Thesis--University of Notre Dame. / Bibliography: p. 82-87.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business, March 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

The aim in this thesis is to investigate the logical status of meta-ethical theories which attempt to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity. That is, an investigation of the logic of statements like "Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion", "Value judgements are (disguised) commands", "Ethical statements are (peculiar) descriptions" is presented. To do this, one such theory, the Emotive Theory, is considered in some detail. This theory was chosen above the others for more detailed treatment as it has proved the most influential in the development of contemporary philosophy since the 1930s when it was first presented. It is here shown that in its historically important presentation, the Emotive Theory is literally false, although it can be made true by suitable re-definition. It can then be seen that the process of making the theory true by re-definition removes it from the type of theory which it is the aim of this thesis to investigate for the theory then ceases to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity. Thus there is no lengthy investigation of the theory when it involves new definition for this falls outside the scope of the thesis. Having presented a detailed refutation of the Emotive Theory as an attempt to analyse ethical sentences in terms of other types of sentences or other types of human activity, a general refutation of all such attempts is developed. It is shown that such statements as "Value judgements are simply expressions of emotion", "Value judgements are (disguised) commands", "Ethical statements are (peculiar) descriptions" are all literally false however much they may point up important facts. This is followed by a short discussion of the implications of the thesis in respect to philosophical investigations of the logic of ethical statements. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

陳金鳳. / 手稿本(cops. 2 & 3複印本) / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Shou gao ben (cops. 2 & 3 fu yin ben) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 149-151. / Chen Jinfeng. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 導言 / Chapter 第一部 --- 認知主義 / Chapter 第一章 --- 自然主義 / Chapter 第二章 --- 直覺主義 / Chapter 第二部 --- 非認知主義 / Chapter 第三章 --- 情緒主義 / Chapter 第四章 --- 規範主義 / 結論

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1985. / Vita. Bibliography: leaves [131]-137.

Issued also as Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / Bibliography: p. 53.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-103). Also available in electronic version. Access restricted to campus users.

Thesis (M. A.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on April 20, 2010). A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Catholic Univ. of America. / Bibliography: p. 171-175.

黃浩麒. / "2003年8月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2003. / 參考文獻 (leaves 97-98). / 附中英文摘要. / "2003 nian 8 yue". / Huang Haoqi. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2003. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 97-98). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 摘要 --- p.4 / Abstract --- p.5 / 康德原著縮寫 --- p.7 / 康德原著引文的翻譯 --- p.8 / 引言 --- p.10 / Chapter 第一章 --- ´ؤ´ؤ簡述反省性判斷力 --- p.18 / Chapter 第二章 --- ´ؤ´ؤ在可能性與現實性之間 --- p.30 / 可能性與現實性 --- p.31 / 曲行的悟性與直觀的悟性 --- p.36 / 實然及應然 --- p.42 / 實在性及其在實踐上的指示 --- p.47 / 人文世界之建立 --- p.56 / Chapter 第三章 --- 吾人的界域 --- p.59 / 康德的界域理論 --- p.59 / 理性的建築術 --- p.62 / 「經驗最大可能的延續及擴展性的原則」 --- p.66 / 「域」、「境」、「界」及實在性之人文意涵 --- p.71 / 「神」所統治下的世界作爲最闊的界域 --- p.74 / Chapter 第四章 --- ´ؤ´ؤ結論：反省性判斷力與人的定位 --- p.83 / 人文世界之闡釋 --- p.84 / 人作爲自然與自由的連結者之意涵 --- p.89 / 參考書目 --- p.97