Prompted by international ramifications of Jewish migration from Nazi Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt called a world conference on refugees in March 1938. The conference, held at Evian, France, in July, established the Intergovernmental Committee on Political Refugees. The committee, led by American diplomats, sought relaxation of Germany's discriminatory practices against Jews and tried, without success, to resettle German Jews abroad. World War II ended the committee's efforts to achieve systematic immigration from Germany. The American, British, and German diplomatic papers contain the most thorough chronicle of American involvement in the refugee crisis. Memoirs and presidential public papers provide insight into Roosevelt's motivations for calling the conference. Although efforts to rescue German Jews failed, the refugee crisis introduced Americans to intervention in Europe.

The purpose of this dissertation was to compare and contrast the origins, formulation, course, and outcome of three major American immigration schemes to provide haven for German Jewish and non-Aryan refugees and British children: The Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees (better known as the Evian Conference), and particularly the German Refugee Children’s Bill (also labeled as the Wagner-Rogers Bill) and the Hennings Bill. The Evian Conference, called for by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the aftermath of the Anschluss, the German annexation of Austria, sought to create a global solution to the problem of forced migration. The Wagner-Rogers Bill, influenced by the November 1938 nationwide pogrom of Kristallnacht and the British Kindertransport, a project to resettle Jewish and Christian children from the Reich into the United Kingdom, attempted, by legislative means, to allow the entry of ten thousand children outside of the annual German and Austrian quotas in 1939 and 1940. The Henning Bill endeavored to rescue British children from the perils of aerial warfare in 1940. This measure necessitated the amendment of the Neutrality Act of 1939, which prohibited American shipping from entering war zones. It has been argued that the Evian Conference was, at its core, a publicity ploy, designed to express sympathy for persecuted German minorities, while avoiding any political cost or acceptance of impoverished refugees. The Wagner-Rogers Bill failed as a result of the interplay of multiple factors that included: lack of presidential backing; the economic throes of the Great Depression; fear of aliens; anti-Semitism; growing isolationism and resistance to continued immigration, and a disunited and fractious Jewish community that sought to avoid stimulation of domestic prejudice and more restrictive immigration policies. A key component was a critical misreading of the bill’s sponsors of public compassion for Hitler’s victims; sentiments that did not translate into a willingness to accept Jewish refugees. The Henning Bill, which FDR endorsed with strict qualifications, demonstrated preferences for particular ethnic groups; specifically, British Christian children. In contrast with the Wagner-Rogers Bill, this legislation rapidly made its way through Congress and into law. Its failure lay in the inability to acquire guarantees of safe passage through contested waters by the warring powers. A general review followed by a more detailed examination was made of existing official and un-official sources, employing public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, journals, and other periodicals for the critical period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1940. Various historiographical appraisals have been made of the actions of Roosevelt, his administration, Congress, the Jewish community, and general public, and these opinions have generated markedly divergent opinions. Some have alleged that FDR and his administration, particularly the Department of State, abandoned the Jews to their fate while others assert that, in the context of the time, he did everything that was potentially achievable. Debate has also been waged over wide-ranging accusations of inaction, apathy, prejudice, and complicity involving official sources, the general public, and American Jewry. I argue that any assessment of responsibility for failure to attempt rescue can be laid at the feet of many actors in this existential drama of life and death.

ABSTRACT The purpose of this thesis was to explore the origins, formulation, course and outcome of the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees meeting (better known as the Evian Conference) of July 1938. Special emphasis was placed on contemporary and later historical assessments of this assembly which represented the first international cooperative attempt to solve an acute refugee crisis. A general review followed by a more detailed evaluation was made of existing official and un-official accounts of the meeting utilizing both public records, private diaries, books, newspapers, journals and other periodicals for the period of January 1, 1938 through December 31, 1939. This data was supplemented by later recollections of conference participants as well as post-Holocaust historical scholarship. Various appraisals have been made of the motivations behind the summit and its ultimate success or failure. Franklin Roosevelt has particularly come under criticism by scholars who believed that his Administration had "abandoned" the Jews to their fate. The President's supporters, on the other hand, declared that FDR did everything possible given the existing political, economic and social conditions of the late 1930's. It is my conclusion that although Roosevelt may have been sympathetic to the plight of Central European Jewish refugees their resettlement and ultimate destiny merited a lower priority given his focus upon rebuilding the national economy and defense. The President clearly recognized the looming threat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan but was unwilling to expend political capital on an issue that faced domestic and political opposition. I further maintain that the conference was set up to fail while providing propaganda value for the participating democracies. The hypocritical rhetoric and actions of the delegates and the ineffectiveness of the conference's sole creation, the Intergovernmental Committee for Political Refugees, was clearly recognized by Nazi Germany and ultimately influenced its anti-Jewish policies. Thus, it is not a coincidence that the pogrom of November 1938, Kristallnacht, occurred only four months later. The avoidance of dealing with the Jewish refugee problem was further highlighted in the futile Wagner-Rogers Bill of 1939, the Hennings bill of 1940 and especially the Bermuda Conference of 1943, a time in which the details of mass murder of Jews and other groups was already well known within official circles. Further work needs to be done on the diverse responses of the Jewish community both within the United States and abroad to the peril facing their co-religionists.