Thesis (M. Div.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 2005. / "May 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86)

Thesis (Th. M.)--Westminster Theological Seminary, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 123-132).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Talbot School of Theology, Biola University, 2005. / "May 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 83-86)

Thesis (Th. D.)--Concordia Seminary, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 279-289).

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät--Münster--Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, 1993. / Bibliogr. p. 442-476. Index.

This thesis addresses the conflict between Anna Stilz and specific liberal political philosophers regarding the nature of duties and obligations owed by individuals to the state. First, I will analyze Stilz’s argument about the nature and grounds of obligation, then address the case against such obligations, particularly as presented by the philosophical anarchist A. John Simmons. Finally, I address what I believe to be the root of the disagreement.

The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

Il existe un phénomène dans la pensée contemporaine qui s'appelle le changement climatique. Cependant, lorsque nous observons les sondages d'opinion, nous remarquons qu'il existe un grand écart entre les croyances sur le changement climatique de la communauté scientifique et le reste de la population. Ceci a mené une réflexion sur la manière dont le groupe responsable de la découverte et la transmission d'informations sur le climat peut être cru ou douté par le reste de la population et, de façon plus générale, le rôle de la science dans la résolution de controverses. Dans cette même intention, nous nous sommes servis de la sociologie pragmatique de la justification pour réconcilier les explications précédentes pour cet écart de même que la théorie du risque. Une exploration statistique a alors été employée pour tenter de comprendre la définition du risque qui soutenait la création d'organismes climatosceptiques américains. Nous avons fait ceci en construisant des modèles en nous servant de la régression logistique pour étudier la relation entre la croyance au consensus scientifique sur le changement climatique et quatre différentes facettes du phénomène en soi, contrôlés par des variables démographiques, religieux, de classe sociale, politiques et scientifiques. Nous avons pu ainsi déterminer quelles variables impactent la relation entre l'autorité scientifique et un phénomène en soi. Une étude de nos modèles nous a amenés à conclure que les catégories démographiques les plus privilégiées ainsi qu'une certaine classe sociale semi-spécialisée se servant davantage des techniques de production associés à la première modernité sont les plus propices à douter le changement climatique, indépendamment du consensus scientifique. Une recherche sociologie subséquente sur les organismes climatosceptiques doit donc être structurée autour de ces deux facteurs.

Our beliefs utilize various sources: perception, memory, induction, etc. We trust these sources to provide reliable information about the world around us. My dissertation investigates how this trust could be justified. Chapter one introduces background material. I argue that justification rather than knowledge is of primary epistemological importance, discuss the internalism/externalism debate(s), and introduce an evidentialist thesis that provides a starting point/framework for epistemological theorizing. Chapter two introduces a puzzle concerning justification. Can a belief source provide justification absent prior justification for believing it's reliable? Any answer appears to either make justifying the reliability of a source intellectually unsatisfying or all together impossible. Chapter three considers and rejects a plethora of proposed solutions to our puzzle. Investigating these solutions illustrates the need to further investigate evidence, evidence possession, and evidential support. Chapter four discusses the metaphysics of evidence. I argue that evidence always consists of a set of facts and that fact-proposition pairs stand in confirmation relations isomorphic to those holding between pairs of propositions. Chapter five argues that justification requires what I call actually connected possession of supporting evidence: a subject must be aware of supporting evidence and of the support relation itself. Chapter six argues that the relation constitutive of a set of facts being justificatory evidence is a sui generis and irreducible relation that is knowable a priori. Chapter seven begins by showing how Richard Fumerton's acquaintance theory meets the constraints on a theory of justification laid down in previous chapters. I modify the theory so as to: (i) make room for fallible foundational justification, and (ii) allow inferential justification absent higher-order beliefs about evidential connections. Chapter eight applies the developed theory of justification to our initial puzzle. I show how my modified acquaintance theory is in a unique position to vindicate the idea that necessarily a source provides a person with justification only if she is aware of evidence for the reliability of that source. However, this awareness of evidence for a source's reliability falls short of a justified belief and thereby avoids impalement from our dilemma's skeptical horn.

This dissertation motivates and defends what I call non-inferential epistemic circularity. Traditionally epistemic circularity is understood to be a property of arguments, where justification to believe these arguments’ premises depends upon the truth of their conclusions. I argue that epistemically circular arguments face a dilemma. If the conditions for non-inferential justification to believe their premises are too weak, these arguments are either indiscriminate or permit one to bootstrap trivially to higher-order justification. If to avoid these problems the conditions for non-inferential justification are strengthened on the basis of evidence, then epistemically circular arguments beg the question because they collapse into logical circularity. To address these problems I argue that an account of non-inferential justification should be developed that limits the role of evidential grounds and finds room instead for non-evidential sources of justification. I conclude that epistemic circularity is constitutive of non-inferential justification because it is a property of the intentional acts in virtue of which this justification is earned.