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This thesis aims to explain how the involvement of secondary parties affect the duration of intrastate armedconflicts. It argues that the acquisition of secondary support in favor of rebel groups is likely to lead to an extended duration of intrastate armed conflict. By granting a relatively weaker rebel group secondary support, a secondary party ought to directly alter the balance of power and capabilities in benefit for the rebels. The secondary party could thereby be able to level the balance of capabilities between a government and a rebel group, creating a situation in which the, at first, stronger government now have to face a rebel group capable of surviving longer. Using a structured focused comparison on two cases, the results find secondary support in the form of funding or economic support given to relatively weak rebels to be an important influence on extending the duration of intrastate armed conflicts. Nonetheless, further research might have to be made in order to fully understand the even more detailed mechanisms behind the strong influences of economic secondary support on conflict duration.