East African states in the 21st century face the challenge of some of the highest rates of urban growth the world has ever seen. Cities are expanding despite low levels of industrialisation and formal employment, in contexts where states often struggle to fulfil basic functions. This thesis aims to bridge a gap between the literature on cities and urban development and scholarship pertaining to the role of the state in developing countries, to explain why responses to the urban challenge are producing widely diverging outcomes in the region. Through a comparative case study analysis of Kampala, Uganda and Kigali, Rwanda, it analyses why attempts to implement certain urban policies and regulations have been much more effective in the latter than the former. It explores this divergence in relation to four critical aspects of urban transformation: physical development (urban planning and development regulation), livelihoods in the informal economy (with a particular focus on petty trade), urban public transport, and urban local taxation. Most explanations for poor state performance focus on capacity, usually defined as bureaucratic competence. This study argues that this is inadequate, and that state effectiveness is highly dependent on the political context and the incentives for enforcement and compliance affecting state actors and urban social groups respectively. Through a process-tracing analysis drawing on six months of fieldwork, it highlights the importance of the credibility of government commitments, the sources of state legitimacy, the autonomy of different components of the state vis-à-vis social forces, and ingrained social power relations. It argues that these factors affect the degree to which formal state institutions are supported by (rather than conflicting with) informal norms. These state-society dynamics proved far more important than bureaucratic capacity in accounting for divergent state effectiveness with regard to implementing urban policy in the two cities under consideration.

The thesis is concerned with the nature of human action presupposed by normative theory; it is about recognising and articulating the fragility of the human within the context of human needs and assumptions made by international ethical theory. The primary aim of the thesis is to establish the existence of two basic needs necessary for moral action, to determine a global obligation to enable the meeting of those needs, and to articulate a necessary reconceptualisation of the state system in line with the demands of that obligation. The thesis makes this argument in three parts. By exploring and revealing the vulnerability and finitude of the individual actor, looking at the notion and language of ‘need’, and demonstrating what is involved in being held morally responsible, Part One seeks to provide an objective and universalist account of the prerequisites of moral action, establishing two basic needs: autonomy and freedom. The second Part of the thesis is dedicated to showing why there is a corresponding obligation – a ‘Global Principle’ – to meet these needs, an obligation which is cosmopolitan in scope and source. In its attempt to articulate a rationally-derived core and primary principle of justice, the thesis hopes to contribute to the cosmopolitan discourse of IPT. Part Three shows in what way the international system, with an emphasis on the state, needs to be reconceived; it argues that the state needs to be reconceptualised as a transparent enactor of the derivative duties of the Global Principle (through political and socio-economic reform) ensuring identification of the individual as the primary actor of responsibility within the international. Overall, the thesis aims to identify and acknowledge the limitations of the human and the necessity of some external provisions in order to enable her to become a normatively accountable actor. It aims to highlight what normative theory both assumes and reinforces about human action, arguing that only once the discourse of IPT has recognised the uniquely needing nature of the individual can she become a meaningful and free actor within the international arena.

This thesis examines the constitutional politics of international law, locating this as part of a wider debate over the nature of responsibility in conditions of uncertainty. Despite a general commitment to international legality operating in international society, international law’s claim to rule is limited by competing beliefs about the institutional practices generated and legitimated by this commitment. This thesis argues that there is a critical divide between “pragmatic” and “constitutionalist” ethics of legality. The account of legality developed here suggests that faith is itself a necessary and useful strategy for responding to social uncertainty and, to the extent that the institution of international law can generate this faith, a constitutional ethic cannot be dismissed as quickly or easily as pragmatists suppose. This claim is further developed through illustrating how this constitutional ethic of legality has begun to shape the politics surrounding the prohibition on torture, the governance of the global commons, the legitimacy of peacebuilding, and the regulation of the use of force.

The promotion of 'democracy' abroad has been a feature of US foriegn policy since the early part of the twentieth century, accompanying its rise as an international actor. It provided the ideological basis for its opposition to rivals in the form of imperialism, fascism and communism. The end of the Cold War, which signalled the emergence of the US as the sole superpower, accelerated this process. With the ideological fusion of democracy and capitalism credited in large measure for the defeat of capitalism and state-planned economy, the promotion of democracy alongside capitalism as the only viable, legitimate mode of governance emerged as an increasingly important component of US foreign policy. Countries as diverse as the Philippines, Chile and Poland have all been subject to US democracy promotion initiatives. In the Middle East though, the US traditionally engaged authoritarian governments as a means of ensuring its core interests in the region. However the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the G. W. Bush administration's perception of the Middle East's 'democratic deficit' as underlying cause, initiated a significant departure in the traditional direction of US policy. Democracy promotion subsequently emerged as a central tenet of US policy to the Middle East. This thesis argues that, as part of the strategy of democracy promotion in the Middle East, the US has sought to gradually replace proxy authoritarian governments with elite-based democracies. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, this strategic shift can be seen as a move from coercive to consensual forms of social control, the underlying aim being to ensure a more enduring form of stability in the states concerned. This is part of a long-term US strategy, evidences prior in other regions such as Latin America, which ultimately aims at the achievement of a Gramscian hegemony; that is the internalisation by other societies of the US interpretation of 'democracy', and associated norms and values, as the natural order. Utilising an analytical framework derived from the neo-Gramscian approach, the thesis focuses in the main on the Clinton (1993-2001) and G. W. Bush (2001-2008) administrations, and uses the following case studies - Egypt, Irag and Kuwait - to examine the US strategy of democracy promotion in the Middle East,

The ‘conditionalist’ approach to the economic statecraft literature in International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis seeks to establish the conditions under which economic instruments of foreign policy are likely to be effective. This thesis applies these conditions to a specific set of economic instruments of foreign policy, namely energy resources, the use of which is here referred to as ‘energy statecraft’. The conditions for successful implementation of energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy set forth in this study serve as a theoretical framework to test a specific case study of energy statecraft: Brazilian biofuels. The choice of Brazil as the only case study in this thesis is justified by its uniqueness in energy statecraft on two different levels: empirical and theoretical. Empirically, among the relatively few energy-exporting countries that use their energy resources as instruments of their foreign policy, Brazil is the only one that uses biofuels for that purpose, whereas other countries that implement energy statecraft mostly do so with petroleum and/or natural gas. Theoretically, Brazil’s promotion of biofuels to third countries is also unique because it is pursued through soft power – attraction by encouraging emulation of its own successful experience with biofuels – rather than through hard power: bribes or coercion. The case study is also analysed in the context of a decade characterised by energy security concerns, including worries over increasingly scarce traditional energy resources, skyrocketing oil prices, unreliability of conventional energy supplies, and environmental threats. All of these factors have boosted the advancement of biofuels worldwide. Finally, the means through which Brazil pursues its goal of turning ethanol into a global commodity is tested against the conditional criteria set out in the theoretical framework. The thesis concludes that this particular foreign policy strategy has been fruitless, with little progress made towards achieving its goal of ‘commoditizing’ ethanol in the short term, though its long-term prospects seem promising. Theoretically, the strategy’s ineffectiveness is attributed to the international context in which it took place, rather than any inherent characteristic of energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy.

This thesis offers a fresh interpretation of Anglo-American relations in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the period 1941 to 1945. Historians of Anglo-American relations have characterized the bilateral relationship as one of rivalry and polarization. While examples of underlying national competition can be identified wherever the wartime alliance operated, whether on the battlefield or at the conference table, the commonalities which united the allies should, however, be given equal weight. My thesis departs from the traditional historiographical perspective, arguing that when closely examined, the allies were very aware of the strategic reciprocal benefits that would emanate from integrating their policies in Saudi Arabia. First and foremost, Britain and the United States’ relations in Saudi Arabia were shaped by the fact that the two countries were allies working side by side in the global struggle that was the Second World War. In this wartime context, the strategic influence of Saudi Arabia has tended to be overlooked. The Kingdom’s influence resided in its geographic location, its religious centrality within Islam, and most importantly, its rare political status as a sovereign Arab state. These attributes served as a unifying force for British and American wartime interests, encouraging the two allies to strive for an Anglo-American partnership in Saudi Arabia that was built on the concept of strategic interdependence. While collaboration between Britain and the United States ebbed and flowed, it is a testament to their continued pursuit of cooperation that the activities of the wartime alliance in Saudi Arabia between 1941 and 1945 were envisaged by policymakers as a template for achieving greater Anglo-American accord throughout the Middle East during and beyond the Second World War.

This thesis seeks to explain why the European Union ratcheted up restrictive measures on Myanmar from 1991 until 2010, despite divergent interests of EU member states and the apparent inability of sanctions to quickly achieve the primary objectives of EU policy. This empirical puzzle applies the ‘sanctions paradox’ to the issue of joint action in the EU. It also connects the assessment of policy effectiveness to EU foreign policy-making. The investigation unravels this conundrum through competitive theory testing. The study discovers that EU foreign policy was essentially decided by the largest member states. Since 1996, the UK has fostered a consensus among EU policymakers on a principled common policy, which would induce political reform in Myanmar mainly via the implementation of punitive measures. Hence, noncompliance by the target with EU demands offers a credible, but insufficient explanation of why the EU tightened its sanctions regime. US pressure on EU policy was marginal. The dissertation argues that a ‘normative’ interpretation of liberal intergovernmentalism best solves this puzzle. The EU met domestic pressures for action, although the measures adopted were clearly too inadequate to be effective. Feedback on policy effectiveness did not play a significant role in EU decision-making. EU policy was driven by a consensus to treat Myanmar as a ‘pariah’ state. Ideological motivations have largely outweighed material interests. Normative arguments were necessary to put proposals on the common agenda; yet, decisions ultimately involved ‘cooperative bargaining’ among the largest states. Consensus building was therefore a dynamic process. The policy entrepreneur defined its interests domestically; member states with lower preference intensity generally refrained from opposing its leadership. This thesis thus contributes to the liberal intergovernmental scholarship by proposing a more comprehensive explanation for the drivers and constraints that influence the making of European sanctions.

Under the Koizumi and Abe administrations, the deterioration of the Japan-China relationship and growing tension between Japan and North Korea were often interpreted as being caused by the rise of nationalism. This thesis aims to explore this question by looking at Japan’s foreign policy in the region and uncovering how political actors manipulated the concept of nationalism in foreign policy discourse. The methodology employs discourse analysis on five case studies. It will be explored how the two administrations both used nationalism but in the pursuit of contrasting policies: an uncompromising stance to China and a conciliatory approach toward North Korea under the Koizumi administration, a hard-line attitude against North Korea and the rapprochement with China by Abe, accompanied by a friendship-policy toward India. These case studies show how the nationalism is used in the competition between political leaders by articulating national identity in foreign policy. Whereas this often appears as a kind of assertiveness from outside China, in the domestic context leaders use nationalism to reconstruct Japan’s identity as a ‘peaceful nation’ through foreign policy by highlighting differences from ‘other’s or by achieving historic reconciliation. Such identity constructions are used to legitimize policy choices that are in themselves used to marginalize other policy options and political actors. In this way, nationalism is utilized as a kind of political capital in a domestic power relationship, as can be seen by Abe’s use of foreign policy to set an agenda of ‘departure from the postwar regime’. In a similar way, Koizumi’s unyielding stance against China was used to calm discontents among right-wing traditionalists who were opposed to his reconciliatory approach to Pyongyang. On the other hand, Abe also utilized a hard-line policy to the DPRK to offset his rapprochement with China whilst he sought to prevent the improved relationship from becoming a source of political capital for his rivals. The major insights of this thesis is thus to explain how Japan’s foreign policy is shaped by the attempts of its political leaders to manipulate nationalism so as articulating particular forms of national identity that enable them to achieve legitimacy for their policy agendas, boost domestic credentials and marginalize their political rivals.

This thesis offers a concrete and practically applicable answer to the question of how to increase the legitimacy of the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security. In order to provide this answer, it connects the minutia of institutional design with the abstract principals of democratic theory in a systematic and reproducible method, thereby enabling a clear normative evaluation of even the smallest technical detail of reform. The thesis elaborates criteria for the evaluation of both the normative desirability as well as the political feasibility of individual reform proposals and applies these to a compilation of all the relevant proposals in four issue- areas: Security Council (SC) membership and voting, SC working methods, relations between the SC and the General Assembly, and relations between the SC and civil society. This evaluation demonstrates that there is a range of feasible proposals for reform that could improve the SC’s accountability both to the GA and to the general public, that could increase the opportunities for effective input from the UN membership and NGOs, and that would thereby promote the UN’s decision-making procedures on issues of global peace and security as a more inclusive, coherent and decisive deliberative system.

This thesis analyses the decision-making within the European Community on opening to the People’s Republic of China between 1969 and 1979. The three main research themes, which this thesis will make a contribution to, are the EC’s decision-making in foreign policy, European integration in the 1970s, and the intersection of European integration and the Cold War. Neither the historiography of the Cold War nor of European integration have dealt with the EC-PRC relationship. This research addresses that deficiency. This is the first detailed, systematic historical study of the origins of the Community’s response to China that bases on archival sources released according to the 30-year rule. The study takes a Community-centred perspective, focusing on how the interests of the EC member states, those of the EC intergovernmental and supranational actors came together in Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg to shape the EC’s response to the PRC. It is based on extensive multi-archival and multinational research, including records of the Community institutions, the French, British and German governments, personal papers, and interviews. The thesis argues that the Commission was the principal architect and motor behind the EC’s opening to China. Sir Christopher Soames, the first British vice-president and commissioner for external relations, was primarily responsible for establishing official relations. Personal beliefs and ambitions were at the root of his decision-making. Geopolitics were key. However the principal factor behind his and the Commission’s subsequent decisions was inter-institutional jockeying for power. The main implications of the opening were a furthering and deepening of European integration, and an acceleration of European détente and détente in Europe. This thesis therefore shows that the wrangle for competencies within the EC institutional system intertwined with broader trends of history, the end of the PRC’s isolation from international affairs and détente.