Since the 1 January 1995, Austria and Sweden have been members of the European Community (EC). This thesis analyses why the two countries joined the EC at a moment, when the latter's development towards a neo-liberal economic policy embodied in the Internal Market and the convergence criteria of the Economic and Monetary Union endangered their traditional Keynesian economic policy making and when the steps towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy threatened Austria's and Sweden's policies of neutrality. It is argued that the process leading to application and then the struggle around the referenda on membership in Austria and Sweden have to analysed against the background of globalisation, a structural change experienced since the early 1970s and characterised by the transnationalisation of production and finance and a shift from Keynesianism to neo-liberalism. Established theories of integration, which take existing power structures as given, are unable to explain instances of structural change. Consequently, a critical theory derived from neo-Gramscianism is developed as an alternative for the investigation of Austria's and Sweden's accession to the EC. Most importantly, its focus on social forces, engendered by the production process, allows the approach to conceptualise globalisation. Applied to the Austrian and Swedish case, it is established that alliances of internationally-oriented and transnational social forces of capital and labour respectively, supported by those institutions linked to the global economy such as the Finance Ministries, were behind the drive towards membership in the neo-liberal EC. While they succeeded in their undertaking, the forces opposed to the EC and neoliberalism should not be underestimated. Nationally-oriented labour and capital in Austria and labour mainly from the public sector in Sweden together with the Green Parties in both countries may well mount a successful challenge in the future. Changes in the international structure, although not of primary importance, implied that neutrality was no big obstacle to EC membership in the late 1980s/early 1990s. Gorbachev's liberal foreign policy and a general decline in the power of the Soviet Union in the case of Austria and the end of the Cold War in the case of Sweden allowed the pro-EC forces in both countries to redefine neutrality in a way that made it compatible with membership.

To what extent can ethics and foreign policy be conceived as possible? Instead of answering within the implied dichotomy of possibility and impossibility, this thesis argues for a reconceptualisation of the dichotomy. Ethics and foreign policy are better understood on the basis of undecidability: neither simply possible nor impossible, but both at the same time. A deconstructive reading of British (1997-2006) and EU (1999- 2004) foreign policy, both of which make claims to ethics, reveals how the issue is beset by internal contradictions, paradoxes and aporias. The deconstruction is structured around the concepts of subjectivity, responsibility and hospitality, each of which constitutes an important point of undecidability within British and EU representations of their ethical dimension. The subject of ethics and foreign policy is always haunted and inhabited by its object, responsibility is necessarily irresponsible, and hospitality contains an irrepressible hostility. Thus, ethics and foreign policy is best conceived as undecidably im-possible. However, such undecidability cannot be used to justify abandoning the goal of an ethical foreign policy. Rather, a Derridean 'negotiation' is proposed. Negotiation seeks to remain loyal to the dual injunction of deconstruction, an undecidability which is the condition of ethics and politics, and a decision which decides, and closes to certain figures of otherness. It requires a permanent questioning, testing and invention of the promise of ethics and foreign policy. This produces a range of illustrative suggestions for the possible enactment of an ethico-political foreign policy, which would refer to and strive for an ultimately unrealisable ethical foreign policy. This research contributes a fundamental critique and questioning of the possibility of ethics and foreign policy. It provides a revealing exploration of British and EU foreign policy from the period, based around responsibility and hospitality. Finally, the thesis introduces the Derridean notion of negotiation to the discipline, seen as a way of moving through the potential paralysis brought by the undecidability arising from foundational questioning.

The thesis builds a model of 'orthodox Western' legitimacy on the basis of the interaction of 'dominant paradigms' in Western thinking about the states-system, the state and the international economy. These are a Realist vision of the states-system, a liberal conception of the state and a free-market, economic liberal version of the international economy. The thesis therefore links the domestic, the international and the economic to overcome the narrow focus on institutions and procedures in legal accounts of international legitimacy and the lack of consideration of the international in domestic approaches. By treating legitimacy as a value judgement the thesis also shows up the failure of existing accounts to consider the competing and contradictory constraints on action established by the value systems tied up with dominant paradigms. Therefore, as well as allowing for judgements against institutional and procedural custom and practice, the model restores the normative content of legitimacy by rooting such judgements in consistency with underpinning value systems, introducing flexibility and prescriptive power. The model is tested and refined by an examination of the rise and fall of Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1992. This looks at the legitimation of Tito's political and economic system and the crisis it suffered during the 1980s. Despite the Western focus of the model it is shown to point towards important issues in the loss of legitimacy by Yugoslavia. In particular, reasons for the timing of its collapse and the bitterness of disputes over reform are shown to be rooted in fundamental disagreements about value systems as the basis for re-legitimising a post-communist country. In addition, there is a lengthy and detailed study of the efforts by the international community to manage the crisis between 1990 and the recognition of Bosnia in 1992. The value of the model in uncovering limitations on actions, explaining policy choices and allowing judgement is reaffirmed and lessons for theoretical refinements are drawn. The thesis is therefore an effort to critique and develop theoretical concepts whilst also subjecting them to serious empirical analysis.

This thesis traces the development of styles and theories of cultural cooperation from the pre-World War II models developed by France and Britain in particular, through the post-WWII international cooperation structures which included cultural cooperation as part of their structures. Organisations considered include the International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation, the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the Council of Europe and the European Union, focusing primarily on the non-educational or scientific aspects of cultural cooperation. Sources used include documentation of the two latter bodies and the public records of the UK Foreign Office and Ministry of Education. Intellectual cooperation was launched under the auspices of the League of Nations as a separate entity from the bilateral cultural relations of governments. Its tradition continues to be powerfully felt in the activity of the Council of Europe, after WWII the fulcrum of multilateral cultural cooperation. The thesis shows how it moved away from acting as a counterpoint to political developments towards the creation of a programme based on sociological study, which contained a strong element of federalist ideology, developing its own orthodoxy of "cultural policy", until partly "repossessed" in the 1990s by political imperatives. The contrast with the tightly regulated European Union is marked, and shows in certain respects a return to earlier experiments in cultural cooperation, which developed most of its theory and practice in the pre-1992 era when the Community Treaty did not provide for action in the field of culture. The thesis argues that the EU's cultural programme is not a manifestation of a "Europeanisation" of cultural policy, although policies elsewhere in the organisation may well have that effect, but of multilateral cultural cooperation.

Until the publication of 1992 Nien Kuo-fang Pao-kao Shu (1992 National Defence Report, Republic of China) by the Ministry of National Defence, and Kuo-fang Waichiao Pai-pi Shu (White Paper on National Defence and Diplomacy) by the Institute for National Policy Research in 1992, there was no single text or collection of readings, written from a ROC perspective or addressing issues of ROC's concern, which was available for people interested in national security. This dissertation is intended to fill that gap by broadening the theoretical and empirical evaluation of Taiwan's national security to encompass military, political and economic factors. The primary objective of this study is to develop an in-depth understanding of the ROC's approach to national security through an examination both of the dynamics of the numerous security threats confronting Taiwan and of the measures instituted to preserve and enhance national security. To accomplish this the study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 will provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of national security. Discussions focus on: the goal of national security; the sources and nature of threats to national security; and the measures to preserve and enhance national security. Chapter 2 considers the military dimensions of Taiwan's security. The following questions will be asked: Under what conditions might the PRC attack Taiwan? Is the PRC capable of gaining control of Taiwan by force? What are the most likely military options to be employed by the PRC should it decide to attack Taiwan? How capable is the ROC of defending itself? And what defence options are available for Taiwan? Chapter 3 examines the impact of the Taiwan independence movement (TIM) on Taiwan's political stability and national security. It centres on the following questions: What are the motives for the pursuit of Taiwan independence? What are both the ROC's and the PRC's attitudes towards the TIM? Will "self-determination" be applicable to Taiwan? And what will be the likely impact of TIM on Taiwan's security? Chapter 4 considers the economic dimension of security. GATT is used as a case study, and the implications of membership for the government and the economy of Taiwan are examined. As with any initiative, many questions have been raised. Because of Taiwan's excessive dependence on exports, its economic success depends in no small way on its ability to keep open its avenues of trade with the outside world. Cutting off those avenues could threaten both Taiwan's economic success and national security. Since survival is essential to Taiwan, in addition to the pursuit of economic growth and development, an independent war capability and sufficient forces are required for safeguarding Taiwan's security. In order to reach this goal, military modernisation is the only option. Thus, Chapter 5 will try to answer the following questions: What are the motives driving Taiwan's accelerated military modernisation? Will Taiwan be able to break through Peking's blockade and procure the weaponry needed for self-defence? Will the economy of Taiwan be able to continuously sustain such huge defence expenditures? Will the armed forces be able to recruit and retain an adequate number of skilled military personnel for the advanced and sophisticated weapons procured? And what will be the potential impacts of cross-Strait arms race on Taiwan Strait stability? In the final Chapter 6 some concluding remarks on the preceding Chapters are drawn. Taiwan should: continue its policy of cautious rapprochement with the PRC; make every effort to prevent any further deterioration in the military balance in the Taiwan Strait; use its economic success as a diplomatic tool to strengthen its relations with countries around the world.

This thesis examines the role of religion in national-EU relations. The focus is on how EU membership (or potential membership) may affect nations of a particular religious background in a particular way and, furthermore, whether religious difference affects national-EU relations in a particular way. The study is based on an internal perspective to two countries-Greece and Turkey-whose religious traditions stand outside a 'core' of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism). On the basis of these two cases I argue that neither religion per se (as theology or doctrine), nor the prevalence of a particular faith are definitive factors in national-EU relations. Rather, it is mainly in the domain of institutional interests of the `church' vis-ä-vis the 'state', that we find religion influencing national-EU relations. These institutional interests are, in turn, shaped by the relationship between religion and national identity in each case, and the relationship between 'church' and 'state'. The differences in these relationships in the cases of Greece and Turkey yield vast differences in the way 'religion' affects national-EU relations. This thesis examines the role of religion in national-EU relations. The focus is on how EU membership (or potential membership) may affect nations of a particular religious background in a particular way and, furthermore, whether religious difference affects national-EU relations in a particular way. The study is based on an internal perspective to two countries-Greece and Turkey-whose religious traditions stand outside a 'core' of religious traditions within the European Union (that is, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism). On the basis of these two cases I argue that neither religion per se (as theology or doctrine), nor the prevalence of a particular faith are definitive factors in national-EU relations. Rather, it is mainly in the domain of institutional interests of the 'church' vis-ä-vis the 'state', that we find religion influencing national-EU relations. These institutional interests are, in turn, shaped by the relationship between religion and national identity in each case, and the relationship between 'church' and 'state'. The differences in these relationships in the cases of Greece and Turkey yield vast differences in the way 'religion' affects national-EU relations. As background information to the interview research, secondary sources are used to explain the relationship between religion and national identity, and between 'church' and 'state' in each case.

Since 1999, multi- and bilateral donor agencies have based their development cooperation with heavily indebted poor countries on the elaboration of poverty reduction strategy papers that should be ‘country-owned’. This thesis explores this concept of ownership and analyses the power relationships between aid donors and recipient governments involved in efforts to promote ownership. It employs a political sociology perspective and draws on institutional theories and theories of organisational change to argue that ownership is a normative, not an analytical concept. Using the two ‘model recipient’ case studies of Bolivia and Ghana, it analyses two different tools of development cooperation: direct budget support mechanisms and the fostering of civil society participation in national policy-making. It places these two cooperation tools in their socio-political context to investigate in how far informal political processes represent factors that determine national politics, and ultimately the likelihood of success of political reform. The empirical research is centred around 140 qualitative semi-structured interviews with donor agency, governments and civil society representatives in both countries. The dominance of ownership questions in current development debates are explained with reference to the historical evolution of development cooperation, particularly the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s and the criticisms and revisions they evoked. The author argues that two different types of ownership should be distinguished: ‘government’ and ‘national’ ownership. The thesis demonstrates that direct budget support mechanisms are intended to foster government ownership, while the promotion of civil society participation is aimed at fostering national ownership. Donors’ attempt to foster ownership of formalised reform agendas is an almost impossible task because informal political processes largely shape the realm of national politics at the state level and determine the type and degree of societal participation in national policy-making. The thesis concludes by suggesting that international donors, pursuing these policies, risk destabilising representative democratic systems of recipient countries in undesirable ways.

A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been on the arms control agenda since 1954, the subject of intermittent bilateral or trilateral talks that achieved only partial measures. The end of the Cold War provided renewed public pressure and political impetus for banning nuclear explosions. This thesis analyses the context and processes of the multilateral test ban negotiations that opened in the Conference on Disarmament in 1994. Combining participant-observation and contemporaneous notes with extensive use of documentary sources, unpublished materials and interviews, the study explores the dynamics of the CTBT negotiations in light both of regime theory and post cold war concepts of multilateralism, highlighting the role of civil society actors as well as states. Providing historical background and rich detail on the negotiating process from 1994-1996, the thesis examines the causal factors, strengths and weaknesses of the outcomes in four key areas: prenegotiations, scope, verification and entry into force. Focusing on the strategies and mechanisms by which actors with competing expectations and interests reached agreement, two types of convergence are explored: distributive, encompassing both imposed and managed divisions of gains and losses; and integrative, in which expectations of what would constitute an acceptable agreement are expanded or changed through cognitive strategies and the shaping of norms and interests. The thesis shows that whilst sharing a general objective of a CTBT, governments had significantly different views on what a test ban should encompass and accomplish, particularly with respect to broader concepts of nonproliferation and disarmament. While nuclear interests played a major role in determining a state's expectations and negotiating posture, other factors were important in reaching convergence. These included: knowledge and ideas; civil society engagement; norms and regime values; partnerships and alliances; internal policy cohesion or division; and the level of domestic and international political attention and support. By choosing to incorporate transnational civil society as a principal unit of analysis, along with states, the thesis contributes to a fuller understanding of how governments' calculations of what constitutes self-interest and security can be influenced and shaped, opening up alternative solutions for agreement than might have been initially envisaged.

Since the launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2000, the European Union has significantly transformed its education policy under the umbrella notion of the ‘knowledge economy’. In particular, the dominant policy discourse links education to economic growth with the predominance of education as a pro-market policy over education as a policy aimed at social inclusion. In addition, the European Commission performs a more cognitive, normative and regulative role through the governance mode of the Open Method of Coordination and its monitoring mechanisms such as performance indicators and benchmarking. Although these changes have been acknowledged by the literature, the tendency of structural or institutional accounts has been to take them for granted or as inevitable. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a theoretically and empirically based analysis of the policy process of these transformations. By drawing upon ideational theories and by employing process tracing over a time frame of more than three decades, the thesis builds a three-stage theoretical argument to explore in a structured fashion how the consensus around specific ideas about the goals of European education policy was formed, which actors advocated it, and why it prevailed. The empirical material draws on original and confidential archival sources, primary sources, official EU documents, and few in-depth elite interviews. The findings show how a specific problem definition of education allowed the European Commission to strategically construct a specific education agenda around the notion of the knowledge economy, which also reflected the preferences of powerful economic actors within the European Union. However, the findings also suggest that the polysemantic concept of the idea of knowledge economy itself acted as coalition magnet by aggregating actors with diverging interests as well as reinforcing the power and interests of the actors advocating this idea. By looking at the political-economic causes of the transformations of education, this thesis adds new knowledge to the current EU education policy literature. In addition, the thesis contributes to the current debates on the role of ideas in shaping political outcomes.

This thesis is a neoclassical realist study of Malaysia’s China policy from 1970 to 2009 under four Malaysian Premiers starting with Razak and ending with Abdullah, with Hussein and Mahathir in between them. Given the puzzle that despite the prevalence of Malay supremacy and the lingering perception of the ‘Chinese problem’, Malaysia’s China policy has unexpectedly evolved from cautious rapprochement to matured partnership, the primary purpose of this thesis is to assess the relationship between ethnic politics and Malaysia’s China policy. That is, why and how has Malaysia’s China policy evolved from cautious rapprochement under Razak to a matured partnership under Abdullah despite the prevailing ethnic conflict between the Malays and Chinese? To locate an answer, this thesis presents a neoclassical realist model of domestic legitimation to study the relationship between ethnic politics and Malaysia’s China policy under each of the four Prime Ministers. This thesis finds that it was the care for domestic legitimation that drove the Malaysian decision-maker to either continue or change Malaysia’s China policy. Extending further, the systemic pressures in the external strategic environment were mediated within the prism of domestic legitimation, that is, by the perceptions of the Malaysian leader who also took cognisance of the ethnopolitical situation before taking the foreign policy decision to continue or change Malaysia’s China policy. This thesis also finds that neoclassical realism was able to accommodate a menu of policy choices in multilateral and bilateral senses – rapprochement, engagement, deterrence, middlepowermanship, and cultural diplomacy – for Malaysia to manage its relations with China, whether as a threat or an opportunity. This thesis further finds that Malaysia’s China policy had an effect, albeit to varying degrees, on the performance legitimacy of the governing regime, that is, the justification of its right to rule in Malaysia. This thesis claims to be the first-of-itskind in examining Malaysia’s China policy through the lens of neoclassical realism.