Thesis--Jāmiʻat al-Qāhirah. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [595]-619).

Thesis--Jāmiʻat al-Qāhirah. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [595]-619).

Thesis--Princeton University. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 285-290).

Thesis--Princeton University. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 285-290).

This thesis deals mainly with the historical development of the religious institution of Ithna ashari Shi'ism in both its scholarly and political aspects. It is divided into six chapters. The word "school" has been used to describe the place in which such an institution had flourished due to the activities of its fuqaha ' in response to their turbulent history, whether it was in Iraq, in Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria, i.e. Syria and Lebanon) or in Iran. Chapter one deals with the Baghdad School. It includes a study of the scholarly development right from the begining of the fuqaha' institution during Shaykh al-Mufid's times (d. 413/1022) and ending with Shaykh al-Tusi (d. 460/1068). Chapter two follows the development of this scholarly renaissance at the hands of the Hilla fuqaha starting with Ibn Idris al-Hilli's time (d. 598/1201) and ending with Fakhr al-Muhaqiqqin ibn al-'Allama al-Hilli (d. 771/1369), and investigates the relationship between the religious institution and the Mongol invaders of Iraq and the ideological influence of the Ithna'ashari fuqaha' on the leaders of the invaders. Chapter three, on the Jabal 'Amil school, deals in part with the unsettled period of the Mamluk state, its struggle against the Mongols and the internal situation of the Shi'a vis-a-vis the Mamluks. It also deals in part with the influence of the Jabal 'Amil fuqaha' on the Safawid state after these fuqaha' had migrated there. Particular attention is paid to the role of Shaykh al-Karaki (d. 940/1533) and his attempt to build a religious institution inside Safawid Iran, and the opposition that he met. The chapter ends with a study of the Akhbari Movement in its first stage, during the time of Muhammad Amin al-Astarabadi (d. 1033/1624). Chapter four focuses on the Najaf School, which had started about two hundred years before as an intellectual school. The development and activities of this school from the beginning of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, are discussed, as is its position regarding the emergence of the Wahhabi Movement, the Akhbari Movement (in its second phase) and the Shaykhi Movement. The chapter also deals with the political activity of the fuqaha' in their struggle against the Qajari state, which had been manifested in the fatwa prohibiting tobacco and in the Constitutional Movement. Chapter five deals with the struggle of the Najaf fuqaha' from the start of the Republican period (1958) until the beginning of the 1990s. This is preceded by an introductory remark concerning the position taken by the fuqaha' towards the British forces who entered Iraq after the First World War and the events of the Iraqi Revolution of 1920. Chapter six has been dedicated to a study of the Qumm school. It looks at the historical development of that city, with particular attention to the role of Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim al-Ha'iri al-Yazdi (d. 1355/1936) in supervising an elite of mujtahids who have participated in the renewal of this city.

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By 2001, the al-Qaida movement had evolved into a transnational revolutionary movement with an eschatological dimension, facilitating the 9/11 attacks to gain religious support and incite a strong reaction. The Bush administration was particularly tough in its response, terminating the Taliban regime and then declaring the right of pre-emption against a wider axis of evil, which led on to regime termination in Iraq and the intended constraining of Iran. In the event, regime termination in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in protracted wars that were intensely costly in human and resource terms, and Iranian influence actually increased. The al-Qaida movement was dispersed while being transformed into a potent idea with little in the way of an organised structure, yet was effective in catalysing movements from South Asia through the Middle East to sub-Saharan Africa. Analyses of events in Iraq and Afghanistan point to deep misconceptions over the potential for the use of military force and of imposed state building. After more than a decade after 9/11, there has been a re-orientation away from large-scale occupations towards more remote means of maintaining control, with an emphasis on armed drones, special forces and privatised military companies. This approach appears initially appropriate and attractive but may be as counterproductive as the previous approach.

The record of American foreign policy in the Middle East between 2001 and 2006 is marked mostly by failures of the Bush Administration to achieve its stated objectives, including reducing terrorism, stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and spreading liberal democracy. Still, there are also notable bright spots, including the case of Libya’s diplomatic rehabilitation. What is it, then, that accounts for this success in the face of so many other failures where the policy goals were markedly similar? I argue that a partial explanation of this discrepancy can be found in the nature of infighting between ideological realists and neoconservatives within the foreign policy bureaucracy. In doing so, process tracing is used to examine policy development toward four country cases: Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Libya, with Libya acting as the control. The object of these case studies is to demonstrate existence of a previously undescribed model of bureaucratic infighting, based on competing ideological differences regarding the fundamental direction and conduct of US foreign policy. I call this the Ideological Infighting, or I2, Model. Whereas previous works of US foreign policy analysis have focused only on the roles of individuals’ ideology or on bureaucratic interests, this study unites both. In doing so, it describes the policy effects that result from ideological disagreements within the executive agencies, rather than viewing a presidential administration as an ideologically coherent entity. It also refines understandings of the relationship between the President and his advisors. Finally, although this work deals specifically with the Middle East, the model is generalizable to all areas of US foreign policy.

This thesis examines how the press of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic represented Iran in the years from 1949 – the year of the GDR’s formation – until 1989, the last complete year before its demise on 3 October 1990. The study focuses on key events in Iranian history such as the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in 1953, the White Revolution, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq war. It will be shown that although news and articles were based on selected facts, they still presented a picture of Iran that was at best distorted, the distortions and misrepresentations amounting to what could be described as 'factual fiction'. Furthermore, clear evidence will be provided that economical and political relations with Iran were a primary concern of the GDR’s leadership, and thus also of the GDR’s press and have therefore dominated the reporting on Iran. Whatever ideological concerns there may have been, they were hardly ever allowed to get in the way of amicable relations with the Shah or later with the Islamic Republic. Only in periods where the two countries enjoyed less amicable or poor relations, was the press free to critically report events in Iran and to openly support the cause of the SED’s communist Iranian sister party, the Tudeh. Despite East Germany’s diametric ideological environment and despite the fundamentally different role that the GDR’s political system had assigned to the press and to journalism, East Germany’s press was as reliant on the input of the global news agencies as any Western media. The at times almost complete reliance on Western news agencies as sources for news on Iran challenged more than just the hermeneutic hegemony the SED and the GDR’s press wanted to establish. After all, which news and information were made available by the news agencies to the media in both East and West was primarily determined by the business interests of said agencies. The study makes a contribution to three fields: Modern Iranian history, (East-) German history and media studies. The most valid findings were certainly made in the latter.