Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Donald Abenheim, Anne L. Clunan. Includes bibliographical references (p. 77-81). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lund Universitet, 1987. / Extra t.p. with thesis statement and corrections sheet laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 165-174).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Lund Universitet, 1987. / Extra t.p. with thesis statement and corrections sheet laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 165-174).

No description available.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "December 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 80-86). Also available online.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Hy S. Rothstein. Includes bibliographical references (p. 93-95). Also available online.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / How much emphasis is afforded to the role of soft power has significant implications for the study of hegemony and predictions regarding the future of US hegemony and the rise of China as a hegemon. The fact that much mainstream work (particularly neorealism) continues to neglect the role of soft power in international relations is seen as a disturbing shortcoming. This study wishes to address this perceived shortcoming by exploring the role of ‘soft power’ as an integral non-material aspect of hegemony by focusing on the perspectives of selected authors (Cox, Nye, Waltz, Keohane), and applying them to the cases of the United States of America and China. It is contended that there is a need for a shift of emphasis in International Relations (IR)- away from the hard power centric analysis towards a ‘soft power’ analysis that focuses on ideas. This study further argues that recognising the importance of the role of ‘soft power’ will result in a more effective analysis and understanding of hegemony in the international system. This is not to disregard ‘hard power’ as an aspect of hegemony, but rather to emphasise ‘soft power’ as it is often neglected or underscored by scholars in their analysis of hegemony and power structures within international relations. The United States of America is a prime example of how ‘soft power’ can help a state to prevent decline through consensus and alliance formation. The Chinese on the other hand have become increasingly aware of the importance of soft power– whilst the US have recently neglected it as a sustaining capability for hegemony. Thus China is growing and nurturing its ‘soft power’ capabilities in order to create an image of a benevolent super power, whilst the US is increasingly being perceived as malevolent- which is not conducive to hegemony in the international system. It is argued that if the Chinese can attain ideological dominance within the global structure, they could become the new hegemon.

This thesis examines an important but understudied phenomenon in international politics: the role of amity in foreign policy. The core research question is "how have American friendships for specified others been made possible?" Drawing on the logic of securitization, this thesis employs Aristotle's notion of character friends as Other Selves and Judith Butler's concept of performativity to elaborate an international process of friendship or amitization. In doing so, the thesis employs critical discourse analysis of presidential rhetoric and popular culture to elucidate the process through which discourses of similarity become naturalized frames of reference within the conduct of foreign policy. It argues that friendship emerges when a state comes to see itself in an other and that this similarity (re)produces a certain form of state identity that enables and forecloses certain policy options vis-à-vis friends. Friendship manifests in a habitual, or naturalized, disposition to treat friends better than others. As such, it can account for how certain policies and postures, such as uncritical and often unconditional support for subjects positioned as "friends," have come to be pursued as common sense. Amitization is illustrated by assessing three case studies: the Anglo-American "special relationship;" the US-Israel "unbreakable bond;" and America's membership of "the Atlantic Community." Specifically, the thesis similarly demonstrates the ways in which amity accounts for how supererogatory commitments such as vast financial assistance, diplomatic support, information sharing, security guarantees and concern for the welfare of these specified others have come to be seen as unquestionably legitimate policies in the broader trajectory of American foreign policy. Amity matters and the practices of amitization are inseparable from intelligible foreign policy.

When the new South African government took power in 1994, the United States (US) pictured a bright future with a strategic country. They envisioned a strong partnership in political, economic and security realms. Although the US has consistently labeled their bilateral relationship with South Africa as ‘excellent,’ government officials from both countries at the end of 2008 expressed concern about the perceived crisis that US-South African relations was in. Against this backdrop, this thesis explores the bilateral relationship between the US, a global power, and South Africa, a regional power, assessing the key issues from 1994-2008. This thesis attempts to achieve an understanding of the relationship by using a new paradigm developed by Professor Brantly Womack of the University of Virginia (US), entitled asymmetry theory. His theory, which was developed after decades of studying the political landscape between states in Southeast Asia, addresses the effects of national disparities on asymmetric bilateral relationships. This thesis breaks new ground by testing Womack’s asymmetry theory in relation to the US and South Africa, two countries located outside the continent of Asia. Moreover, this is the first study where the theory has been applied to a relationship between a global and regional power. This thesis argues that there was a considerable downward swing in US-South African relations during the Bush Administration due to the confliction of several vital principles in each country’s foreign policy, the structural implications of asymmetry, and the lack of an institution were US and South African government officials could quickly communicate to clarify any disputes or misperceptions that may have arisen. This thesis argues that the bilateral relationship has changed from normalization to normalcy throughout the time period although there are still significant hurdles to overcome in the future. Additionally, this thesis argues that the value of asymmetry theory has proven itself in its illumination of the dynamics of the relationship. / Political Sciences / D. Litt. et Phil. (International Politics)

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study is an historical analysis of the American policy of Constructive Engagement and serves as a comprehensive review of that policy, its ideological foundation, formulation, aims, and strategies. This study also serves as a detailed assessment of the policy’s ties to the South African Total National Strategy. Constructive Engagement, according to the Reagan Administration, was designed to lend American support to a controlled process of change within the Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by encouraging a “process of reform” that would be accompanied by American “confidence building” with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, however, the region had to be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa resolved. With the assistance of American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the region, and South Africa could proceed to political reform within the Republic. In reality, the most important aims of Constructive Engagement were to minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline States of southern Africa and remove the Cuban combat forces from Angola. These goals would be largely achieved by supporting and encouraging the South African policy of destabilizing its neighbours, called the Total National Strategy. This alignment inexorably led to a situation in which global policy issues eclipsed regional concerns, thereby making the United States a collaborator with the apartheid regime. Consequently, South Africa was allowed to continue its program of apartheid while enjoying American encouragement of its policy of regional destabilization, particularly its cross-border attacks into Angola and Mozambique. The U.S. support for the apartheid government offered through Constructive Engagement made the policy vulnerable to criticism that the apartheid regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a move toward liberalizing the Republic’s political system but that it was tailored to deny citizenship through the establishment of Bantustans, a point that provided ammunition to domestic opponents of Constructive Engagement. For a time, U.S.-South African cooperation was effective; the Frontline States were grudgingly forced to accept Pretoria’s regional hegemony. However, dominance of the Frontline States did not improve the security of the South African state. The African National Congress had not been defeated and was determined to make the Republic ungovernable. Furthermore, by the late-1980s, Pretoria could not dominate southern Africa and Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, which, although crippled from years of war, appeared poised to reassert themselves in the region. For South Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed, and coexistence with its neighbours would be a necessity. Without a powerful apartheid regime with which to reduce communist influence in southern Africa, the Reagan Administration abandoned Constructive Engagement. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie is ’n historiese analise van die Amerikaanse beleid van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid en dien as ’n omvattende oorsig van dié beleid, sy ideologiese grondslag, formulering, oogmerke en strategieë. Dit dien ook as ’n gedetailleerde beoordeling van die beleid se bande met Suid-Afrika se Totale Nasionale Strategie. Volgens die Reagan-administrasie was Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid bedoel om Amerikaanse steun te verleen aan ’n beheerde proses van verandering binne die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Hierdie verandering sou bereik word deur die aanmoediging van ’n ‘hervormingsproses’ wat met Amerikaanse ‘bou van vertroue’ met die apartheidregime gepaardgaan. Voordat dié proses kon begin moes die streek egter eers gestabiliseer en die konflikte binne Suider-Afrika opgelos word. Met behulp van Amerikaanse diplomasie kon vrede in die streek bewerkstellig word, en kon Suid-Afrika oorgaan tot binnelandse politieke hervorming. In werklikheid was die vernaamste oogmerke van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid om Sowjet-invloed binne die Frontliniestate van Suider-Afrika te minimaliseer en die Kubaanse gevegsmagte uit Angola te verwyder. Dié doelwitte sou grootliks bereik word deur die ondersteuning en aanmoediging van Suid-Afrika se beleid om sy buurstate te destabiliseer, wat as die Totale Nasionale Strategie bekend gestaan het. Hierdie ooreenstemming van belange het noodwendig gelei tot ’n situasie waar globale beleidskwessies streeksaangeleenthede oorskadu, en sodoende die Verenigde State van Amerika ’n kollaborateur van die apartheidregime gemaak. Gevolglik is Suid-Afrika toegelaat om sy apartheidprogram voort te sit terwyl hy Amerikaanse aanmoediging van sy beleid van streeksdestabilisering geniet, veral sy oorgrensaanvalle in Angola en Mosambiek. Die Amerikaanse steun vir die apartheidregering wat deur Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid gebied is, het die beleid vatbaar gemaak vir kritiek dat die apartheidregering se ‘eksperiment met hervorming’ nie ’n stap in die rigting van die liberalisering van die Republiek se politieke stelsel is nie, maar eerder toegespits is op die ontsegging van burgerskap deur die vestiging van Bantoestans, ’n punt wat ammunisie verskaf het aan teenstanders van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid binne die VSA. Die VSA-RSA-samewerking was vir ’n tyd lank doeltreffend; die Frontliniestate moes skoorvoetend Pretoria se streekshegemonie aanvaar. Oorheersing van die Frontliniestate het egter nie die veiligheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse staat verbeter nie. Die African National Congress was nie verslaan nie en was vasbeslote om die Republiek onregeerbaar te maak. Boonop kon Pretoria teen die laat-1980s nie Suider-Afrika domineer nie en Angola, Mosambiek en Zimbabwe, hoewel verswak weens jare se oorlogvoering, het gereed gelyk om hulle weer in die streek te laat geld. Vir Suid-Afrika het die Totale Nasionale Strategie misluk, en naasbestaan met sy buurstate sou ’n noodsaaklikheid wees. Sonder ’n magtige apartheidregime waarmee kommunistiese invloed in Suider-Afrika verminder kon word, het die Reagan-administrasie Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid laat vaar.