Bachelor-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2006.

Cette thèse étudie la proposition 100% monnaie, telle qu’elle fut formulée aux États-Unis dans les années 1930 par Henry Simons (l’auteur principal du « Plan de Chicago »), Lauchlin Currie et Irving Fisher notamment. L’essence de cette proposition est de divorcer la création de monnaie des prêts de monnaie : les dépôts servant de moyens de paiement seraient soumis à 100% de réserve en monnaie légale, conférant à l’État un monopole de la création monétaire. Cette idée de réforme étant régulièrement sujette à confusion, nous entreprenons de clarifier son concept et d’étudier ses principaux arguments. Au chapitre 1, nous montrons que le 100% monnaie ne saurait être considéré comme un simple avatar des idées de la « Currency School » : contrairement à l’Acte de Peel de 1844, il ne contient en soi aucune règle d’émission, laissant ouvert le débat « règle ou discrétion ». Au chapitre 2, distinguant entre deux grandes approches du 100% monnaie, nous montrons que celui-ci n’implique nullement d’abolir l’intermédiation bancaire basée sur les dépôts d’épargne. Au chapitre 3, nous analysons, à travers les travaux de Fisher, l’objectif principal du 100% monnaie : celui de mettre fin au comportement procyclique du volume de monnaie, causé par le lien de dépendance entre création monétaire et prêts bancaires. Au chapitre 4, nous étudions un autre argument du 100% monnaie : celui de permettre une réduction de la dette publique, en rendant à l’État l’intégralité du seigneuriage – argument souvent critiqué, dont nous montrons qu’il n’est pourtant pas infondé. Alors que le 100% monnaie suscite un regain d’intérêt depuis la crise de 2008, il nous a paru fondamental de clarifier ces questions. / This thesis studies the 100% money proposal, such as it was formulated in the United States in the 1930s by Henry Simons (the main author of the “Chicago Plan”), Lauchlin Currie and Irving Fisher in particular. The essence of this proposal is to divorce the creation of money from the lending of money: deposits serving as means of payment would be subjected to 100% reserves in lawful money, awarding the state a monopoly over money creation. Because this reform idea is regularly subject to confusion, we endeavour to clarify its concept and study its main arguments. In chapter 1, we show that the 100% money proposal ought not to be viewed as a mere avatar of the “Currency School” ideas: contrary to Peel’s Act of 1844, it contains no issuing rule by itself, leaving open the debate “rule or discretion”. In chapter 2, distinguishing between two broad approaches to the 100% money proposal, we show that it does not imply abolishing bank intermediation based on savings deposits at all. In chapter 3, we analyse, through Fisher’s works, the main objective of the 100% money proposal: that of putting an end to the pro-cyclical behaviour of the volume of money, caused by the dependency relationship between money creation and bank loans. In chapter 4, we study another argument of the 100% money proposal: that of allowing a reduction of public debt, by returning the totality of seigniorage back to the state—an oft-criticised argument, which, as we show, is not unfounded however. While the 100% money proposal has been arousing renewed interest since the 2008 crisis, we thought it was fundamental to clarify these issues.

The study is concerned with the conception of capital and income in the changing economic circumstances of the late nineteenth century. This issue arises as a matter of interest from the confusing accounting for capital assets then followed, and which has become the subject of a small but significant literature. Methodologically the issue, and the literature it has provoked, provide a 'set' in which an accounting calculation is identified, its context considered and consequences evaluated. It introduces the idea that accounting had macroeconomic implications, and meets Hopwood's (1983) injunction that accounting ought to be considered in the context in which it arises. The study illustrates the significance of a flawed accounting founded on an inadequate definition of capital to adversely affect economic life by reference to the legal debate and litigation in English courts about the definition of profit available for distribution as dividends that occurred at the end of the nineteenth century. The study explores nineteenth century understanding of the concept of capital in economic philosophy on the basis that it would be in that body of philosophic literature that such ideas would have to be examined. The study finds that, for most of the nineteenth century, understanding of the nature of capital and income derived from the works of William Petty and Adam Smith. It held that capital and income were separate states of wealth. This conception of capital continued in the work of David Ricardo, Marx and J. S. Mill, and is evident also in the work of Alfred Marshall. The modern, twentieth century, understanding of capital and income as antithetical states of wealth is identified in the study as deriving from the work of the American economist Irving Fisher in 1896. The contribution of this thesis is to • Establish that the crisis in late nineteenth century financial reporting derived from the prevailing conception of capital and its relationship to income, • note that the conception in legislative requirements determining profit were consistent with that definition, and • identify the origin of the modern, twentieth century understanding of capital and income as antithetical states of wealth. The study provides an in-principle view that nineteenth century capital accounting had the capacity to cause misallocation of resources within an economy.