This dissertation explores the role of nationalism in shaping Japan’s relations with China. Although not discounting the significance of external-structural constraints, it aims to explicate “nationalism” as a domestic (power and ideational) variable, and its interactions with other determinants in re-defining Japanese external policy-orientation that affected the bilateral relationship, during the Koizumi administration (2001-2006). Interpreting from a neoclassical realist (NCR) perspective, it offers a theoretically informed examination about why, how, when, and the extent to which nationalism matters in Japan’s China policy. This is done by operationalising, and systematically assessing nationalism’s salience vis-à-vis other external-domestic dynamics (i.e. alliance commitment/resolve, economic interdependence, domestic political process/actors) that simultaneously affect Japanese state-elites’ policy decision-making. It also establishes whether these factors serve to exacerbate, or mitigate domestic nationalist impulses, and their corresponding impact on Japan’s China policy-options. Two nationalist-flavoured bilateral disputes – Yasukuni Shrine and East China Sea – are utilised as case-studies. This thesis argues that nationalism matters, albeit to a qualified extent. Taking a realistoriented, “middle-ground” position, it hypothesises that nationalism’s salience is dependent on state-elites’ perception/calculation of the conditions related to its interactions with the other aforementioned variables that concurrently influence foreign policy-making, during a given time period. It finds nationalism especially prevalent under perceptively sanguine external conditions, where an advantageous relative power position vis-à-vis China, fostered, in particular, by favourable US-Japan alliance resolve, tends to encourage assertive-nationalistic foreign policy-options, and vice-versa. Given the findings, it concludes that nationalism is an important, but not necessarily the primary driver of Japan’s China policy. Overall, this thesis makes a sustained theoretical contribution to our understanding of the international relations of Japan, and the utility of IR realism. Specifically, the hospitability of NCR to domestic-ideational theorising, can bridge mainstream IR and domestic/Areastudies approaches to advance a more holistic, albeit realist-oriented appreciation of nationalism in Japan’s relations with China.

The media long regarded as a characteristic element of state propaganda in authoritarian regimes have become a key interest for western academic literature. Yet little attention has been paid to the fact that media within an authoritarian country may be influenced by external factors as well. This work addresses this issue and explores the roles external factors like media globalization and transnational media corporations (TNMCs) play in the transition of China's media governance. It argues that transnational forces have increasingly imposed insurmountable politico-economic pressures on the Chinese media regime, leading the state to further embrace the globalised economy and thus promote market-driven policies. As such, the ongoing task of media governance transition has a far-reaching impact upon socio-political systems in the PRC-a pattern of steady institutionalization with Chinese characteristics of media governance is emerging. The socio-political impact of the steady media institutionalization fosters a more relaxed space in both political and social domains. This has also challenged the dominant approaches, i. e., the 'Value-domination', the Nationalist, the Liberal model, and the Trans-cultural model, in the study of media politics in authoritarian states. After examining the changes in media institutions, policy responses, media structure, and media culture, the author conceptualizes these changes as institutional transformation, de-regulation,d e-monopolization, and de-propagandization. This dissertation concludes that China's media governance has continuously progressed from the model of 'leader-determined' model towards a 'consensus-building' model with an increase in media participants.

This thesis argues that democratisation affected environmental governance in Indonesia in two aspects: the development of environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and their involvement in policy networks. The former is analysed from three perspectives of social movement theories: `political opportunities', `framing' and `resource mobilisation'. The perspectives on the latter are derived from theories of the policy process: the `policy network' and Kingdon's `multiple streams'. Indonesian ENGOs developed significantly after the late 1980s, together with the democratisation movement. Democratic ideas `re-framed' environmental issues, which stimulated and politicised ENGO activities, while increasing `political opportunities' by shifting the values of government officials. They also enhanced ENGOs' accountability and their embedding in local communities. The democratisation of formal institutions after the late 1990s facilitated ENGO activities, but it was not the decisive factor for their development. Neither was economic growth: the impacts of economic changes were not straightforward. The case studies of the pulp-rayon company Indorayon and the policy-making process of participatory forestry in Wonosobo District show that the spread of democratic ideas resulted in the incorporation of ENGOs in policy networks, which had previously been a `politico-business oligarchy' in the authoritarian Suharto period, by increasing their resources, particularly `legitimacy'. Also, ENGOs significantly facilitated the inclusion of other actors in the networks. On the other hand, conventional informal institutions still remained and they constrained actors. This helped conventionally strong actors (e. g. the state and large businesses) to preserve their political leverage. The spread of democratic ideas influenced agenda-setting and policy formulation. It is suggested that utilitarian arguments for democratisation (i. e. democratisation for better ecological consequences) could produce policies that neglected the social aspect of sustainable development, which in turn negatively influenced their ecological and economic impacts. `Rights-based' arguments (e. g. participation is a right) seem more conducive to the efforts for sustainable development in the South.

This research uses discourse analysis to examine Japan's UN security policy after the Cold War period using three cases: the Gulf Crisis, the Cambodian peace process and the promotion of the human security policy. The key argument is that there is a need for a new IR theory-based approach that could explain foreign or security policy decision-making process and could also provide the analysis at both the domestic and the international level simultaneously. This research therefore adopts Wendt's Constructivism, along with the use of 'identity' as the key analytical platform, from which the 'recursive Constructivist model' is developed. Unlike popular literature, this research suggests that 'identity transformation' and the level of conformity between the identities projected internationally (international -role identities) and those embraced domestically (domestic-type identities) are the key factors determining Japan's foreign and security policy preferences. On the interpretation of Japan's post-Cold War security development, this research argues that it could be understood via the UN framework, and not only from the traditional perspective of the Japan-US alliance. Apart from the fact that it could be understood via the process of 'identity transformation', this research provides strong evidence and suggestions that Japan's assertive foreign and security pursuits in the post-Cold War era are the result of the nation's changing sets of ideas and beliefs on the link between 'national' and 'international' security. The original contributions of this research are two-fold. The theoretical contribution is a modification of Wendt's original framework of identity transformation into the so-called 'recursive process of identity transformation. ' The application of 'identity' and the 'recursive Constructivist model' to Japan's UN security policy in this research is significant because it is the first example among research in the field of Japanese studies to use a different analytical framework and tool in examining Japan's foreign and security policy. The model's ability to capture the intertwined process of social interactions at both the domestic and the international level is also important as it contributes to further IR theoretical development and a better understanding on Japan's foreign policy decision-making process. Also, the value-added benefit of the examination of human security policy is another vital substantive contribution, as this is the first exploration of this issue within the context of Japan's UN security policy.

The dramatic phenomenon which appeared soon after Stalin's death in March 1953 in the Communist world was the strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the two largest socialist countries - the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The most important reason was that the Soviet leaders wanted to make use of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain their leading position in the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. For the Chinese, the main reason was economic rather than political. They wanted to obtain as much aid as possible from the Soviet side, while implementing their first five-year-plan (1953-1957). Only two and a half months after the death of Stalin, an important agreement was signed in Moscow for assistance to China in the construction and reconstruction of 141 industrial sites. By the end of 1953, China's share of the USSR's total external trade turnover amounted to 20 per cent, while the Soviet Union's share of China's trade was 55.6 per cent. From mid-1958 the Chinese method of building socialism began to take shape: the grouping of agricultural co-operatives into large People's Communes combining small-scale industry with agriculture, the Great Leap Forward. In the eyes of the Soviet leaders this was a great challenge not only to orthodox Marxist thinking, but also to the leading position of the CPSU. What is more, it was in 1958 that it first became apparent that China and the Soviet Union shared different views on a number of foreign policy issues which brought the conflict to a state of high tension. First it was the bombing of Jinmen (Quemoy) and Mazu (Matsu) . Then came the Sino-Indian border clash. On 9 September, in spite of a Chinese request, the Soviet Foreign Ministry issued a `neutral' statement, providing the first public indication that relations were deteriorating rapidly. Khrushchev's China policy appeared to have two elements. 1) To increase the scale of Soviet economic aid to China, thus reassuring it of friendship while increasing Soviet penetration of its economy. 2) To oust Mao Zedong and anti-Soviet elements from the Chinese leadership. The period from 1960 to 1969 was characterised by the Sino-Soviet `cold war', beginning with polemics in ideology and expanding to economic, political and military confrontation. Until the end of 1962 both sides refrained from attacking each other directly. The Chinese directed their attacks against `revisionism' in general and the Yugoslavs in particular; the Russians directed their attacks against `dogmatism' in general and the Albanians in particular. The first major ideological confrontation took place at the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in Bucharest from 20-25 June 1960. Then on 16 July the Soviet government informed the Chinese government of its decision to withdraw all Soviet technicians working in China. This unilateral decision, which aroused greater resentment in China than any other action, struck a crushing blow at China's economy at a time when the country was suffering from the failure of the Great Leap and a series of natural disasters. The Chinese government replied with charges of revisionism. But as the economic links between the two countries deteriorated, the Chinese leaders eventually published their well-known nine comments, from 15 August 1963 to 14 July 1964, strongly criticising both Soviet internal and external policies. Sino-Sovient relations deteriorated after Khrushchev's fall in October 1964. There were at least two events contributing to this. One was a quarrel about taking `unity of action' to aid North Vietnam, suggested by the Soviet leaders. The other was a dispute about holding an international conference of all Communist parties in 1965. Party relations were broken, although no-one at the time thought that this break could continue for the next 23 years. 1966-1969 witnessed the high-tide of the `Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, and this put the PRC in full confrontation with the USSR for two decades. There is no doubt that the struggle against `Soviet revisionism' which dominated Mao's mind in his later years was one of his main motives for starting the Revolution. Kiu Shaoqi whom he regarded as China's Khrushchev and the representative of the revisionist line inside the Chinese Party, had to be denounced. Smashing revisionists at home meant smashing them abroad and therefore the necessity of ending the few remaining contacts between the Russians and their last Chinese informants. Simultaneously, the first frontier confrontations took place. The boundary question between the PRC and the USSR has occupied an important position in the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations. However, it only led to fighting when relations between the two countries deteriorated for other reasons. Armed clashes occurred on 2 and 15 March 1969, on the Island in the Wusulijang (River Ussuri) called Zhen Bao, just a few weeks before the Ninth Congress of the CCP. Mao concluded that the USSR was behaving like a young imperialist power on the offensive and found ample evidence in the behaviour of Brezhnev. The Soviet Union's policy towards China in the 1970s seemed to want to knock together an `Asian collective security system', aimed at isolating China; to build up its armed forces in the Far East to put pressure on China and Japan in order to compete with the United States in the Pacific Ocean; to use the `Cuba of Asia', Vietnam, as its agent, to seize the whole of Indochina and dominate Southeast Asia, edging the United States out of the continent. The USSR's invasion of Afghanistan seemed to be bent on controlling that country, but also on furthering its long-term strategic objective of expanding its power in South Asia and the Middle East. The Chinese response was inevitably hostile, to try to: a) reduce or eliminate the threat of a `two front war' involving China with more than one major enemy; b) more generally deflect any political and military pressure against the PRC by seeking to prevent `encirclement' by the PRC's enemies; c) form the broadest possible international united front against hegemonism; d) gain stable, diversified foreign trade partners and sources of advanced technology for the PRC, thereby enabling China to modernize its economy. Under Mao's guidance the theory of the Three Worlds was put into practice. China established diplomatic relations with many capitalist countries; and in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was a limited Chinese-American alliance against the Soviet Union. Mao's death and Deng Ziaoping's succession led to a fundamental change in China's internal economic policy and its accompanying ideology, and gradually also to a change in its attitude to the Soviet Union. With Gorbachev's succession in the Soviet Union in 1985 there were corresponding changes, making an eventual rapprochement possible. The evolution of Soviet policy towards China began on 24 March 1982 when Brezhnev made his speech in Tashkent, developed through 28 July 1986 when Gorbachev made his speech in Vladivostok, and culminated in May 1989 when Gorbachev came to Beijing to have the first Sino-Soviet summit. The process of normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was complex and full of difficulties. China identified the three major obstacles as both a barrier to positive change and as a genuine test. The year 1988 saw a breakthrough in eliminating the three obstacles as the Soviet Union promised to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and reduce its forces