Suicide attacks are a complex and vexing phenomena that are appearing with greater frequency in the international arena. Previous approaches to studying suicide attacks tend to examine them at one-level of analysis. While helpful, the insights produced are isolated from other crucial factors. This dissertation examines suicide attacks at three-levels of analysis as it investigates the organizational incentives, individual motivations and how the attacks achieve societal resonance. As such, the dissertation asks three primary research questions: why do organizations adopt suicide attacks, why are individuals motivated to become suicide attackers and how do the attacks attain resonance? The research questions are applied to four case studies selected along a conflict continuum where suicide attacks were used. The cases are (a) the Japanese use of Kamikazes during World War II, (b) the LTTEs use of suicide attacks during its irregular war against Sri Lanka, (c) Hamas use of suicide attacks as domestic terrorism against Israel, and (d) Al Qaedas use of suicide attacks as transnational terrorism. The dissertation argues that organizations use suicide attacks out of defensive necessity and for strategic purposes, individuals are motivated to become suicide attackers by a religo-nationalist liberation ideology that promises the attacker post-mortem incentives for his or her death, and that societal resonance is achieved when the organization draws on religious, cultural and nationalistic narratives that enable the population to accept the tactic.

This study investigates the underlying reasons for Turkish-Iranian security rapprochement during the Erdogan Administration, and attempts to discover whether the ongoing rapprochement indicates Turkeys realignment in the international system. It employs a rigorous qualitative analysis to explore the perceptions of the key decision makers throughout the intergovernmental partnership process with Iran on three major security policies: counterterrorism, nuclear proliferation and energy security. It counterposes the threat perceptions and major arguments of the pro-status quo and revisionist elites. The data has been collected through extensive elite/expert interviews and content analysis of the Turkish and international media. Findings of this research indicate that the Turkish and Iranian governments cooperate in counterterrorism policy because both are mainly concerned with the spillover effect of micronationalist independence movements in the post Iraq War security landscape. The Erdogan Administration supports the Iranian nuclear initiative mainly because the key political actors believe that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons and Iranian nuclear program poses no significant threat to Turkeys national security. In addition the Erdogan Administration forged an energy partnership with Iran not only to meet increasing domestic energy demands but also to promote Turkeys strategic interests through development of trans-regional pipeline networks. The investigations revealed that Turkeys growing security partnership with Iran does not indicate realignment from the West to the Muslim world. Turkeys rapprochement with Iran is driven by practical and rational calculations rather than Islamic identity or aspirations. Even though many key actors in the Justice and Development Party government comes from religious social networks, their statements indicate that the Erdogan Administration does not seek to align itself with the Muslim World at the expense of the existing pro-Western orientation. Instead, Turkeys rapprochement with Iran is an integral part of the Strategic Depth doctrine of Foreign Minister Davutoglu to expand Turkeys interrelations with the East in line with national interests. In so doing, the Erdogan Administration not only addresses the practical security interests but it also attempts to regain the strategic superiority in the Near East.

This paper examines the factors that influence the evaluation practices of American philanthropic foundations, using an institutional theory framework. To this end, it explores the literature, contributed by both the academic community and esteemed philanthropic practitioners, that informs understanding of organizational dynamics in general and evaluation practices in particular. From this literature emerged several propositions regarding the factors that influence evaluation practices. As part of this study, these propositions were explored through key informant interviews with representatives from eight foundations headquartered in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Through this approach, this paper contributes to the field by integrating the views of academic theorists, philanthropic thought leaders, and current practitioners. Relative to evaluation practices, the most striking findings were the importance of the grantee-funder relationship, the influence of grantees, and the impact of organizational lifecycle. These insights have several implications for policy-makers and point to opportunities for further research.

Why do belligerents intentionally kill legally protected civilians during armed conflict? Such acts not only violate the human security of people protected by the civilian immunity norm but may also be war crimes. The violation of this pillar of international humanitarian law (IHL), the body of law tasked with regulating armed conflict, has been the subject of significant research and policy deliberation. Many of the useful analyses produced by these efforts operate from common assumptions. One is that a monolithic understanding of the distinction principle, the obligation for belligerents to distinguish between permissible and impermissible targets and a core component of the civilian immunity norm, exists among those who monitor and disseminate IHL. Another assumption among scholars and practitioners concerned with deliberate civilian targeting is that a shared understanding of who is protected during armed conflict exists between those who monitor IHL and those who must abide by it. Through the analysis of interviews conducted with IHL experts and belligerents who fought in a variety of conflicts on the African continent, this study reveals that neither of these assumptions is warranted. It finds that not only is there a lack of consensus among belligerents as to whom they can permissibly target during armed conflict, but that there is still debate among IHL experts as to whom the law protects. Furthermore, this study finds that shared understandings of who is protected during armed conflict do not exist between experts and belligerents, so that belligerents claiming to abide by their particular interpretation of the distinction principle ostensibly target civilians deemed protected by IHL experts. Thus this study offers new avenues for understanding violations of the civilian immunity norm and possibly reducing their occurrence.

The thesis examines the Eisenhower administrations decisions to use space for intelligence and military purposes. The first two chapters cover historical developments spanning the period from 1945 to 1952 as well as the first two years of the Eisenhower presidency (1953-1954). The third chapter provides a detailed analysis of U.S. space policies from 1955 to 1961. In particular, Chapter III takes a close look at the U.S. military space program as well as the prospect for space arms control. Organized chronologically, the thesis draws on publicly available documents, including declassified documents deposited at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. By examining significant National Security Council (NSC) documents, including reports and meeting notes, the thesis presents an argument that since the very beginning, U.S. space policy included a provision for intelligence and military applications of satellites as a matter of national security. Throughout the Eisenhower presidency, the concept of peaceful use of outer space, which did not preclude satellites from having certain military applications, was never questioned at the NSC. The thesis concludes that space militarization could have hardly been avoided. While the Eisenhower administration initiated a space arms control debate in early 1957, the Soviet Union gradually tied the issue of space arms control to other military issues, including nuclear disarmament and the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, which turned out entirely unacceptable to the United States.

Why do states join military coalitions? After joining wartime coalitions, why do states contribute differently to support the coalitions? What influences the decision process and the burden-sharing outcome of coalition countries? This dissertation investigates these questions by reviewing the contributions of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan to the U.S.-led War in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2010. Conventional wisdom focuses on neo-realist and strategic culture theories to analyze a country's coalition behavior. The neo-realist theory of international relations suggests a systemic level explanation, and argues that the distribution of power in the international system determines the coalition behavior of states. Strategic culture theorists reject systemic level explanations, and argue that neo-realism cannot explain why states, under the same international system, behave differently. They embrace a domestic level analysis, which emphasizes national strategic decision makers, their belief systems, and the organizational culture of the military—in short a 'national style' of coalition behavior. This study demonstrates that both neo-realism and strategic culture fail to offer sufficient explanations for analyzing and predicting the coalition behavior of states. Taking a middle ground, it proposes a neo-classical realist model of coalition burden-sharing. It argues that international systemic incentives and constraints are channeled through domestic political and culture-induced processes to produce unique burden-sharing behaviors for states. My theoretical model examines the effect of three systemic variables - alliance dependence, balance of threat, and collective action; and three domestic level variables - domestic political regime, public opinion, and military capability - in explaining the politics of coalition burden-sharing. I test the model in the cases of Britain, Germany, and Pakistan. My research provides empirical support for the integrated burden-sharing model. It shows that among the coalition countries in Afghanistan, Britain pursued a policy of 'punching above the weight.' The British forces in Afghanistan's Helmand province were overstretched, with few troops and few resources. By contrast, the German forces in Kunduz had mostly pursued a risk-averse strategy. This was due to the imposition of national caveats or restricted rules of engagement, which constrained the ability of the German forces to participate in offensive military operations against the Taliban insurgents. Pakistan joined and supported the war in Afghanistan by severing diplomatic relations with the Taliban; and deploying up to 150,000 troops along the Afghan-Pakistan border. Despite providing critical logistical support, and conducting numerous military offensives against Al Qaeda and Taliban militias in its tribal areas, Pakistan was widely labeled as an uncertain partner with conflicted goals. This was due to Pakistan's overt contribution to the war on terrorism, and its covert support for various Afghan-focused insurgent groups. This dissertation concludes with a brief discussion on the theoretical and policy implications of coalition burden-sharing.

Cities are the distinctive space for humanity. At the end of the twenty first century, more people will live in urban areas of the developing world than are alive on the planet today. By the year 2020, more than 80 percent of Latin America's population will be living in cities, adding significant pressure to already very unstable systems. The tensions resulting from the contradictions between the values of modernity and the practice of exclusion prevailing in the region have been identified as major threats to its political stability and economic development. In order to contribute to the search for appropriate solutions to the aforementioned problems, this dissertation addresses the relationship between decentralization and governance. A comparative political analysis of the process and impacts of implementing a decentralization reform in Bogotá, the capital of Colombia is presented. Three critical variables of good governance are assessed: participation, equity, and efficiency. Decentralizing reforms marked the political life of the region in the latest years of the twentieth century and the awakening of the new millennium; it was a policy championed by all sides of the political spectrum as the appropriate strategy for enhancing democracy and inclusion, and ultimately in good governance. Good governance refers to the capacity of a social and political system to create the minimum consensus required to organize and act based on a collective will. Evidence provided by this study shows puzzling results. There has been definite improvement in democratic governance, which cannot necessarily be attributed to decentralization, as decentralization in Bogota was not a systematic process of public policy implementation and presented many contradictions and inconsistencies. Nevertheless, this case also indicates that, despite limitations and contradictions, change may occur in an unsystematic manner; but also that increasing the constituents' aspirations without providing the means to fulfill them may widen the gap between the citizens and the government. Previous and new forms of governance coexist in tension and the success or failure of the reform in the future depends, fundamentally, on how the system incorporates them. This study is a contribution to the literature on both decentralization and governance.

Administrative and policy failures increasingly occur because of the inability of organizations to facilitate collective action in the absence of a central, hierarchical authority. I explore how organizations achieve (or fail to achieve) voluntary, self-organizing collective action that is not a direct result of external control, presenting a polycentric system of governance within a set of public, nonprofit, and for-profit agencies operating in the policy domain of emergency management. Using a complex adaptive systems framework (Axelrod and Cohen 1999), I identify the patterns of variation, interaction, and the choices made among agencies that determine whether organizations work together. I develop a model of an integrated, interdependent system of emergency management facilitated by a knowledge commons, as opposed to the established sequential cycle of disaster response. The research problem addressed, collective action without hierarchy, is fundamentally an issue of decision making. The ability of decision makers to recognize key situations in their environments and develop strategies for action, i.e. cognition, is critical. Analysis of network data and semi-structured interviews finds that urgent need, proximity, and professional capital, a concept developed in this dissertation, promote and sustain cooperation. I show how these factors increase the capacity of heterogeneous networks to accomplish shared goals. Even if the conditions of urgent need and proximity are satisfied, situations exist where agencies fail to cooperate. Key standards of professional performanceappearance, levels of staffing, past performance, response time, and the quality of equipmentinfluence the decisions of emergency managers to work together. I present the concept of professional capital to describe how these recognized standards of professional performance demonstrate competence and justify the decisions of managers to interact. Professional capital transcends jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries, influencing the confidence of decision makers and shaping judgments based on expectations of performance. This concept adds a missing component to social capital theory, which currently focuses on the roles of pre-established trust and norms of reciprocity in promoting collective action.

No description available.

This research is on the challenges that the state parties faced in including the crime of aggression under the international affairsfuture challenges that might arise in prosecuting the crime of aggression. The crime of aggression, formerly known as crimes against peace, is the use of unlawful force by a state against another state. Its prohibition started before World War One but successful prosecutions for this crime took place after World War Two when Nazi and Japanese leaders were prosecuted by the Allied Powers. The research will analyse some important international criminal law principles that will affect the laws prohibiting aggression since it is an international crime that has to be bound by principles already adopted and received by the international community. The biggest obstacle that the state parties had to overcome was an accepted definition of the crime for purposes of the Rome Statute. A definition was adopted in 2010 at the Kampala Review Conference but at least 30 states parties need to ratify these adoptions that will be reviewed again in 2017. The ICC will only have jurisdiction over this crime if enough ratifications are obtained from the state parties. Other challenges include: personal jurisdiction (who the ICC may prosecute for this crime); the leadership nature of this crime; the exclusion of non-state actors from the definition of this crime; immunity of state leaders that will further complicate their prosecution if responsible for committing aggression; the inclusion of humanitarian intervention as aggression; and the application of the principle of complementarity with regard to the crime of aggression. States, particularly the United States of America, have objected to the inclusion of this crime in the Rome Statute for fear that its nationals (military and political leaders) will be held criminally liable for making political decisions to use military force against another state. Current international affairs will be used to demonstrate why this crime has been difficult to prosecute compared to the other international crimes. After raising the challenges that the ICC might face I am going to offer possible solutions and recommendations that the ICC should first implement to be able to have more successful prosecutions of the crime of aggression. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted