the Mesa de Enlace, an interest group coalition comprised of Argentina’s four largest agricultural producer associations, and its response to changes in Central Bank governance. My argument is twofold. First, I argue that the new mandate in the long run will exert inflationary pressure on Argentina’s real exchange rate, a key determinant of competitiveness for primary commodity exports, particularly soy. Public statements made by various representatives of the Mesa de Enlace indicate strong opposition to the nominal overvaluation (atraso cambiario) of the peso. Second, I argue that the new mandate politicizes an already-politicized Central Bank. Given the agricultural sector’s waning influence in institutionalized policymaking channels, executive intrusion in Central Bank operations is economically harmful. Such government interference serves to diminish agricultural considerations in monetary policymaking and to encourage the Mesa de Enlace’s exploitation of informal channels for interest articulation, creating disincentives for robust investment and causing undesired work stoppages, hoarding, and social protest. / text

This diploma thesis aims to provide an overview of strategies that are implemented by municipalities in the Central Bohemian region to articulate their interests. As a part of this work, a theoretical framework of interest articulation is covered, including models of direct form, indirect form and semi-direct form of interest articulation. Subject of the research is a sample of 14 municipalities in the Central Bohemian region. The results are based on semi- strucutred interveiws and provide with an overview of specific purposes and respective strategies of the municipalities according to a selected model (direct, indirect and semi-direct) of interest articulation.

中共對台工作組織研究是兩岸關係研究課題的核心，值得就此議題，投注心力予以關注。本論文旨在針對中共對台工作運作過程，透過理論的闡述和案例的實證，試圖掌握中共決策行為發生的規律、決策規則的選擇，以及政策的實施等過程，進一步找出影響中共對台決策績效的真實原因，為我國與中共交手尋求對策。因此，本論文以政府過程為研究途徑，關注下列問題：中共對台決策權由哪些組織及何人控制？哪些組織或人得以參與對台決策過程？有哪些因素、哪些人影響中共對台決策過程？台灣民眾的利益是如何輸入中共的決策中樞？對台政策如何制定？政策制定的法定程序如何？有哪些實際過程？制定出來的政策如何執行？哪些組織或人控制著對台政策的執行過程？對台政策能否得到有效的執行？影響政策執行的因素為何？政策制定與執行如何互動？ 政府過程（process of government）是對政府活動的行為、運轉、程序，和構成要素如政治利益團體之間，以及它們與政府之間的交互關係，進行實證性的分析、研究和闡述。政府過程研究，強調用一種動態的方法，對政府體系與制度進行觀察、分析。政府過程的核心功能是政府決策和決策實施。過程是指政治要求與支持的輸入，轉化成權威性政策輸出的過程，包括利益表達（interest articulation）、利益綜合（interest aggregation）、政策制定（policy making）、政策執行（policy implementation）等，其中政策制定或政策執行是政治過程的關鍵性階段。本文假設中共的對台政策的制定依據，都來自於聽到、看到、想到：聽到台灣領導人、朝野政黨、社會意見領袖、學者專家、大眾傳媒怎麼說，看到台灣平面媒體怎麼寫，民意調查怎麼反應，以及政治、經濟、社會如何變化，中共決策制定者進而思索如何據此制定適當的對台政策。因此，本論文以為中共對台工作的政府過程，始自訊息的蒐集、綜合研析。 本論文探討的中共政府，有四個層次：一是狹義的政府，這是指中央政府的國務院及各級地方人民政府；二是廣義的政府，除了國務院及各級地方人民政府，還包括全國人民代表大會及各級地方人民代表大會；三是更廣義的政府，也就是除了第二類，尚包括中國共產黨各級組織、軍隊組織，以及中國人民政治協商會議各級組織等；四是包含上述之外，同時涵蓋民主黨派、人民團體，甚至企業、社團等，也就是所謂的政府體系。就宏觀面來看，本論文其實就是在探討中共政府體系的對台工作。 中共對台工作機制的建立，與其對台認知有關，當認知改變，對台政策隨即跟著改變，對台工作的方法，以及組織和人員也接著改變。因此，中共慣稱，政治路線決定組織路線，組織路線又決定幹部路線。政治路線是總方針、總政策，政策決定後，就須從其本質和需求，考慮何種組織體系以達成目標。同時，就政府過程探討中共對台組織結構，並不只是從規範層面就結構談結構，而是從實務運作上可以觀察到的功能進行分析，也就是以哪些政治結構實際上介入政府過程為標準。基本上，中共對台工作已經形成一個龐大的網絡，是以台辦系統為主幹，再佐以黨、政、軍、群等其他相關部門，構成網絡關係結構。綜合而言，中共對台工作機制，是中共為進行國家統一過程而設置的一種制度安排，並具有下列特點：一、黨的領導；二、黨政共治模式；三、軍隊角色特別突出；四、領導與協調小組普遍設置；五、社群參與政府過程運作；六、多元、多層次的複雜工作體系。 關鍵字：中共對台工作、政府過程、利益表達、利益綜合、政策制定、政策執行 / The research over Leading Group of Taiwan Affairs has been an important issue in the study of Cross-Strait Relations. This thesis attempts to find out the pattern of China’s policy over Taiwan Affairs through the process of decision making within Leading Group. At least seven research questions can be listed in this thesis. 1) Who and which group control policy over Taiwan Affair in China? 2) Who is involved in the process of decision making? 3) Which element can influence the change of policy? 4) How does China consider the interest of Taiwan’s people? 5) How to implement Taiwan’s Policy in reality? 6) Who has power over the implementation of Taiwan’s Policy? Finally, 7) how does the interaction between policy implementation and policy making in China? The research over process of government can be considered as the behavior, performance, procedure and formation of government, as well as the interaction and empirical analysis of political interest groups and government. It is a dynamic process over the investigation of governmental system. Process is defined as the input of political request and demand, as well as the output of authoritative policy, including interest articulation, interest aggregation, policy making, and policy implementation. The last two elements, especially, are the essence of policy process. By assuming China’s policy on Taiwan is formed by hearing, listening and deliberating of Taiwan: hearing the voices of Taiwan’s leaders, scholar, media; listening to the poll of Taiwanese people; and deliberating the evolutions on Taiwan’s political, economic and social changes; China’s decisions making in terms of Taiwan Affairs can be molded. This thesis will focus on the Chinese governmental process on Taiwan Affairs and discuss four levels of central governments in terms of decision making over this issue. The first and most narrow-defined level of central government refers to the State Council and its national branches. The second and less narrow-defined of central government refers to the first level governmental organs plus the National People’s Congress and its national branches. The third level of government is defined as the first and second levels of governmental organ plus the Chinese Communist Party, military organization and National Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference. Whereas the fourth and widest-defined central government includes above organizations plus all kind of governmental bodies. From this aspect, this thesis aims to discuss Taiwan Affairs from all sorts of governmental bodies. The establishment of Policy on Taiwan Affairs is based on China’s perception on Taiwan issue. The change of perception will shift the direction of policy, which will also affect China’ attitude and arrangement of personnel. Therefore, China government used to argue—it is political direction determines organization direction, and it is organization direction decides cadre direction. Political direction is the mainstream of all kinds of principles and policies. When political direction is decided, organization direction should be adjusted in order to achieve political direction. In the meantime, the discussion over the process of government in terms of Taiwan Affairs should not be focused on the‘norm,’rather; it is the empirical analysis that matter. Basically, China’s affair on Taiwan Issue has formulated an enormous governmental network, which constitutes by the Chinese communist party, politic, military and many governmental divisions. All in all, six characteristics of Taiwan Affairs can be found in this thesis: 1) the dominate of the ruling party; 2) a model of join-governance; 3) the emphasis of the role on military; 4) a wide establishment of coordination committee; 5) various participations within governmental process; and 6) multi-variate and multi-levels working system. Key words: Taiwan affairs, Process of government, Interest articulation, Interest aggregation, Policy making, Policy implementation