<p>People give each other advice on a variety of topics throughout their lifetimes. In this dissertation, I ask: Do advisors accurately perceive the impact of their advice? Or, do they possess blind spots that prevent them from doing so? I focus on whether advisors recognize the information they need in order to form judgments of the impact of their advice, which I call "impact judgments". Four studies demonstrate that advisors have blind spots in their perceptions of their influence and that these blind spots have consequences for advisors' accuracy and subsequent behavioral intentions. First, a free-recall task (Study 1) and a manipulated scenario task (Study 2) showed that advisors failed to recognize when they were missing information needed to form accurate impact judgments, namely, information on the advisee's initial, pre-advice opinion, unless they were prompted to think about why they need that information. Second, an experiment where participants were assigned the role of advisor or advisee (Study 3) demonstrated that advisors' impact judgments were less accurate when advisors did not know the advisee's initial, pre-advice opinion. Third, participants' recollections of a time they gave advice (Study 4) showed that advisors relied on their impact judgments for forming downstream behavioral intentions such as willingness to give advice again, even when they recognized that they were lacking needed information. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for advice giving by individuals and members of organizations, a general framework for impact judgments, and areas for future research.</p> / Dissertation

Thesis advisor: Liane Young / Research in three parts used behavioral methods and fMRI to shed light on the nature of moral norms and situate them within a broader understanding of how people deploy cognition to navigate the social world. Results revealed that moral norms in two clusters: {1} “universal-rights norms” (i.e., values focused on universal rights to be unharmed and treated as an equal); and {2} “group-elevating norms” (i.e., loyalty, reciprocity, obedience to authority, and concern about purity) predicted prosocial and antisocial moral judgments, interpersonal orientations, and behaviors through cognitive mechanisms including representations of causation and theory of mind (ToM). Five studies reported in Part 1 demonstrated that universal-rights norms were positively associated with prosociality (equal allocations and willingness to help); whereas group-elevating norms were robustly positively associated with antisocial interpersonal orientations (Machiavellianism and Social Dominance Orientation). Three studies in Part 2 showed that group-elevating norms predicted antisocial moral judgments including stigmatization and blame of victims. In contrast, universal-rights values were associated with sensitivity to victims’ suffering and blame of perpetrators. Experimentally manipulating moral focus off of victims and onto perpetrators reduced victim-blaming by reducing perceptions of victims as causal and increasing perceptions of victims as forced. Effects of group-elevating norms on victim-blaming were likewise mediated by perceptions of victim causality and forcedness, suggesting that intervening on focus constitutes one way to modulate effects of moral norms on moral judgments. Four studies in Part 3 examined moral diversity within the domain of fairness and revealed that group-elevating and universal-rights norms are differentially reflected in conceptions of fairness as reciprocity, charity, and impartiality. Reciprocity and charity warranted being clustered together as person-based fairness due to their shared motivational basis in consideration of the unique states of individuals and emotion, and their robust, overlapping recruitment of neural activity indicative of ToM in PC, VMPFC and DMPFC. Impartiality, which favored no particular individual, constituted person-blind fairness, due to its reliance on standard procedures rather than the unique states of individuals or emotion, and its failure to recruit PC, VMPFC and DMPFC. In terms of fairness and moral praiseworthiness, these three allocative processes cleaved along a different line. Person-blind impartiality was rated most fair and highly moral, and person-based fairness broke apart into: charity, deemed highly moral and labeled by the most empathic participants as fair; and reciprocity, which was lowest in fairness and moral praiseworthiness ratings and most esteemed by Machiavellian individuals and those who made a greater number of self-interested allocations. Enhanced activity in LTPJ for unfairness generally, and in judgment of reciprocity in particular, pointed to a role for ToM in moral evaluation of these different conceptions of fairness. Findings across Parts 1-3 have meta-ethical implications. Reduced endorsement of universal-rights norms and increased endorsement of group-elevating norms conferred risk for antisocial judgments, interpersonal orientations and behaviors, suggesting that universal-rights norms and group-elevating norms may differ in their capacity to produce moral outcomes. Results demonstrating a role for ToM and representations of causality in the effects of moral norms on moral judgments deserve focus in future research. It will be important to determine how deeply moral values imbed into individuals’ cognitive architecture, and the extent to which effects of moral values can be modulated via interventions on basic cognition. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

How can empirical science, and psychology in particular, be harnessed to avoid or eliminate unwanted biases? The body of work herein explores this question across twelve experiments. The first approach we consider is placing the onus on the individual to root out any already existing bias within him or herself. Chapter 3, for example, presents experiments that assess whether people (viz., jurors during voir dire) can accurately "self-diagnose" when they are irreparably biased by negative pretrial publicity. (The answer is a resounding no). A second approach is to try and avoid letting bias enter the courtroom in the first place. Chapter 4, for example, provides an experimental test of an institutional solution known as blind expertise, wherein certain biases of an expert witness are avoided by having an intermediary pick the expert, and then having the expert render an opinion before knowing which litigant made the request. In Chapter 7, we consider a third approach to handling bias, one that concedes it will exist in the courtroom. Namely, instruct jurors on the existence of bias, so that they can try to weigh it properly. To this end we test a recently enacted New Jersey instruction on eyewitness testimony. We find that jurors do not become more sensitive to low versus high evidence quality, but instead they discount the eyewitness testimony across the board. Across this inquiry, we deploy several novel tactics; in Chapter 5, for instance, we explore how continuous response measurement (CRM) can provide unique insights into the study of reasoning, and in particular how jurors parse trial evidence. We end in chapter 8 with a more general discussion of how behavioral science can be applied across law and policy.

Researchers have increasingly directed attention to the importance of emotions in decision making. Recent theories have focused on the interpersonal effects of emotions--the influence of the decision maker's expressed emotions on observers' decisions and judgments. In the current research, we examine people's expectations of how incidental, discrete emotions affect behavior. We also study how these expectations affect decisions in interactive settings, and contrast them with how emotions actually impact other people's behavior.These ideas were tested in four studies. In Study 1a, participants (N = 58) answered a questionnaire asking their perceptions of how different emotions affect behavior. In Study 1b, participants (N = 203) read a number of hypothetical scenarios in which different interactions between them and another person took place. Studies 2 (N = 98) and 3 (N = 132) were two economic games -- a Stag-Hunt game and a Trust Game -- involving decisions with non-trivial financial consequences.Across these four studies, I found that people do have strong beliefs about how incidental emotions affect behaviors. Because of these beliefs, when told about their counterparts' emotional state, people in interactive settings modify their behavior. The impact of people's beliefs on behavior, however, was more consistent for negative emotions such as anger and fear, than for positive emotions such as happiness and gratitude. These findings also indicate that people are sensitive to the different effects of different emotions: different negative emotions such as guilt and anger have different effects on their expectations. Finally, I found that people's expectations about how their counterparts' emotions affect behavior can be inaccurate in specific settings.

The dissertation explores factors influencing consumers' payments in anonymous Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing contexts. Consumers often pay more than zero when given the opportunity to self-determine payments. However, most PWYW research has focused on contexts where the possibility of social influence from a salesperson or clerk is present. I suggest that in anonymous exchange contexts where social pressure does not exist, consumers will nevertheless make voluntary payments greater than zero. The present research explores PWYW in anonymous purchase contexts. Results from eight studies indicate that PWYW payment amounts are affected by heuristics and biases. In Essay 1, the influence of reference price on PWYW payments is explored. Firm-provided external reference prices (ERPs) framed as injunctive norms (e.g., suggested price) and descriptive norms (e.g., average payment) caused anchoring effects on voluntary payments such that those with higher ERPs reported higher payments. Further, ERPs framed as descriptive (vs. injunctive) norms were more predictive of payment amounts, but only when the ERP is high. Recalling internal reference price information is more effortful than simply reacting to a firm-provided price. The possibility that decreased cognitive processing results in higher payments, violating the concept of self-interest primacy, is explored in Essay 2. Four studies manipulate processing styles and demonstrate that when consumers use more effortful cognitive processing, they tend to make lower PWYW payments. These results suggest that consumers are likely to rely on a normal price heuristic when using more superficial processing. The dissertation demonstrates the importance of reference price information and cognitive processing styles when voluntary anonymous payments are made anonymously. PWYW decisions are influenced by the exchange context and how the information is cognitively processed. At a theoretical level, the findings demonstrate that consumers make voluntary payments in the absence of social pressure and that those payments can be predictably influenced by features in the exchange setting. Finally, the research suggests that consumers who exert less cognitive effort in PWYW situations make higher payments. It therefore appears that the first instinct is not to act self-interestedly by making little or no payments, but rather payments seem to be guided by heuristic-based decision making. / 2016-09-29

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