Indonesia’s cooperation in maritime security initiatives is vitally important because half of the world’s trading goods and oil pass through Indonesian waters including the Straits of Malacca, the Strait of Sunda and the Strait of Lombok. Consequently, Indonesia’s active engagement in maritime cooperation is a matter of some import for the international community. However, Indonesia’s varying participation across maritime cooperation arrangements is puzzling. Indonesia has joined some of these cooperation initiatives and opted out of others despite the presence of United States leadership. This thesis addresses this puzzle by carrying out a comparative analysis of 26 cooperation arrangements using government documents and elite interviews in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and New York. In addition to addressing an empirical puzzle, this thesis also contributes to the theoretical debate on international cooperation. The International Relations literature on cooperation tends to focus on great power bargaining. Whether, why and how middle powers decide to join international initiatives over which they have little influence has been overlooked. The implication of this study suggests that neither the calculation of relative gains as argued by neorealists, the constructivist expectation regarding the importance of shared identity, the neorealist or the neoliberal argument on the role of hegemonic leadership nor the bureaucratic politics approach emphasis on competing government actors’ preferences can explain the variation in Indonesia’s engagement with cooperation initiatives. I argue that Indonesia’s decision to cooperate is formed by the calculation of absolute gains. Indonesia cooperated as long as the benefits of cooperation exceeded the costs.

The thesis analyses the development of the concept of flexible integration in the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) of the European Union (EU) and outlines an array of ideas, interests and issues at stake for the actors in the negotiations. The thesis has two objectives: (1) to explain the 1996-97 IGC process of negotiation which led to the institutionalisation of flexible integration in the Amsterdam Treaty and (2) to analyse the substance of the flexibility debate from the early 1970s to the present day. The research aims to show that flexibility comes to the fore whenever at least one of the following five issues is debated on the European level: (1) economic and monetary union, (2) free movement, (3) defence, (4) enlargement and (5) the exclusion of recalcitrant member states. The 1996-97 IGC was exceptional in that it met all the five criteria which have a tendency to trigger the flexibility debate. The thesis has three basic lines of argumentation. The first relates to the ICC process, the argument being that the 1996-97 IGC negotiations on flexibility were m incremental learning process where the basic positions of the member governments illustrated some continuity, but the specific positions of the negotiators fluctuated with the dynamics of the negotiations. The second line of argumentation relates to the concept of flexibility itself (substance), the argument being that one of the main difficulties with the flexibility negotiations was that flexibility meant different things to different people. Member governments did not necessarily agree about its purpose. The final strand of argumentation relates to the key players in the flexibility debate. Although all member states, large and small, played an important role in the IGC process, the most influential actors in the 1996-97 IGC were the civil servants of the respective Presidencies and the Council Secretariat.

China has become heavily dependent on Australia for resource supply as a result of her rapid economic growth over the 2000s. Stable and reliable resource supply from Australia has become a matter of national economic security. Yet, China’s resource relationship with Australia is grown out of a delicate geopolitical framework, because Australia is not only a resource superpower but also a staunch U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite extensive economic interdependence between the two countries, China faces a huge challenge to build a genuinely reliable and close resource partnership with Australia. This study discusses how China has pro actively sought to shape or adapt to the evolving power dynamics behind the bilateral resource politics over the 2000s. It provides a relevant case study on the resource politics between a rising great power and a resource superpower under the condition of complex interdependence. China’s search for resource security has become the primary goal of her policy towards Australia in the 2000s. However, China’s engagement with Australia has led to an uneasy resource partnership with growing competitive dynamics and constant power struggle. The political context of the resource ties between China and Australia has changed dramatically towards the end of the 2000s, as the systemic impact of China’s rise has resulted in a deterioration in the strategic dimension of China-Australia relations. This has in turn created considerable constraints and uncertainties in China’s resource cooperation with Australia. Both the difficult resource investment ties and the inequitable iron ore trade relationship show the limits of this resource partnership. Australia’s approach to this critical resource relationship with China remains ad hoc, transactional and oriented to short-term interest maximisation. Despite her growing power, China remains the more vulnerable party in the uneven resource interdependence with Australia. The Chinese have sought to improve their power position vis-à-vis the Australians; but domestic economic constraints and internal fragmentation have considerably undermined Chinese efforts to gain the upper hand in the bilateral resource politics. China has to navigate cautiously between power and vulnerability in her engagement with Australia.

In an increasingly interconnected global political sphere, Islamist political actors have undergone a process of transformation, notwithstanding the self-referential character of their ideology. The present study assesses to what extent international norms have influenced this process. The argument is that these norms challenge the self-referential character of Islamism and its communitarian assumptions. The thesis initially provides an overview of Islamist political theory with reference to Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Sayid Quṭb, Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, and argues that Islamism is not a particularly original critique of liberalism, but can be considered a form of communitarianism. The study then focuses on the case of Hezbollah to substantiate the claim that international norms influenced Islamist politics. It conducts an empirical analysis of four instances of Hezbollah’s interaction with international norms. The norms in question are non-combatant immunity, human rights, and maintenance of international peace, whereas the fourth example provides a more general overview on the impact of international norms on Hezbollah’s political language. The case study shows that by interacting with international actors and state institutions, and by looking for legitimacy for its actions - not only vis-à-vis its community - but also within the international normative system; Hezbollah’s political identity was modified by the influence of international norms. International norms then challenge the communitarian assumptions underlying Islamist politics. They are important factors in the socialisation of Islamist actors within the international normative system and become constitutive elements of the political identity of Islamist movements such as Hezbollah.

After its transition to democracy and decolonisation in the mid-1970s, Portugal’s main external focus shifted from Africa and the Atlantic to Europe. However, past priorities continued to occupy an important place in its foreign policy. This thesis assesses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on Portuguese foreign policy by focusing on relations with Angola and Mozambique, the two largest former colonies of Portugal in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis uses the concept of “Europeanisation”, comprising three relevant dimensions for examining possible changes in the foreign policy of an EU member state: national adaptation (a “top-down” process), national projection (“bottom-up”), and identity formation (socialisation process). In order to better control for the influence of other variables (beyond the EU) on Portuguese policy, the concept of Europeanisation is framed within a foreign policy analysis approach. The study focuses on the period between 1978 and 2010, and covers three policy areas: external trade, development aid and political-diplomatic issues. The application of this analytical framework produced significant evidence of Europeanisation, both in its dimension of national adaptation and, chiefly, national projection. The analysis also revealed variations across policy areas and country cases, with the strongest evidence of Europeanisation found for the domain of trade and for the case of Mozambique in general. These findings give support to studies stressing that EU membership “strengthened” Portugal’s postcolonial relations, but also add a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the EU’s impact on the national level.

Although the conundrums of why states falter, how they are reconstituted, and under what conditions war may be constitutive of state-making have received much scholarly attention, they are still hotly debated by academics and policy analysts. Advancing a novel conceptual framework and analysing diverse Somali state trajectories between 1960 and 2010, this thesis adds to those debates both theoretically and empirically. The core issues examined are why and how Somaliland managed to establish state-run structures of governance, how far its development paralleled or diverged from past Somali state trajectories, and under what conditions violent conflict advanced or abridged the polities’ varied state-making projects. Drawing on diverse strands of literature on state-building, nationalism and warfare, the thesis develops an original analytical frame to better understand processes of state-making and state-breaking. It argues not only for the need of ‘bringing the nation back in’, but proposes to conceptualize state trajectories in terms of changing levels of institutional and socio-cognitive standardization. Scrutinizing received wisdom, the empirical research presented finds, amongst others, that Somali state trajectories have been less unique than commonly claimed, and proposes that Somaliland’s alleged state-making success between 1991 and 2010 hinged at least as much on autocratic governance, top-down policies and coercive means as on frequently emphasized elements of grassroots peace-making, ‘traditional’ reconciliation and ‘home-grown’ democracy. Conceptually, the project is located at the intersection of political-economy and historical and institutional approaches to state-making. Applying qualitative research framed in comparative case studies the thesis not only advances the theoretical debate surrounding issues of state fragility and state-making, but also offers novel insights into Somalia’s history and presents new empirical findings on the frequently romanticised case of Somaliland. Yet, the research results are significant beyond Somali boundaries as they provide relevant insights for our general understanding of state trajectories and the role of conflict in statemaking and state-breaking.

Can and does neoclassical realism explain the difference in how India and China mobilise oil (a key resource) externally to meet their respective goals and objectives. The thesis illustrates how political economy (political economy as employed in the thesis examines the structure of the economic system, not the foreign policy executive) is incorporated as the intervening variable into neoclassical realism to explain the acquisition of oil blocks by Indian and Chinese oil corporations in West Africa. Consequently, the thesis transcends the existing or prevalent theories of neoclassical realism which either elucidate structural outcomes like polarity or balancing, or deviations from neorealism like under balancing or over balancing. The thesis postulates that the independent or the exogenous variable i.e. the difference in the relative power of India and China elucidates the ability of Chinese oil companies to outbid their Indian competitors and/or be preferred as partners by international oil companies (IOCs) and/or have better quality oil blocks as well as China’s widespread outreach in 11 countries in West Africa compared to India’s presence in two counties namely Nigeria and Gabon. The intervening variable or the difference in the political economy of India and China explicates why China is represented by state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the oil industry in West Africa where as India is represented by SOEs and/or private enterprises. For case study analysis, the thesis uses a pattern-matching logic in 11 countries in West Africa and employs Angola, Nigeria and Gabon for in depth case studies. The thesis examines not only the bids that Chinese and Indian oil corporations place for the oil blocks but tries to explicate the reason why they are able to place those bids. It examines the rate of return on capital/investment, rate of interest on loans and the ease of availability of loans or finance, the difference in the level of technology and ability to acquire technology, project management skills, risk aversion, valuation of the asset and the difference in the economic, political and diplomatic support received by the Chinese and Indian oil companies from their respective governments. It also discusses the reasons why the Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) are preferred as partners by African oil companies and IOCs. Thus, the thesis provides a more comprehensive explanation for the ability of the Chinese oil companies to mobilise oil in the oil industry in West Africa relative to their Indian counterparts, and makes an empirical contribution to the existing literature on India and China in the oil industry in West Africa.

The thesis analyses the conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power in the multilateral trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round and Doha Development Agenda (DDA). It deals with two related research questions. The central question of this research is: to what extent and why did Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power decrease from the Uruguay Round to the DDA? This question is related to the following auxiliary research question: what are the conditioning factors of Canada’s and Japan’s bargaining power during the Uruguay Round and DDA, and to what extent have these factors changed from one round to the other? While the thesis includes a general overview of their negotiation profiles, it analyzes specific, detailed case studies of the profiles of these countries in anti-dumping and market access/NAMA negotiations in both rounds. The hypothesis of this research is that Japan and Canada have lost bargaining power from the Uruguay Round to the DDA because of changes in the following conditioning factors: economic power; activity in country coalitions and groups; interests groups and decision-making structures on the domestic level; ideational power; and foreign policy objectives. In addition, the importance of the position of the preferences a country in the spectrum of the overall membership of multilateral trade negotiations is examined. The thesis finds that this hypothesis is partially confirmed. Canada and Japan have mainly lost bargaining power owing to a relative decrease in their economic power, a lower profile in central negotiation groups as well as coalitions, and due to domestic politics. Ideational power and especially foreign policy objectives can be considered less relevant. The thesis also finds that especially Japan’s bargaining power in anti-dumping negotiations was affected by a change of the position of its preferences within the spectrum of the overall membership of the negotiations.

This study examines to what extent Indonesia’s transition to democracy has impacted Jakarta’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the foreign policy-making process, its fundamental doctrine, and foreign policy strategies in three specific areas: regional cooperation in ASEAN, promotion of political values, and conflict management. The puzzle this thesis addresses is that Indonesia’s foreign policy in many ways does not conform to expectations generated by theoretical works on democratization and foreign policy. The dissertation argues that Indonesia’s democratisation has affected Jakarta’s foreign policy only in a mixed and limited fashion. While Indonesia’s democratisation has shaped ideas that have influenced Indonesia’s foreign policy, some traditional foreign policy pillars continue to be relevant. First, notwithstanding Indonesia’s democratic transition, Jakarta remains committed to the principle of an independent and active (bebas-aktif) foreign policy. As such, maintaining a balanced presence of big powers remains a key explanation for Indonesia’s policies on East Asia cooperation. Second, while democratisation has led to the proliferation of foreign policy actors, foreign policy-making remains largely unaltered, with the president and the foreign minister serving as the central decision-makers. However, democratisation has changed the substance or style of Indonesian foreign policy, and such a change is discernible in efforts to shape political cooperation in ASEAN, Jakarta’s management of conflict on Ambalat dispute with Malaysia, and its Myanmar policy. Additionally, democracy and human rights now prominently feature in Indonesia’s foreign policy strategy towards the wider Asia. Significantly, however, while democracy promotion has been driven by the desire of Indonesia’s foreign policy leaders to reflect its newfound identity, human rights promotion has been lacking in Indonesia’s promotion of political values abroad due to domestic considerations. Hence, frameworks focusing on the role of identity and ideas in foreign policy flowing from democratization offer an important, yet insufficient explanation of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the cases discussed. Using an integrative approach that draws on works on the role of leaders, the salience of institutions, and the influence of identity and ideas in foreign policy, this study contributes to the wider discussion about the relationship between democratisation and foreign policy.

Over the past two decades, there has been a rapid increase in funds made available by the international donor community to support local civil society actors in fragile states. Current peacebuilding and development efforts support and strive to recreate an active, vibrant and ―liberal‖ civil society. In the case of Sierra Leone, paradoxically, the growing support has not strengthened civil society actors based on that liberal idea(l). Instead of empowering individuals, enhancing democratic ownership and pro-active participation stemming from the civil sphere, Sierra Leone‘s civil society landscape appears to be neutralised, depoliticised if not instrumentalised to provide social services the state is either too weak or unwilling to deliver. In critically assessing how Sierra Leone‘s civil sphere became depoliticised during the country‘s peacebuilding and development phase, the thesis advances three main arguments. First, it supports the commonly agreed consensus in scholarship that postwar civil societies have become instrumentalised to serve a broader liberal peacebuilding and development agenda in several ways. Second, a deeper inquiry into the history of state formation and political culture of Sierra Leone reveals that Ekeh‘s (1975) bifurcated state is very much alive. In short, Western idea(l)s of participatory approaches and democracy are repeatedly challenged by a persisting urban-rural divide as well as socially entrenched forms of neopatrimonialism, elite-loyalism and tribalism. Sierra Leonean civil society finds itself currently in the midst of renegotiating those various intersections of a primordial and civic sphere. Third, the effects colonialism has had on African societies are still reflected in the current monopolisation of wealth and power among a few (elites) next to a vast majority living in abject poverty. More concretely, how abject poverty, human development and above all the lack of education affect activism and agency from below remains a scarcely addressed aspect in the peacebuilding and development literature.