The principal aim of the Lisbon Treaty is to address the pre-Lisbon concerns about the coherence of EU action. In this regard, coherence is the simple litmus test for EU external action in the post-Lisbon era. This thesis investigates the coherence of EU external action towards Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the post-Lisbon era in light of the requirement of coherence in EU external relations law and the introduction of the HR/VP and the EEAS in her service with the aim of enhancing coherence in EU external action. The principle of coherence governs the interaction between various policy strands of EU external action (horizontal coherence). The importance of coherence is linked to visibility and efficiency based on the effective use of EU resources, as well as to the credibility of the Union. This thesis concentrates on coherence in the interaction between EU policies towards SSA using the key EU policies towards the region namely development policy, trade policy, the CFSP and the CSDP. The regional context facilitates the analysis of the different strands of external action policies where, despite of or perhaps due to the Treaty of Lisbon, the different instruments of EU foreign policy and lines of competence demarcation between their institutions are still mired in complexity. Although the focus is on coherence, the specialised regional focus of the thesis also facilitates a broader understanding of the nuances in the implementation of EU external relations law and EU external policies in different contexts especially in the post-Lisbon era. Using Mali as a case study, the thesis submits that while it can be argued that policy coherence for development (which is a key requirement in EU external action towards SSA) cannot be certainly determined, Mali clearly illustrates incoherence vis-à-vis synergy in the sequencing of available policy options in EU external action towards SSA. The thesis also discussed the limits and prospects of coherence in EU external action despite the changes made at Lisbon.

This thesis explores the shifts and continuities in the construction of security in the post-communist period. The thesis provides an insight into the reasons and the ways in which the dominant discourse of security and foreign policy of the Albanian state shifted in 1997 from a an emphasis on the ‘nation’ and ‘national sovereignty’ into a liberal discourse which emphasized the ‘economy’ and the ‘region’. The overarching question of the thesis is why did the Euro-Atlantic orientation become the hegemonic discourse of Albanian foreign and security policy in the post-1997 period? In order to find the answer for this question I will concentrate on the meanings that the Albanian political elites—and more specifically the two main governing parties, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party— have attached to the notions of ‘national question’ and ‘Euro-Atlantic orientation’. The argument of the thesis is that the different articulations of ‘Euro-Atlantic orientation’ and of the ‘national interest’ have relied upon the elites’ different conceptions of self, that is, what constituted Albanianism. In turn, the political actors translate the basic identity narratives of the nation through their ideological/interpretative repertoires. The thesis builds on Discourse Theory and particularly the approach developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) By incorporating notions of ‘identification strategies’, ‘interpretative repertoires’ and ‘myth’ into the framework of Lene Hansen and Ole Waever (2001), the thesis reveals the intricate interplay between the construction of state identity and of political identities in post-communist Albania.

This thesis examines the impact of Europeanization on the foreign policy of the new member states of the European Union, using as case studies Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. It asks what the extent of Europeanization of foreign policy is and whether and to what extent there has been divergence in the way in which the new member states have responded to the similar constraints and opportunities of the European integration. Insofar as divergence can be identified, a third research question asks why there is policy divergence. It argues that the governmental politics and the politics of national identity play a key role as mediating factors for the Europeanization of the system of policy making, the process of elite socialization and the conduct of foreign policy itself. Three critical international events are used as sub-case studies in order to assess the extent of Europeanization of foreign policy of the CEE counties: the US-led war in Iraq in 2003, the NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008. The study’s findings suggest that the pressures of Europeanization leads to convergence in some policy areas, but domestic factors such as governmental and national identity politics offer a more convincing explanation of divergence. Overall, Europeanization is uneven not only across issue-areas, but also across countries. The limits of convergence as an outcome of Europeanization and the persistence of diversity are therefore best accounted for by the diversity of domestic factors.

This thesis examines the manner in which some environments, such as ‘ethnic’ conflict situations, provide fertile ground for securitization process to develop into a more institutionalized form. Once institutionalized, securitization is no longer limited to the typical unidirectional top-down (i.e. elite-driven) path, but rather it becomes subject to bottom-up and horizontal forces, creating what is termed in this thesis ‘horizontal’ and ‘bottom-up’ securitization. These horizontal and bottom-up forces lead to ‘involuntary’ acts at the actor and audience levels, which in turn contribute to the perpetuation and further institutionalization of an already securitized environment. Within this framework the audiences have a much more active role in the development and perpetuation of security narratives and threats than they do in the ‘mainstream’ reading of the theory. The Cyprus conflict, as an intractable ‘ethnic’ conflict, is used to test the abovementioned arguments. Empirical evidence from the case study demonstrates that the social context dominating such environments contributes significantly to the development of institutionalized, horizontal and bottom-up securitization, obstructing desecuritization and subsequently also the prospects for conflict resolution.

This thesis investigates what it means to view disruptive innovation as a political problem. I take my point of departure in the tendency for controversial disruptions in heavily regulated sectors, such as electronic cigarettes or hydraulic fracturing, to open regulatory spaces by challenging established expectations about how they ought to be governed. In the wake of such disruption, policy actors with a stake in the matter engage in sensemaking and discursive contests to control the meaning of the innovations in order to close the regulatory spaces by aligning them with one set of laws instead of another. I study these contests in two recent legislative initiatives of the European Union to address the disruptive potential of e-cigarettes and fracking: the 2014 revision of the Tobacco Products Directive and the 2014 Commission recommendations on unconventional fossil fuels. The research draws on 51 interviews carried out with key policy actors during and after the policy debates. I bolster this with an analysis of policy documents, press releases and scientific studies, as well as a content and network analysis of position statements in newspaper articles. I find that the strategic use of rhetoric and framing plays an important part in creating, maintaining, and entrenching opposed coalitions in both policy debates. In both case studies, the policy solution is accompanied by deteriorating levels of trust among participants, leading coalitions to engage in strategies of venue-shopping to circumvent their opponents. This underscores the significant challenges there are for policymakers to address disruptions while maintaining legitimacy. The original contribution of the thesis lies in its novel conceptualization of disruptive innovation as a political problem, its application of micro-sociological approaches to the politics of expertise and European public policy, and its practical and theoretical suggestions for how to better study periods of disruption and govern through them.

The current doctoral research looks at how norm entrepreneur and norm interpreter interact, highlighting the limitations of previous research in recognising the agency of the norm interpreter and the complex interactions between the two actors. Normative encounters is coined as a central concept for understanding how the EU as norm entrepreneur creates normative dialogues with its interlocutors, in this case Latin American regional organisations. Two dynamics are proposed to show how normative encounters happen or are prevented from doing so. On one side, an analysis is made of cases in which the norm entrepreneur attempts to diffuse its norms to the norm interpreter that localises the norms which are then incorporated (or not) in concrete policies through policy entrepreneurship. On the other side, an equally important dynamic starts with the norm interpreter that creates new norms though norm subsidiarity, diffuses this new normative content and creates a need for the initial norm entrepreneur to adapt its normative approach and to make it visible to the norm interpreter through concrete policies. By using concepts from both International Relations and public policy studies, the thesis questions and updates the way of looking at the European Union as a normative actor. It also explores the link between norms and policies by analysing the European Union cooperation for development strategies and programmes, as well as the negotiation of Association Agreements with three regional groups in Latin America: Central America, Mercosur and the Andean Community. Thus, the study opens a space of analysis in which norm entrepreneurship is part of both the EU desire to diffuse its norms and of its need to adapt to a new international context. In this way, norm entrepreneurship becomes also a reaction to norm subsidiarity and makes it imperative for the European Union to use new norms if it is to keep its normative identity. We are witnessing a shift from a world in which the EU diffuses norms to other actors and regions, to a world in which the EU norms are perceived, interpreted and sometimes challenged, sometimes rejected and replaced by new ones.

This study examines the development of Western European Communist parties (WECPs) and their post-Communist successor parties. These parties had always adapted in surprising ways as they struggled in political systems that they sought to overthrow. Following the collapse of Communism in 1989 in central and Eastern Europe (CEE) they continued to amaze. Some reformed themselves dramatically, sacrificing or transforming their policies in search of office and votes. A number of them moved into mainstream politics and became more influential as other parties brought them into governing coalitions or they expanded at elections. Several WECPs disappeared but others resisted compromising their orthodox Marxism- Leninism. These hard-line Stalinist parties managed to remain significant players in their party systems. This in-depth study analyses the reasons behind the divergent trajectories of five WECPs and their post-Communist successor parties in the Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland and Portugal. It does this by importing and refining an analytical framework developed to explain the diverse adaptation of Communist parties in CEE. Extensive primary research based on elite interviews and the analysis of party programmes is used to evaluate the framework's usefulness and its implications for studying the trajectories of Communist parties in Western Europe (and beyond). There are two main empirical findings from this research. First, it was elites with experience in working with groups and institutions outside their parties that led efforts to reform WECPs, just as in CEE successor parties. Second, mid-level elites in WECPs were not necessarily hardliners bent on resisting reform. Their leaders could be extremely effective in advocating reforms and convincing members into supporting them, meaning that organisational democratisation could be compatible with reform. This meant that organisational centralisation was not as necessary as it was in the successor parties in CEE. Moreover, reformist party leaders had not, like their counterparts in CEE, learnt to be centralisers through past struggles over reform. When party leaders did pursue elitist strategies to promote programmatic transformation this usually took place through shifting power to the party in public office rather than central office.

This research studies mass-elite dimensions of support for the EU in Bulgaria. The scope is to fill a missing gap in the existing literatures on public opinion and party positions on European integration providing an in-depth study on a specific case of Central and Eastern Europe before accession. In order to present the most comprehensive study, the research employs quantitative and qualitative research methodologies in the form of cross tabulations of public opinion surveys, contents and discourse analysis of election programmes, parliamentary debates and elite interviews. The main research question is what the level of support was for the EU at mass and elite levels in Bulgaria during the accession process, and what the relationship between them was. The results are likely to be valid well beyond the specific interest of the research in all current member states and candidate countries. The main conclusions drawn from this project are that in Bulgaria the utilitarian and proxy models of support explain well the high degree of public support for EU membership before accession and in that respect Bulgaria conforms to the analysis of past academic contributions on public opinion in Central and Eastern Europe. At elite level European integration was perceived positively and debated in broad terms until the Copenhagen criteria for accession were formulated. In the latter part of the transition EU membership was established as a valence issue in Bulgarian party politics but the parties differed in their visions of the EU according to ideology, their coalition potential and positions in the party system. Moreover, the level of support for the EU in Bulgaria was influenced by internal (domestic) and external (EU related) factors associated with European integration. Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis provide a contextual framework for the empirical chapters by describing the environment in which support for the EU in Bulgaria was formed and developed. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 analyse the public and elite debates on European integration. The concluding Chapter 7 builds upon the thesis' findings by suggesting new avenues for research.

The overarching focus of this thesis is Serbian government strategies under the Serbian Progressive Party towards European integration based on a rationalist approach to Europe. Current research on Serbia assumes the rationalist approach whereby Serbian elites’ strategies towards EU integration are driven by the logic of consequences, in the calculation of benefits and losses resulting from EU membership. This study will take the analysis further by examining Serbian government strategies towards EU accession through the prism of rationalism as well as statecraft where the desire for power has been one of the main driving forces for the Progressives’ strategy to EU conditionality. The research will be a comparative case study using two distinct policy areas of Kosovo and media freedom in Serbia and argue that the Progressives have engaged in partial compliance with regard to Kosovo and fake compliance in the area of media freedom. Both cases have reputational costs of compliance but the differences in outcomes can be attributed to the extent of the EU’s competencies in each policy area and the visibility of Serbian compliance to conditionality. Media freedom, an internal issue, is a low visible area as media freedom legislation is namely in the hands of national governments, thereby limiting the EU’s capacity to regulate and enforce media freedom in some of its own member states as well applicants. Kosovo is a highly visible policy area as a consequence of the presence of external actors monitoring Serbian compliance, thereby increasing the EU’s capacity in this field and making Serbian compliance/non-compliance difficult to hide. Previous scholarship on EU integration in applicant states analyses the EU’s conditionality-driven approach which enforces compliance on acceding countries. However, the thesis seeks to contribute to the existing research by questioning the sustainability of such an approach and the EU’s legitimacy as a normative power seeking to export its values to accession countries. Serbia, is an example within a national context, that seeks to elucidate this argument especially in light of the EU’s exchange of regional stability (Kosovo) for external lenience on matters of democracy (media freedom).

2005 was a landmark year in the European Union’s (EU) financial reporting history as all EU listed firms were required to switch from national accounting standards to IFRS. Using a sample of European commercial banks, this study explores two research questions within the framework of equity valuation theory: (i) whether the disclosed fair value estimates of loans and advances; held-to-maturity investments; deposits; and other debt, as well as the recognition of derivatives at fair value, are value relevant, (ii) whether the adoption of IFRS led to a reduction in European banks’ cost of equity capital. The results show that the fair value of loans and advances and other debt are value relevant as is the recognition of derivatives at fair value. Further analysis revealed that the relevance of fair value of loans and derivatives is contingent on banks’ financial health and earnings variability, respectively, as well as on the ability of countries to enforce IFRS. The findings also indicate that the cost of equity capital of European commercial banks decreased after the adoption of IFRS. However, banks domiciled in countries with continental accounting standards and weak enforcement rules experienced a greater reduction in their cost of equity capital.