Decentralisation, meaning the delegation of responsibilities from central to lower government levels is generally assumed to improve the delivery of local public services. The theoretical assumption is that local authorities are encouraged by decentralisation to behave in a more accountable and entrepreneurial fashion. At the same time, accountability and (public) entrepreneurship are distinct concepts and may even be considered to involve conflicting behaviours. Therefore, decentralisation outcomes may vary depending on which behavioural pattern predominates. Previous research has focused on using large data sets to examine the impact of decentralisation on outcomes such as economic growth, disparities, poverty reduction and government performance. But there is also a need to better understand how decentralisation, and specifically fiscal decentralisation, may promote accountability and public entrepreneurship in specific settings. To contribute to closing this gap, this dissertation examines both fiscal decentralisation policies and contemporaneous changes in political arrangements. It identifies the incentives these changes create for Mexican local authorities to behave in more accountable and entrepreneurial ways and which may lead to differences in government performance. The study focuses on rural municipalities where achieving the predicted decentralisation outcomes is highly challenging. A mixed methods research design was used with two phases. In the first stage, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and changes in government accountability and entrepreneurship was investigated through statistical analysis based on fixed effects estimation using a sample of 505 rural municipalities. For that purpose a longitudinal dataset was developed, comprising municipal level information between the years 1990 and 2009, including indices for accountability and public entrepreneurship. Phase two involves multiple case studies of individual municipalities that were selected based on performance. The empirical evidence suggests that decentralisation policy has tended to work against accountability but has increased entrepreneurial behaviour in rural municipalities, highlighting the potential tension between the two. The extent to which these effects occur seems to depend on the particular fiscal arrangement. In addition, political competition seems to reinforce accountability and has an impact in entrepreneurship in a different way to the effects expected theoretically, though the effects are not as strong as with fiscal decentralisation. This study advances the public entrepreneurship literature and expands the understanding of fiscal decentralisation. Additionally, it provides suggestions for which policy arrangements are likely to promote accountability and entrepreneurial actions by public authorities.

A concepção tradicional de federação remete à possibilidade de uma melhor organização do Estado, proporcionando-lhe maior desempenho na execução da atividade financeira para satisfazer as necessidades públicas em níveis mais eficientes. As estruturas federativas existentes no mundo, porém, apresentam diferenças entre si e vários são os elementos que contribuem para essa ocorrência, motivo pelo qual não se pode conceber um modelo único de federação, imune a deficiências e problemas. Um Estado federado, dependendo do padrão de federação que adote (mais descentralizado ou menos descentralizado, por exemplo), pode não ser capaz de solucionar questões de vital interesse à sociedade. Na presente tese de doutorado, o autor analisa as características da federação brasileira e procura perscrutar se existe relação entre a estrutura do federalismo fiscal adotada no Brasil e a ocorrência de desvios de recursos públicos, dentre os quais os deflagrados por atos de corrupção. A preocupação contida no estudo não é apenas a de investigar essa relação, mas a de avaliar suas possíveis causas, analisando de forma criteriosa os níveis de descentralização presentes na federação e o grau de autonomia dos entes federados. No primeiro capítulo são discutidos o conceito, características e classificação dos Estados federais, a importância da federação para a atividade financeira estatal, os princípios do federalismo fiscal e as funções fiscais alocativa, distributiva e estabilizadora. A investigação sobre a possibilidade da existência de vínculo entre o desvio de recursos e o tipo de estrutura do federalismo fiscal é objeto de análise no segundo capítulo, no qual também serão expostas definições e características de condutas que tendem a provocar o mencionado transviamento, tais como o rent-seeking (comportamento caçador de renda), o patrimonialismo, o clientelismo, o coronelismo e a corrupção. O terceiro capítulo cuida da análise do arcabouço do federalismo fiscal brasileiro e procura examinar se os níveis de descentralização presentes no país são adequados para uma perfeita relação entre os entes subnacionais e o governo central, bem como se essa estrutura impede ou estimula as ocorrências de desvios de recursos públicos. No quarto capítulo, as hipóteses contidas nos capítulos anteriores são demonstradas por meio da análise do processo orçamentário federal (mais especificamente em relação às consequências advindas da elaboração da lei orçamentária anual) e das transferências intergovernamentais no Brasil. / The traditional conception of a federation leads us to the possibility of a better organized Government, capable of satisfactorily performing the financial activity in order to meet the public needs at more efficient levels. However, the federative structures existing worldwide today are quite different from each other and various are the elements contributing to such occurrence and this is why we cannot conceive one single federation model unaffected by deficiencies and problems. A federate Union, depending on the federation model adopted thereby (either a more or less decentralized one, for instance), may be unable to solve issues of vital interest to the society as a whole. In this dissertation, the author analyzes the characteristics of the Brazilian federation and seeks to scrutinize whether there is a relation between the fiscal federalism structure adopted in Brazil and the occurrence of deviation of public funds, including those triggered by corruption acts. Rather than simply investigating such relation, this dissertation is concerned with evaluating the possible causes for deviation of public funds, minutely examining the levels of decentralization present in the federation and the degree of autonomy among the federated entities. In chapter one, the author discusses the concept, characteristics and classification of the federal states, the importance of the federation for the financial activity performed by the Government, the principles of fiscal federalism and the allocable, distributive and stabilizing fiscal functions. Whether there is a connection between the deviation of funds and the type of structure of fiscal federalism is investigated in chapter two, where definitions and characteristics of conducts prone to cause the mentioned deviation are expounded by the author, such as rent-seeking, patrimonialism, clientelism, coronelismo and corruption. In chapter three, the author analyzes the framework of Brazilian fiscal federalism and examines whether the levels of decentralization existing in Brazil are proper for a perfect relation between the subnational entities and the central Government, as well as whether such structure either impedes or otherwise fosters the occurrences of public fund deviation. Chapter three demonstrates the hypotheses contained in the previous chapters by means of an analysis of the federal budgetary process (more specifically in relation to the consequences derived from preparation of the annual budgetary law) and intergovernmental transfers in Brazil.

A concepção tradicional de federação remete à possibilidade de uma melhor organização do Estado, proporcionando-lhe maior desempenho na execução da atividade financeira para satisfazer as necessidades públicas em níveis mais eficientes. As estruturas federativas existentes no mundo, porém, apresentam diferenças entre si e vários são os elementos que contribuem para essa ocorrência, motivo pelo qual não se pode conceber um modelo único de federação, imune a deficiências e problemas. Um Estado federado, dependendo do padrão de federação que adote (mais descentralizado ou menos descentralizado, por exemplo), pode não ser capaz de solucionar questões de vital interesse à sociedade. Na presente tese de doutorado, o autor analisa as características da federação brasileira e procura perscrutar se existe relação entre a estrutura do federalismo fiscal adotada no Brasil e a ocorrência de desvios de recursos públicos, dentre os quais os deflagrados por atos de corrupção. A preocupação contida no estudo não é apenas a de investigar essa relação, mas a de avaliar suas possíveis causas, analisando de forma criteriosa os níveis de descentralização presentes na federação e o grau de autonomia dos entes federados. No primeiro capítulo são discutidos o conceito, características e classificação dos Estados federais, a importância da federação para a atividade financeira estatal, os princípios do federalismo fiscal e as funções fiscais alocativa, distributiva e estabilizadora. A investigação sobre a possibilidade da existência de vínculo entre o desvio de recursos e o tipo de estrutura do federalismo fiscal é objeto de análise no segundo capítulo, no qual também serão expostas definições e características de condutas que tendem a provocar o mencionado transviamento, tais como o rent-seeking (comportamento caçador de renda), o patrimonialismo, o clientelismo, o coronelismo e a corrupção. O terceiro capítulo cuida da análise do arcabouço do federalismo fiscal brasileiro e procura examinar se os níveis de descentralização presentes no país são adequados para uma perfeita relação entre os entes subnacionais e o governo central, bem como se essa estrutura impede ou estimula as ocorrências de desvios de recursos públicos. No quarto capítulo, as hipóteses contidas nos capítulos anteriores são demonstradas por meio da análise do processo orçamentário federal (mais especificamente em relação às consequências advindas da elaboração da lei orçamentária anual) e das transferências intergovernamentais no Brasil. / The traditional conception of a federation leads us to the possibility of a better organized Government, capable of satisfactorily performing the financial activity in order to meet the public needs at more efficient levels. However, the federative structures existing worldwide today are quite different from each other and various are the elements contributing to such occurrence and this is why we cannot conceive one single federation model unaffected by deficiencies and problems. A federate Union, depending on the federation model adopted thereby (either a more or less decentralized one, for instance), may be unable to solve issues of vital interest to the society as a whole. In this dissertation, the author analyzes the characteristics of the Brazilian federation and seeks to scrutinize whether there is a relation between the fiscal federalism structure adopted in Brazil and the occurrence of deviation of public funds, including those triggered by corruption acts. Rather than simply investigating such relation, this dissertation is concerned with evaluating the possible causes for deviation of public funds, minutely examining the levels of decentralization present in the federation and the degree of autonomy among the federated entities. In chapter one, the author discusses the concept, characteristics and classification of the federal states, the importance of the federation for the financial activity performed by the Government, the principles of fiscal federalism and the allocable, distributive and stabilizing fiscal functions. Whether there is a connection between the deviation of funds and the type of structure of fiscal federalism is investigated in chapter two, where definitions and characteristics of conducts prone to cause the mentioned deviation are expounded by the author, such as rent-seeking, patrimonialism, clientelism, coronelismo and corruption. In chapter three, the author analyzes the framework of Brazilian fiscal federalism and examines whether the levels of decentralization existing in Brazil are proper for a perfect relation between the subnational entities and the central Government, as well as whether such structure either impedes or otherwise fosters the occurrences of public fund deviation. Chapter three demonstrates the hypotheses contained in the previous chapters by means of an analysis of the federal budgetary process (more specifically in relation to the consequences derived from preparation of the annual budgetary law) and intergovernmental transfers in Brazil.