In recent years, American foreign policy has been much more attuned to the dangers of rogue states than rising peer-competitors. Perhaps what is more puzzling is why weak states would challenge not only their regional neighborhoods but also a disproportionately powerful United States. This project addresses and explores the phenomena of weak revisionists. The question under investigation here has received comparatively little attention in the scholarly literature: why do weak states adopt expansive foreign policy aims? Existing literature affirms the importance of relative power in determining state behavior and it implies that that only the great powers are afforded the luxury of pursuing other goals beyond their immediate, territorial security. For weak powers to even contemplate goals beyond survival would be a foolhardy endeavor. The underlying motivations behind the formation of foreign policy goals for smaller powers remain unclear and understudied. I present a neoclassical realist approach, which argues that the level of threat faced by a regime and domestic strategic culture determine a state's foreign policy goals. Specifically, I argue that high levels of threat, which heighten a sense of vulnerability, create domestic opportunities for hawkish strategic subcultures to promote a forceful response to those threats. In short, unfavorable geopolitical circumstances, legacies of external and internal challenges, and historical grievances have entrenched cultures of insecurity giving motivation to weak revisionists to pursue expansive goals. Towards this end, I will examine foreign policy-making in Iran, North Korea, and Libya. / Ces dernières années, les dangers potentiels présentés par les soi-disant « états voyous » ont inquiété davantage les Etats-Unis que leurs alliés et concurrents. Un des aspects paraissant inexplicable est le fait que ces prétendus états voyous, perçus comme étant plus faibles à tous les niveaux, osent confronter à la fois leurs voisins régionaux mais aussi les Etats-Unis qui apparaissent comme infiniment plus puissants. Ce projet étudie donc la question des « faibles états révisionnistes ». La question à laquelle nous tenterons de répondre est ainsi : pourquoi se fait-il que des états dits relativement « faibles » poursuivent des objectifs politiques internationaux perçus comme agressifs ? La littérature existante affirme que la notion de pouvoir relatif est essentielle pour déterminer le comportement international d'un état, suggérant ainsi que seules les grandes puissances peuvent se permettre d'aspirer à des objectifs internationaux qui vont au-delà de leur sécurité territoriale immédiate. L'idée que des états perçus comme relativement faibles puissent poursuivre des objectifs mettant en danger leur survie paraît inconcevable. Les raisons pour de tels comportements restent à ce jour elles aussi peu étudiées. À travers ce projet, je propose une approche réaliste néo-classique qui suggère que le niveau de menace auquel un état doit faire face ainsi que la culture stratégique de l'état en question déterminent la politique extérieure de cet état. Ainsi, il est démontré qu'un niveau élevé de menace sécuritaire mène à un sentiment de vulnérabilité chez un état, créant ainsi des opportunités pour des sous-cultures stratégiques belliqueuses de promouvoir une réponse agressive à ces menaces. Concrètement, l'association de circonstances géopolitiques défavorables à la présence d'une culture nationale pour la confrontation ainsi qu'à un passé national douloureux a engendré la création de cultures nationales d'insécurité menant des états relativement faibles et révisionnistes à poursuivre des objectifs internationaux agressifs. L'analyse proposée sera complétée par une étude de cas comparée des politiques extérieures de la Libye, de la Corée du Nord, et de l'Iran.

Threats are key elements in international relations but very few studies are exclusively devoted to them. In this thesis, we present an explanation of threat perception which rests on two main factors. The first one is the level of compatibility between the current preferences of two states. The more two countries have incompatible preferences, the more they will see each other as threatening. The second factor is the historical predispositions that two states hold towards each other. Negative historical predispositions tend to exacerbate the effects of conflicting preferences whereas positive ones tend to minimize their effects. In addition, we claim that state preferences are shaped by the government's evaluation of the country's material situation and by its view of the national identity and not by the influence of domestic interest groups as some theorists claim. Concerning historical predispositions, we believe that they are influenced by the first interactions between two states following a regime change in one or both of them. Those first interactions are themselves shaped by the level of compatibility between state preferences that existed at that crucial time. We test this explanation along with rival ones derived from different International Relations theories by comparing American and British perceptions of China since 1949 and more particularly between 2006 and 2010. In the end, we are able to conclude that our explanation of threat perception is confirmed by the evidence gathered while rival ones tend to be disproved. / Les menaces sont un aspect important des relations internationales mais peu d'études leur sont entièrement dédiées. Dans ce mémoire, nous présentons une explication de la perception des menaces qui repose sur deux facteurs principaux. Le premier est le niveau de compatibilité entre les préférences actuelles de deux États. Plus les préférences de deux pays sont incompatibles, plus ils se sentiront mutuellement menacés. Les prédispositions historiques qu'un État a vis-à-vis d'un autre constituent le deuxième facteur. Des prédispositions négatives tendent à exacerber les effets des incompatibilités de préférences alors que des prédispositions positives tendent à les minimiser. De plus, nous considérons que les préférences étatiques sont façonnées par l'évaluation que fait le gouvernement de la situation matérielle du pays et par sa vision de l'identité nationale. Nous écartons donc l'explication de la formation des préférences étatiques basée sur l'influence des groupes d'intérêts avancée par certains théoriciens. En ce qui concerne les prédispositions historiques, nous croyons qu'elles sont influencées par les premières interactions entre deux États suite à un changement de régime chez au moins l'un d'entre eux. Ces premières interactions sont elles-mêmes façonnées par le niveau de compatibilité entre les préférences étatiques qui existait à ce moment crucial. Nous testons cette explication ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'explications rivales découlant de différentes théories des relations internationales en comparant les perceptions américaines et britanniques de la Chine depuis 1949 et, plus particulièrement, entre 2006 et 2010. Cela nous permet de conclure que notre explication de la perception des menaces est confirmée par les faits alors que les explications rivales semblent pour leur part infirmées.

International investment has become one of the most important issues on the Post-Uruguay Round Agenda of trade negotiations. The rapid growth of and the critical role in today's global economy played by international investment, as well as its essential link to trade flow necessitates a comprehensive study of the possibility of inserting broad investment provisions in the framework of an organization with trade liberalization objectives, the World Trade Organization. The inclusion of such rules requires: (1) an extensive examination of the existing investment-related provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreements, and the evaluation of their utility, followed by the examination of the recent practices of this Organization with respect to investment; (2) tracing the development of international negotiations on investment measures, from the Uruguay Round to the recent movement to launch a Multilateral Agreement on Investment. / This thesis attempts to assess the ground upon which a proposal for a new agreement on investment in the framework of the World trade Organization could be achieved.

Private international law stipulates that copyright is subject to the so-called principle of territoriality. Substantive conflicts of laws as well as procedural conflicts of jurisdictions regulating copyright are said to operate territorially; i.e., confined to the jurisdiction where protection is claimed. / Copyright, however, is a universally valid proprietary right acquired in the legal regime of the country of the literary or artistic work's origin. The "monopolies of exploitation" that ultimately protect copyright are territorially confined because they are the result of the territoriality of laws and statutes. / This thesis, therefore, introduces a new reading of the private international law of copyright. Copyright, like any other property right, should be understood in systems of real rights transpositions, which adapt its underlying proprietary title to the terms of the respective legal order of protection.

States have often applied their laws extraterritorially in order to force other states to comply with international interests such as human rights and environmental standards due to the absence of reliable enforcement and legislative bodies in international society. Many disputes caused by such extraterritorial application have been settled in dispute settlement procedures of the GATT and World Trade Organization (WTO). However, some argue that the WTO is not an appropriate forum to settle extraterritorial disputes since competence of the WTO is limited to "trade" issues and the legitimacy of extraterritorial measures should be assessed by applying all relevant international norms. This paper argues, by analyzing the nature of extraterritorial disputes and by comparing past approaches taken to extraterritorial disputes with the WTO procedures, that the WTO can provide effective solutions to extraterritorial disputes procedurally and substantially. This paper also argues that WTO can contribute to the development of the international legal system in the course of its resolution of extraterritorial disputes by examining state practices after the GATT/WTO dispute settlement.

In this thesis, after examining the evolution of both the economic situation over the recent past and of the various treaties and agreements that both inspired and responded to this evolution, we propose a resolutely legalistic procedure for dispute resolution to be included in a panamerican free-trade agreement that would encompass almost all countries of the American continent, in accordance with the objective announced by the heads of State who participated in the Summit of the Americas. We opt for institutional dispute resolution mechanisms that would intervene after any possibility of appealing a ruling by a lower forum has been ruled out, thus reducing the links between the political and juridical structures of the eventual treaty, recognizing that private parties may, in certain circumstances, have an inherent right to intervene in such proceedings. We favor the inclusion within the treaty itself---particularly as far as competition law is concerned---of substantive law that would be as comprehensive as possible, and suggest means for this substantive law to continue to evolve even after the treaty is concluded. Without setting aside a pragmatic approach which is always likely to help solve or avoid disputes, we have strived for the recognition by states of the inescapability of a strong legalistic approach, each element of which would be free of any suspected political meddling, if we really want the liberalization of exchange between countries of such diverse socio-economic conditions as those we find in the Americas. The objectives of a regional agreement on the opening of the economy and trade liberalization must be different from those of multinational agreements such as the WTO; otherwise, the existence of such agreements could not be justified. Each must provide for dispute resolution mechanisms adapted to its specific mission.

Lease, charter and interchange have become more and more important throughout the last decades. The International Civil Aviation Organization could not ignore that reality. In 1980 after a long preparatory work Article 83bis, an amendment to the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation was adopted by the 23rd Assembly without any negative votes. Yet, in 1990, this amendment, which enables the State of Registry, which is responsible for the operation of the aircraft even if flying with an operator of another state, to transfer its functions and duties to the State of the Operator. / This thesis takes a closer look on the history of that amendment. The reasons why Article 83bis is still not in force shall also be discussed. An attempt shall further be made to analyze the provisions of Article 83bis more thoroughly and to explain why states should no longer hesitate to ratify that amendment. Article 83bis has no controversial content and is very important for the safety of international air transportation, in establishing clearly who is responsible for a leased, chartered or interchanged aircraft.

The thesis explores an important cause of self-defeating escalation during war, military control of the national security decision process. The thesis employs a neoclassical realist framework and specifies the implications of militarized decision-making on the state's ability to assess and adapt to its strategic environment during war. The central argument is that military control of the national security decision-making process leads to the adoption of the military's preferences and the streamlining of the decision process, following the military organizational style. A plausibility probe is conducted against fifteen decision points within the broader setting of Germany's submarine warfare policy during World War I. The findings demonstrate that the establishment of a military dictatorship in Germany in October 1916 led to the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare on January 9, 1917, and the intervention of the United States into the war less than three months later. / La thèse explore une cause importante du phénomène d'escalade autodestructrice intra-guerre, c'est-à-dire le contrôle du processus décisionnel de sécurité nationale par le militaire. La thèse utilise une approche réaliste néoclassique et spécifie les implications des processus décisionnels militarisés sur l'habileté de l'état d'évaluer et de s'adapter à son environnement stratégique durant une guerre. L'argument central est que le contrôle du processus décisionnel par le militaire entraîne l'adoption des préférences des militaires et la réorganisation du proce ssus décisionnel suivant le mode d'organisation militaire. Une étude de plausibilité est menée sur quinze points de décision au sein du cadre de la politique allemande de guerre sous-marine durant la Première Guerre mondiale. Les résultats empiriques démontrent que l'établissement d'une dictature militaire en Allemagne en Octobre 1916 fut instrumental dans l'adoption de la guerre sous-marine à outrance le 9 janvier, 1917, ainsi que dans l'intervention des États-Unis moins de trois mois plus tard.

Access to, and use of the geostationary orbit--a limited natural resource--is governed by the legal norms of international space law and international telecommunication law. In order to better understand the issues involved in its regulation, the fundamental elements of the geostationary orbit, its definition, technical characteristics, advantages and nature as a limited natural resource are examined (Chapter I). The legal regime governing an area or environment is built primarily upon its legal status; hence, in Chapter II, the legal status of the orbit is discussed. An analysis of the applicable legal principles of international space law follows (Chapter III); while Chapter IV contains detailed consideration of the regulatory regime established through the International Telecommunication Union. In addition to the UN and ITU, other international organizations are, to some extent, involved in regulation of the use of the geostationary orbit by their respective members. Relevant provisions of the treaties setting up these organisations are briefly discussed in Chapter V. This is followed by a final analysis, conclusions and recommendations (Chapter VI). An extensive, but selective bibliography completes the study.

Realism is a two-dimensional theory of International Relations that sprung from the mid-20th century pen of Hans Morgenthau. It was a useful construct to explain 19th century European balance of power politics and for the most part, the actions of the main protagonists during the Cold War. Notwithstanding purported improvements and modifications associated with its various progeny, Realism's contemporary analytic value is problematic. Despite Realism's universal and 'timeless' empirical and iconic pretensions, by the end of the Cold War, the theory had limited explanatory, predictive, or prescriptive value. / The families of Realisms, including neo-Realism, are stepped in confusion over means and ends; agents and structures; and wholes and parts. International Politics cannot be properly understood or thought to exist as an independent and closed system in which specific outcomes can be calculated with regularity and precision in two-dimensional causal terms based upon normative distillations of human nature. Explanations of global politics as a linear function of interests defined as power among nations maintain limited relevance in the 21st century. Rather, world politics constitutes a complex interactive system. Clausewitz's nuanced, insightful, and non-linear approach to theory and method, as well as more recent developments in Critical Scientific Realism and Complex Systems Theory, provide the basis for a new non-linear theory of International Relations. Complex Realism provides the potential for more accurate, nuanced, and scientific understandings of evolving, emergent, and adaptive 21st century realities. The core tenets of Complex Realism have already been embraced by the US military in terms of tactics and operations in its approaches to fighting counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. They should now be applied at the scholarly and grand strategic levels to better understand broader issues of international politics including security, and formulating policies for such daunting global challenges as the weaponization of space. / Le Réalisme est une théorie à deux dimensions des relations internationales, née au milieu du 20ème siècle sous la plume d'Hans Morgenthau. C'est une construction, utile au 19e siècle en Europe, pour expliquer l'équilibre de la politique de puissance européenne, et pour la plupart des actions des principaux protagonistes durant la guerre froide. En dépit des améliorations présumées et des modifications associées aux diverses théories inspirées du réalisme, la valeur analytique contemporaine du Réalisme est problématique. Malgré ses prétentions universalistes et scientifiquement "éternelles", empiriques, et iconiques, à partir de la fin du 20e siècle, la théorie du Réalisme a une valeur explicative, prédictive, ou normative limitée. / Les familles de Réalismes, y compris le Néo-Réalisme, sont chargées de confusion aussi bien dans le but que dans les moyens, les agents, les structures, que des parties et du tout. Les politiques internationales ne peuvent pas être correctement comprises ni être prises pour un système fermé et indépendant dans lequel les résultats spécifiques peuvent être calculés, avec régularité et précision, dans des termes de causalité qui sont basés sur les distillations normative de la nature humaine. Au contraire, les politiques mondiales constituent un système interactif complexe. Le regard nuancé, perspicace et non linéaire de Clausewitz d'aborder la théorie et la méthode, aussi bien que des développements plus récents dans le réalisme critique scientifique et de la théorie des systèmes complexes, fournissent la base pour une nouvelle théorie non-linéaire de relations internationales. Le Réalisme complexe fournit le potentiel pour des compréhensions plus précises, plus nuancées et plus scientifiques des réalités évolutives, émergentes et adaptatives du 21e siècle. Les principes fondamentaux du Réalisme complexe ont déjà été adoptés par les militaires des États-Unis au niveau des tactiques et des opérations dans leurs approches de combats anti-insurrectionnels en Irak et en Afghanistan. Ils devraient maintenant être employés au niveau académique et au niveau des grandes stratégies pour mieux comprendre les questions plus larges de la politique internationale dont la sécurité, ainsi pouvoir formuler d'importantes stratégies sur des questions majeures telles que la militarisation de l'espace. fr