Large-scale humanitarian crises in foreign countries raise the question of whether or not other countries have a duty to alleviate that suffering. In extreme cases, humanitarian intervention, that is: military intervention for the purpose of alleviating human suffering, is sometimes advocated as the morally required course of action. This thesis suggests that while the international community has a general moral responsibility to prevent and ameliorate humanitarian crises there is no simple duty of military humanitarian intervention. Hitherto, the question has typically been treated as a matter of either moral or legal principle. This thesis argues that empirical factors, which affect the international community's ability to carry out interventions effectively, have not been given their due weight in the debate. On the basis of evaluations of international responses to crises in Somalia and Rwanda, 1992 - 1994, it is suggested that a range of factors undermine the efficacy of humanitarian interventions. These factors include the impact of state interests, the effects of domestic politics in intervening states and, contrary to expectations, the role of humanitarian considerations in decision making on intervention. By showing the limitations of a simplistic view of a duty of humanitarian intervention the thesis seeks to contribute to reconciling idealism with realism in international crisis-responses. Based on sound moral and political judgment military interventions in humanitarian crises would hopefully be less ambitious and ultimately more effective.

Thesis Univ. of Washington, 1996. / Originaltitel: Brave women and fair men, based on thesis. Includes bibliographical references (p. [221]-226) and index.

Thesis (D.Phil.)--University of Oxford, 2009. / Supervisor: Professor Andrew Hurrell. Bibliography: p. 339-396.

Cuba's role in Africa in the 1970s has been the subject of numerous and diverse interpretations. Students of Cuban politics sometimes tend to take a general view of Cuban policy toward Angola, and so important differences between each issue or situation are overlooked. This study offers separate accounts of the role of Cuba in Africa and in Ethiopia since 1975, with the purpose of exploring the possibility of an influence relationship between Moscow and Havana. Influence analysis is an extremely subjective task. That is, it appears to be virtually impossible to document Soviet influence on Cuba. Nevertheless, it remains possible to examine available evidence with respect to each situation, and then to construct what appears to be the most coherent argument regarding the possibility of Soviet influence on Cuba. I shall conclude that the body of evidence suggests that Cuba did not intervene in Angola chiefly to conform to Soviet preferences or interests. In this sense then, Cuba probably was not influenced by the Soviets to any great degree with respect to the Angolan episode. In contrast, Cuba's role in each of the two Ethiopian incidents seems to exemplify the rather strong possibility of Soviet influence on Cuba. Further, it appears probable that the Soviets influenced Cuba through diplomatic persuasion with regard to the two Ethiopian incidents. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis explores the obstacles in establishing a consistent and effective response framework for humanitarian catastrophe and the importance of maintaining a sustained dialogue to this end. It does so by recognizing the underlying conflict between two positions: the norm of non-intervention of states into the affairs of others, and the protection of individuals caught in the middle of violent conflict. The importance of working towards a resolution of this conflict is illustrated through the case study of Darfur, where a divided international community led an insufficient response to the crisis that can ultimately be judged as a failure. Lastly, a recent attempt at reconciling the non-intervention/protection conflict is examined through the report of the Responsibility to Protect, which takes important steps in the direction of consensus, but ultimately suffers from inflated expectations regarding its scope or purpose.

This research makes use of a Constructivist approach to norm development, in particular the concept of the norm life cycle, to assess the emergence and development of the responsibility to protect as a norm in international society in relation to the conduct of interventions on humanitarian grounds. This study finds that the responsibility to protect emerged relatively rapidly in international society as a norm relevant to the formulation and implementation of international responses to conflict situations characterised by the commission of atrocity crimes. Indeed, between 2001 and 2010, this study finds that the responsibility to protect norm became codified and entrenched in international organisation, and could therefore have been expected to influence state behaviour, and the discourse surrounding that behaviour, in relation to the conduct of interventions on humanitarian grounds. However, through an assessment of the application of the norm through the United Nations and the African Union to the conflicts in the Darfur region of Sudan from 2003 onwards, the study finds that the norm, while featuring relatively prominently in discourse surrounding Darfur between 2007 and 2008 in the United Nations, appears to have receded thereafter, disappearing from discourse by 2009 altogether, and appears not to have been useful to the attainment of its content goal, namely preventing or halting the commission of atrocity crimes, in the case of Darfur. Indeed, the norm may even have contributed to complicating, as opposed to facilitating, international engagement on Darfur. This study explores the apparent contradiction between the emergence and entrenchment of the responsibility to protect norm in international society at the same time as the norm appears to have increasingly faded from discourse surrounding international responses to the conflicts in Darfur, and assesses the implications of this both for the future development and utility of the norm, as well as for future responses to conflicts characterised by atrocity crimes on the African continent.

The intent of the author is to establish a methodology for future forcible interventions in the affairs of failed, failing or rogue and terrorist sponsoring states in order to stabilize and democratize these nations in accordance with stated United States' goals. The argument follows closely current and developing United States military doctrine on stabilization, reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations. Further the author reviews several past interventions from 1844 to the present. Conducting a survey of colonial, imperialist as well as pre and post World War II, Cold War, post Cold War and post September 11th interventions to determine the techniques and procedures that proved most successful, the author proposes a program of intervention and reconstruction called Progressive Reconstruction that incorporates many of the successful activities of these past and present doctrines. The cornerstone of the methodology is the combination of rapid decisive combat and stabilization operations leading into a series of governmental transitions from foreign direct and indirect to indigenous independent rule.

Under what conditions and for what reasons do American leaders seek the endorsement of relevant international organizations (IOs) such as the UN or NATO for prospective military interventions? My central hypothesis is that U.S. government efforts to obtain IO approval for prospective interventions are frequently the result of significant bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining between hawkish policy leaders who emphasize the likely positive payoffs of a prompt use of force, on the one side, and skeptical officials--with the top military brass and war veterans in senior policy positions at the forefront--who highlight its potential downsides and long-term costs, on the other. The military leaders--the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the regional combatant commanders, and senior planners on the Joint Staff in Washington--are generally skeptical of humanitarian and other "idealist" interventions that aim to change the domestic politics of foreign countries; they naturally tend to consider all the potential downsides of intervention, given their operational focus; and they usually worry more than activist civilian policy officials about public and congressional support for protracted engagements. Assuming that the military leaders are not merely stooges of the civilian leadership, they are at first likely to altogether resist a prospective intervention, when they believe that no vital American interests are at stake and fear an open-ended deployment of U.S. troops. Given the military's professional expertise and their standing in American society, they come close to holding a de facto veto over prospective interventions they clearly oppose. I hypothesize that confronted with such great initial reluctance or opposition on the part of the military brass, civilian advocates of intervention from other government agencies will seek inter alia to obtain an advance endorsement from relevant IOs, so as to lock in international support and thereby reassure the military and their bureaucratic allies that the long-term costs to the United States in terms of postwar peacekeeping and stabilization will be limited. That, in turn, can be expected to help forge a winning bureaucratic coalition in Washington and persuade the president to authorize military action. United States multilateralism for military interventions is thus often a genuine policy resultant--the outcome of sustained bureaucratic deliberations and bargaining--and it may not actually reflect the initial preferences of any particular government agency or senior official.

Texte repris d'une thèse de doctorat publiée en 1996 : "Brave women and fair men" : women advocates of U.S. intervention in World War II, 1939-1941 : Thèse de doctorat : Histoire contemporaine : Université de Washington : 1996. / Bibliogr. p. [221]-226. Index.

This study focuses on the premise that national interests of governments are the primary motivating factors that inform decisions on military interventions. Military strategy remains a principal tool in the attainment, pursuance and safeguarding of these interests. Military intervention is the last resort to a series of options that begin with and continue to inform the dynamic: diplomacy, policing, reliance on alliance action and finally, deterrent or pro-active military action. Military interventions in the 20th century have been undertaken at the multilateral, regional and sub-regional levels in given conflicts by a range of actors. Scholarly questions have been asked about the rationale behind the respective governments’ decisions to undertake these interventions. In the case of this study, which focuses on the SADC coalition of willing nations’ military intervention in the Congo conflict, questions have centred on the following: What was the rationale and motive that led governments of the three countries to undertake the decisions for military intervention in the Congo? Was the intervention an altruistic act by the intervening governments seeking to stop aggression of an ally or was it driven by the personal quests by leaders of these intervening countries to secure their share of the DRC mineral wealth? Or, was it merely a case of the three governments intervening as a coalition in pursuit of their varied interests? What was the strategy that this coalition adopted in pursuit of the member countries interests? It is this attempt to explain and determine the rationale and principal factors that informed the three countries’ decision to intervene in the conflict and the military strategy adopted to safeguard these interests that serve as the focal basis for this study. In trying to answer its key questions, this study uses historical and qualitative approaches in collecting and analysing data not only from both primary and secondary sources but also interviews with participants (some off the record as still serving). Thus, the findings of the research would be analysed critically within the framework of the core objectives of the study, which seek not only to identify and establish how the interests of the governments that intervened in the DRC conflict were the primary motivating factor that informed their decisions on military interventions, but also to ascertain the extent to which the SADC coalition’s military strategy became a principal tool in the attainment and safeguarding of these varying interests as well as how that strategy was utilised as a mechanism for the translation and development of these varying interests into common ones among the intervening countries. Lastly, the study seeks to offer policy suggestions on the execution of future military interventions in African conflicts, particularly at the SADC sub-regional level. Whilst literature on military interventions seems to be informed by realpolitik, with the notions by Barry Buzan (and others) that strong states take decisions to intervene when their geostrategic and economic interests are served, states can also militarily intervene for humanitarian purposes. Using the realist paradigm as a theoretical tool of analysis, the study noted that military intervention can best be understood in terms of the power and interests of particular nation states acting individually or collectively as a coalition using the brand of a sub-regional, regional or even international organisation with or without the mandate of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). An analysis is made on the scholarly legal debates surrounding the decision to intervene by the SADC coalition. The study generally established that the claimed interests that motivated the decisions by the respective governments were generally based on the political, economic and military/security dimensions. A critical evaluation of these respective interests of the interveners show that their interests shifted in regards to the levels of importance (that is primary and secondary level) at the initial stage of the intervention and during the intervention period. The coalition’s military strategy became a tool for attaining, securing and safeguarding of these respective interests. As part of the strategy, the SADC coalition’s Mutual Defence Pact acted as a political and legal guide in the promotion of complimentary and common interests of the interveners. Despite formulating such a military strategy, the unexpected longevity of the intervention impacted on the intervening countries’ logistical capacity to sustain the war effort. An initiative by the DRC government to enter into bilateral business ventures with the respective SADC countries and its awarding of mining concessions to the same was meant to be part, arguably, of sustaining the military intervention. However, this war time economic initiative has raised questions among scholars and policy practitioners on whether or not the decision for intervention by a coalition of these countries was basically underpinned by the quest to attain and safeguard national interests or it was aimed at promoting personal elite interests. Having taken note that the major findings of the study revolve around contentious primary issues relating to foreign policy decision making in the context of military intervention, a number of recommendations are made. These include: · Firstly, the undertaking of cost benefit analyses in regard to political, legal and economic matters prior to a nation’s decision for military intervention; · Secondly, the need for an appropriate and effective sub-regional mechanism guided by a sub-regional legal guide or tool for military intervention that would be utilised within the relevant AU and UN political and military framework; Finally a paradigm shift is needed in the conceptualization of what constitutes national interest. This includes a new theoretical thinking based on unilateral and multilateral military intervention in the present global order which should be based on the global or collective interest where maintenance of international peace, stability and security (more importantly human security) are of primary importance. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.