This thesis seeks to systematically examine the contributions made by the dispute settlement bodies established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to the development of the law of the sea. The two main research questions to be answered are: (i) what kind of contribution have UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies made to the development of the law of the sea? and (ii) what are the factors that impact the performance of UNCLOS dispute settlement bodies in developing the law of the sea? To that end, Chapter 1 provides a working definition for the concept of 'judicial development of international law' in order to establish a framework for an assessment of the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals. Based on this working definition, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 examine the significance of UNCLOS tribunals' decisions in the development of three main areas of the law of the sea, respectively the law on fisheries, the law on the outer continental shelf and the law on marine environmental protection. Based on the findings of these chapters, Chapter 5 analyses the factors that help explain the contributions of UNCLOS tribunals to the law of the sea as identified in the preceding chapters. These factors include: (i) the jurisdictional scope of UNCLOS tribunals, (ii) the institutional design of UNCLOS, (iii) the interpretative method employed by UNCLOS tribunals in deciding their cases and (iv) the perception that UNCLOS tribunals hold regarding their roles. Chapter 6 concludes by taking stock of the contribution of UNCLOS tribunal in these areas and offering some final observations on the role of UNCLOS tribunals in the development of the law of the sea.

Values matter in both legal decision (lawmaking and lawapplying) and discourse (lawshaping and lawinfluencing). Yet, their purported subjectivity means that gaining or improving knowledge about values (whether they be epistemic, legal, moral, ethical, economic, political, cultural, social, or religious) in the context of analytic legal thought and understanding is often said to be at odds with its goal of objectivity. This phenomenon is amplified at the international level where the infusion of seemingly subjective political values by sovereigns, and the decisionmakers to whom they delegate, can, and does, interfere with an idealized and objective rule of law. The discourse on value subjectivity, and its relation to the purpose and function of the law, is particularly apparent in evolving international legal orders such as investment treaty arbitration. The primary aim of this work is to provide a new method for gaining empirical knowledge about value subjectivity that can help close a weak link in all nonpositivist (value-laden) legal theory: a weakness that has manifest itself as skepticism about the possibility of measuring value objectively enough to permit its incorporation as a necessary component of analytic jurisprudence. This work proposes a theory of configurative fairness for addressing the problem related to the development or evolution of legal regimes, and how legal regimes perceived as subjectively unfair can be remedied. Such a theory accepts the premise that perceptions of fairness matter in directing the way that legal orders develop, and that perceptions of fairness relate to the manner in which values are distributed and maximized in particular legal orders. It is posited that legal orders perceived as fair by their participants are more likely to be endorsed or accepted as legally binding (and are therefore more likely to comply with the processes and outcomes that such laws mandate). The purpose of a theory of configurative fairness is an attempt to provide a methodological bridge for improving knowledge about value in the context of legal inquiry through the employment of a technique called Q methodology: an epistemological and empirical means for the measurement and mapping of human subjectivity. It is a method that was developed in the early twentieth century by physicist-psychologist William Stephenson: the last research student of the inventor of factor analysis, Charles Spearman. What Stephenson did was to create a way for systematically measuring subjective perspectives, and although not previously used in jurisprudential thought, Q methodology will facilitate a means for the description and evaluation of shared subjectivities. In the context of law generally, and in investment treaty arbitration specifically, these are the subjectivities that manifest themselves as the conflicting perspectives about value that are omnipresent in both communicative lawshaping discourse and authoritative and controlling lawmaking and lawapplying decision. Knowledge about these shared value subjectivities among participants in investment treaty arbitration will allow the legal analyst to delineate and clarify points of overlapping consensus about the desired distribution of value as they relate to the regime-building issues of evolving legal orders. The focus for a theory of configurative fairness pertains to the identification of the various value positions that participants hold about a particular legal order and to configure those values, through its rules and principles, in a manner that is acceptable (and perceived as fair) by all of its participants. If such a value consensus can be identified, then particular rules in the legal order can be configured by decisionmakers in a way so as to satisfy participants’ shared value understandings. To engage such a theory, a means for identifying shared value subjectivities must be delineated. This work conducts a Q method study on the issues under debate relating to regime-building questions in investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study asked participants knowledgeable about investment treaty arbitration to rank-order a set of statements about the way that the values embraced by this legal order ought to be configured. The results of the study demonstrate that there is significant overlap about how participants in investment treaty arbitration perceive the desired distribution of values across the regime. The Q method study identified six distinct perspectives that represent shared subjectivities about value in the context of the development of investment treaty arbitration. The Q method study was also able to identify where there is an overlapping consensus about value distribution across the distinct perspectives. It is these areas of overlapping consensus that are most likely to reflect shared value understandings, and it is proposed that it is upon these shared value understandings that the future development of investment treaty arbitration ought to aim.

Selon une présentation classique, le droit du contentieux international est apprécié à travers les concepts de pouvoir de juger, de compétence et de recevabilité. Force est toutefois de constater qu’il est aujourd’hui souvent fait référence, dans les décisions des juridictions internationales comme dans la doctrine, à la faculté procédurale, notamment des personnes privées. Cet intérêt pour la situation du requérant et sa faculté d’obtenir une décision sur le fond de son différend interroge quant à une possible évolution des concepts juridiques régissant la matière. L’étude de ce « droit » d’action dans le cadre du contentieux des investissements permet de se rendre compte de l’utilité de la notion pour le droit du contentieux international. D’une part, une fois déployé, le concept réalise un ordonnancement efficace des règles déterminant la possibilité d’une décision sur le fond. La pratique arbitrale fait preuve à cet égard d’une certaine confusion entre ces règles et celles encadrant l’existence de l’obligation alléguée que l’étude permet de dissiper. D’autre part, le droit d’agir en justice permet plus généralement d’appréhender les effets juridiques du consentement de l’Etat à la juridiction. L’étude démontre en effet que la faculté procédurale procède de l’invocabilité de ce consentement : celui-ci reconnaît à l’entité visée par l’engagement le droit d’agir en justice. Or cet effet juridique ne peut être valablement saisi par le concept de pouvoir de juger, lequel procède de la réunion des consentements. Puisque le contentieux des investissements s’intéresse à plusieurs égards à cette invocabilité, soit pour la préserver soit pour la remettre en cause, on comprend que le droit d’agir soit devenu un concept incontournable en la matière. Mais la nécessité d’y recourir peut s’exporter au-delà du contentieux des investissements, n’importe quelle branche du contentieux international pouvant être intéressée à régir les effets juridiques du consentement du seul Etat défendeur. / The settlement of international disputes is classically studied thought the concepts of judicial power, jurisdiction and admissibility. However it is now common to find references to the notion of « right of action » or « right of claim » in decisions of international tribunals especially when individuals are involved. One might wonder whether this observation reveals an evolution in the concepts governing disputes settlement in international law. The study of the right of action in international investment law demonstrates the usefulness of the concept in explaining the applicable rules. First, as a key concept, it can be used to identify the rules that determine the possibility to obtain a decision of the tribunal as opposed to the rules governing the State’s responsibility. In practice, it appears that the tribunals do not always respect this distinction. Secondly, the right of action allows taking into account the legal consequences of the State’s consent to arbitration. In this case, the concept of judicial power is partly irrelevant as it is usually based on a consent agreement between the parties. It follows that the concept of right of action is relevant when the applicable rules deal with the possibility to invoke and to rely on the consent to jurisdiction expressed by the respondent State. The fact that it is the case in the settlement of disputes between a State and an investor does not mean that it can not be so in the context of a interstate dispute.

This thesis examines the process applied by international tribunals for delimiting Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf boundaries under international law. Maritime delimitation is governed by articles 74 and 83 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which are customary international law. However, owing to the vagueness of such legal provisions, international tribunals have been developing a standard process for delimiting maritime boundaries. The delimitation process has evolved significantly since the 1969 judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in North Sea Continental Shelf. The ICJ re-stated this process in its 2009 Black Sea judgment as being constituted of three stages: first, an equidistance line is provisionally drawn; second, this line is adjusted should relevant circumstances so require; third, the overall equitableness of the boundary is evaluated by assessing the proportionality between the length of the relevant coast and the marine areas appertaining to each state. This thesis analyses each stage of the delimitation process as re-stated in Black Sea. By way of introduction, chapter 1 outlines the relevant legal provisions and the historical evolution of the delimitation process through the jurisprudence of international tribunals. Chapter 2 discusses both the notions of the relevant coast and of the relevant area, and the practical methods for their identification. Since Black Sea, international tribunals have tended to identify the relevant coast and the relevant area prior to establishing a provisional equidistance line. Chapter 3 discusses the issues concerning the drawing of the provisional equidistance line. Chapter 4 examines relevant circumstances and the methods for adjusting an equidistance line. Chapter 5 discusses proportionality. Using doctrinal legal research methodologies, this thesis aims to assess the degree of consistency in the international tribunals’ application of the three-stage delimitation process. It argues that, while great leaps forward have been made since 1969, there is still a number of unresolved issues, in relation to which this thesis endeavours to provide some workable solutions.

Dans l’arbitrage relatif aux investissements, on entend par exceptions préliminaires les incidents de procédure par lesquels les Etats contestent la compétence du tribunal arbitral ou la recevabilité de la requête de l’investisseur. Avec le développement du contentieux arbitral, le recours à cette technique contentieuse se fait de plus en plus fréquent, mais la présentation des exceptions préliminaires par les Etats et leur traitement par les tribunaux arbitraux sont souvent sources de confusion. Notre étude propose de préciser les concepts clés du contentieux international de compétence et de recevabilité et de revenir sur leur distinction dans un domaine spécialisé du contentieux international – le contentieux arbitral fondé sur les traités de protection et de promotion des investissements. La réaffirmation de la distinction entre les questions de compétence et de recevabilité permettra d’en proposer une classification en fonction de l’objet de l’exception préliminaire et de mieux saisir la portée de la notion d’exception préliminaire qui constitue un moyen de leur mise en oeuvre dans l’arbitrage transnational. Cette classification commandera le régime qu’il convient de réserver à chaque type de défense, afin d’ordonner la présentation des exceptions préliminaires par les Etats et leur examen par les arbitres, examen qui détermine leur faculté d’exercer la fonction juridictionnelle. / In investment treaty arbitration, preliminary objections can be defined as procedural issues raised by the States in order to contest arbitral tribunal jurisdiction or admissibility of an investor claim. With the rise of investment treaty arbitration, recourse to this litigation technique is getting more and more frequent. However, the submission of preliminary objections by the States, as well as their examination by the arbitral tribunals are frequently confusing. Our research focuses on the core concepts of jurisdiction and admissibility in international litigation in order to reconsider their distinction in a specialised field of international litigation - investment treaty arbitration. On the basis of this distinction, we propose a classification of preliminary issues according to their object. This classification will order the legal regime to be applied to each type of preliminary defence, thus putting some order in the submission of preliminary objections by the States and their examination by the arbitrators, examination which relates to their capacity to exercise their jurisdictional function.