Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-117).

This study seeks to advance the understanding of appellate promotion in the senior judiciary of Great Britain . It describes the population and attributes of judges who served in the British High Courts, Court of Appeal, and Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (i.e., Law Lords) from 1850 to 1990. It specifically builds upon the work of C. Neal Tate and tests his model of appellate recruitment on a larger and augmented database. The study determines that family status, previously asserted as having a large effect on recruitment to the appellate courts, is not as important as previously believed. It concludes that merit effects, professional norms, and institutional constraints offer equally satisfactory or better explanations of appellate recruitment patterns.

Judicial misconduct -- Judges' insensitivity to stress -- Courtroom gender bias against women -- Complaints against and removal of judges -- Courtroom fairness.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / This dissertation constructs and illustrates a model of the field of norms which lies before an appellate judge. The style of the model is both academic and graphic. The function is analytic. The method is phenomenological, analytic and synthetic. Three major illustrations--landmark cases--provide a synthesis and explanation at the boundary lines of the field sectors. In Chapter II, the structural elements of the field are analyzed. First, the field is encircled and divided into thirds along a scale of normative agreement-disagreement, noting, concurrently, correlative social processes which provide social order. Where there is normative unity, processes of prescription provide order; where plurality, collaboration; where diversity, reciprocity. Second, the field is divided into three levels. Within the ultimate-mediate-proximate hierarchy, there is an inverse relationship between formal and situational authority. When norm components (subject, normed-act, and conditions of application) fit the case, lower norms exert more influence than do hi gher norms. When fit is at issue, higher norms control. Third, the sectors which lie between the three processes of social order are identified and examined as basic social units whose functional specializations are guided by particular norm types. The cultural (religious, familial, educational, and artistic) sector is bounded by processes of prescription and reciprocity; persons feel themselves to be duty-bound and conscience-directed by patterns of being and belonging. The economic-political sector is bounded by processes of reciprocity and collaboration; persons feel the necessity of choice and calculation of means and ends in order to achieve their interests. The legal (primarily judicial) sector is bounded by processes of collaboration and prescription; litigants feel the process by which they will be judged should be fair, and the content should be more than legal; judges feel they should account to litigants and various publics for their actions by reasoned reference to legal standards which respond to the whole life-range of norms. Finally,the hierarchical levels of the three sectors are examined and described separately. The cultural sector is differentiated into ethos, moral code, and mores; the economic-political sector into goals, policies, and needs; the legal sector into concepts, rules-in-books, and rules-in-action. In Chapter III, the focus is upon functional elements at the boundaries of the units of the normative field. The problem is to understand how sectors and levels are maintained as separate yet interdependent units. First, a range of inter-level actions is analyzed. Next, the three normative processes--prescription, reciprocity, and collaboration--are examined in detail on both sides of the boundary and at each of the normative levels. The difference at the legal-cultural boundary is illustrated by Griswold v. Connecticut, in which the Supreme Court made explicit as legal precept what was already implicit in the moral code--the right of married persons to use contraceptives. At the legal and economic-political boundary, Mac Pherson v. Buick shows how the New York Court of Appeals imposed a principle of due care upon manufacturers' policies. The eventual importance of action at the cultural and economic-political boundary is illustrated in Chapter IV by the School Segregation Cases. There the Court bolstered efficient against traditional norms for ordering racial diversity by making explicit the creed of equality as fundamental law and imposing a doctrine of federal supremacy on citizenship questions upon states-rights ideology. Concluding, the appropriateness and general fit of the illustrations to the theoretical model support the assumptions that appellate judges make their decisions within a patterned normative field, and that the pattern can be found and described analytically. / 2031-01-01

Judges strive to achieve both balance and fairness in their rulings and courtrooms. When either of these is compromised, or when judicial discretion appears to be handed down or enforced in random or capricious ways, then bias is present. Bias is unavoidable, because judges are human, they have certain preferences, and lawyers do not always know how to get familiar with judges' style and previous rulings. Lawyers strive to win their cases by persuading judges that their argument is better than opposing counsel, and deserves merit. Understanding rhetoric, the history and art of persuasion that goes back to Ancient Greece and Rome, gives lawyers the strategies they need to communicate effectively with judges and win cases, but rhetoric is not taught in law schools. My thesis explores the history and magnitude of the problem of bias in bench trials, and offers discussion of how rhetoric can be used ethically by both judges and lawyers. I examine how the judicial system works and conclude with ideas for dealing with bias. In studying bias, I have drawn on textual sources including legal journals, books written by lawyers and judges, accounts of legal and judicial history, materials from political science, rhetoric and communication, current events and news reports, and observed judges on popular reality television programs and in municipal courtrooms.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Drexel University, 2007. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-87). Also available online

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern.

Thesis--Marburg. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. i-xii).

Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 58.