Aujourd'hui, les conflits s'enflamment vite et peuvent devenir importants dans un court laps de temps. La tendance des armées occidentales est d'avoir une capacité de déploiement rapide et d'être en mesure de mener des opérations militaires quelque soit le type d’environnement afin de stopper un conflit s’initialisant. La capacité de se battre dans la jungle est donc plus actuelle que jamais. Mon travail est une analyse de données qualitatives du combat en jungle dans laquelle j’utilise les principes fondamentaux des forces armées suédoises1 afin de décomposer le sujet et d’obtenir un meilleur aperçu de la guerre dans la jungle. J'utilise également comme méthode l'observation participante en vue d’obtenir une meilleure compréhension de cette dernière. Mon travail est surtout basé sur le plan tactique afin de voir comment une section agit dans ce milieu. J’ai abouti à quatre conclusions: - Pour être en mesure de mener une guerre dans la jungle, vous devez être formé, acclimaté et préparé. Si vous ne l'êtes pas, votre pire ennemi sera la jungle elle-même. - Dans la jungle, la façon de faire guerre revient aux chefs de groupe et aux soldats plus que quiconque, en raison des courtes distances et des difficultés à poser un appui-feu. - Gagner les coeurs et les esprits2 des indigènes est la clé de la mobilité afin de recueillir des renseignements ainsi qu’une certaine autonomie. - Il est important d'avoir la suprématie aérienne et d’être en mesure d'utiliser les rivières, en raison de l'avantage gagné par l’utilisation des hélicoptères et des bateaux. En outre, l’ennemi aura un gros désavantage s’il ne peut pas les utiliser.

This thesis examines the Australia Army???s campaign on Papua from July 1942 to January 1943 with the focus on logistic support of the fighting arms and the relation of logistics to the tactics of tropical jungle warfare. It begins by examining the traditional approach to logistics in the military profession - the experience of Australian officers and forces in particular - from the First World War until May 1942, when the Australian territory of Papua was invaded. It establishes that the Army was poorly prepared because, as well as having never anticipated a prolonged land campaign in Papua-New Guinea, it lacked the logistic resources and knowledge of logistics as applicable to tropical jungle warfare. It then proceeds to examine the retreat over the Kokoda Track and the turning-point battles for Milne Bay and Imita Ridge. It demonstrates that the principal factor in the Australian retreat was logistic failure, as geography and lack of logistic resources prevented adequate supply of the fighting arms at least until lines of communication had been shortened; even then, difficulties remained. The thesis is rounded off by assessing the counter-attack across the territory of Papua for the capture of the enemy???s beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. It concludes that, as the island???s geography and tropical environment so dominated operations and since shortages of logistic equipment and units persisted, the Army could not perfect its logistic organisation by the end of this first phase of the New Guinea campaign. It fell back on improvisation and the fortitude of troops to triumph over the Japanese.

This thesis examines the Australia Army???s campaign on Papua from July 1942 to January 1943 with the focus on logistic support of the fighting arms and the relation of logistics to the tactics of tropical jungle warfare. It begins by examining the traditional approach to logistics in the military profession - the experience of Australian officers and forces in particular - from the First World War until May 1942, when the Australian territory of Papua was invaded. It establishes that the Army was poorly prepared because, as well as having never anticipated a prolonged land campaign in Papua-New Guinea, it lacked the logistic resources and knowledge of logistics as applicable to tropical jungle warfare. It then proceeds to examine the retreat over the Kokoda Track and the turning-point battles for Milne Bay and Imita Ridge. It demonstrates that the principal factor in the Australian retreat was logistic failure, as geography and lack of logistic resources prevented adequate supply of the fighting arms at least until lines of communication had been shortened; even then, difficulties remained. The thesis is rounded off by assessing the counter-attack across the territory of Papua for the capture of the enemy???s beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda. It concludes that, as the island???s geography and tropical environment so dominated operations and since shortages of logistic equipment and units persisted, the Army could not perfect its logistic organisation by the end of this first phase of the New Guinea campaign. It fell back on improvisation and the fortitude of troops to triumph over the Japanese.