Dans le premier livre du Traité de la nature humaine (1739), David Hume avance plusieurs arguments paraissant avoir des conséquences sceptiques radicales à l'effet que les procédures inférentielles à la base de nos croyances tant empiriques que non empiriques ne sont pas fondées par la raison, en conséquence de quoi ces croyances ne sont pas épistémiquement justifiées. Pourtant, le Traité poursuit un projet positif de type naturaliste, celui de construire une science de la nature humaine par la méthode expérimentale, et ce projet amène Hume à défendre des principes théoriques empiriques se voulant de bonnes explications des phénomènes cognitifs, passionnels et moraux humains. Or, il semble que Hume ne puisse pas défendre une telle théorie sans se commettre à la thèse que certains procédés inférentiels sont fondés et permettent de produire des croyances justifiées, ce que semble contredire son scepticisme. Comment Hume peut-il tenir une position philosophique cohérente en défendant à la fois un scepticisme épistémique radical et une théorie de la nature humaine? Notre étude de ce problème s'intéresse à deux arguments de type sceptique présentés par Hume: son argument sur les croyances causales, couramment désigné comme son argument sceptique sur l'induction, et son argument sceptique sur la raison basé sur la faillibilité de nos facultés inférentielles. Nous présentons une analyse de ces arguments montrant en quoi ce sont des arguments sceptiques radicaux mettant en cause la justification de nos croyances. Nous montrons ensuite que le texte de Hume ne permet pas de trancher clairement la question interprétative de savoir comment celui-ci envisage de défendre la poursuite de son projet d'une théorie de la nature humaine face à ses arguments sceptiques, mais que seulement deux possibilités demeurent à cet égard: la possibilité que Hume soit conduit à une conception non épistémique du fondement normatif des croyances, et la possibilité que Hume croie pouvoir encore, malgré ses arguments sceptiques, défendre le caractère raisonnable des croyances issues de sa recherche en référence à des caractéristiques qui différencient épistémiquement sa méthode philosophique expérimentale de ses concurrentes. Nous montrons toutefois qu'aucune de ces deux possibilités ne semble épargner à Hume des difficultés importantes. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Hume, Scepticisme, Croyances, Justification, Théorie de la connaissance.

L'oeuvre de l'écrivain français Pierre Michon (1945-) compte à ce jour dix titres officiels, dont on retrouvera le détail dans la bibliographie qui figure à la fin de ce mémoire. Originaire de la Creuse, un département agricole du centre de la France, Pierre Michon a mis de longues années à surmonter les conflits par lesquels l'écriture lui apparaissait à la fois comme une nécessité absolue et comme un bien, une pratique inaccessibles. Une enfance rurale, marquée par l'absence paternelle et la découverte du langage à travers les fictions des femmes, se pose d'emblée comme la pierre angulaire d'une oeuvre qui, des Vies minuscules (1984) à Corps du roi (2002), a mis dix-huit ans à s'élaborer, se définir et s'affiner au gré d'un parcours d'écriture tout à fait remarquable. Bien qu'il nous soit loisible d'en espérer de nouvelles pages, l'oeuvre de Pierre Michon se laisse déjà appréhender comme un système unique, un monde écrit dont les lois propres invitent le lecteur à remettre en question son rapport intime à l'écrit, sa conception de la chose littéraire, la légitimité du métier d'écrivain. L'objet des pages qui suivent pourrait se formuler ainsi: En quoi consistent ces lois qui fondent la cohésion, le pouvoir d'ébranlement et l'originalité de l'oeuvre de Pierre Michon ? De quelle force, principe ou impérieuse nécessité l'écriture est-elle ici la traduction? Comment « parler, enfin, des qualités propres du texte de Michon : dire pourquoi il marche si bien, possède un pouvoir si singulier d'emportement, un tel entrain »? Notre étude ne prétend nullement à faire le tour de ces interrogations générales, encore moins à livrer le sens d'une oeuvre aussi complexe. Elle tentera néanmoins d'en expliciter les points forts au moyen, dans une première partie, d'un procédé d'analyse thématique -inspiré notamment de la pensée kleinienne, des positions de Freud et de Lacan au sujet de la fonction paternelle et des travaux de Jean-Pierre Richard en critique littéraire -centré sur la question de l'absence du père dans les Vies minuscules, où la mise en scène de l'arrière-pays tient lieu de cadre métaphorique à l'énigme des origines. Projet d'archéologie mémorielle, voire de mise en récit d'une « généalogie fantasmatique », l'écriture cherche ici à transcrire dans un registre symbolique ce qui relève d'un imaginaire des commencements, où la métaphore du lieu, investie de connotations primitives (la campagne profonde, l'animalité mise à nu par l'absence de la lettre, la mécanique élémentaire des passions paysannes), campe le récit d'une histoire personnelle et la recherche de repères ancestraux dans l'universalité du mythe. Aussi les motifs de la fuite masculine, de la transmission maternelle du symbolique et de la nostalgie du corps du père, apparaissent-ils comme des symptômes de l'absence même de ce dernier. Celle-ci, croyons-nous, peut être interprétée comme la matrice non seulement des Vies minuscules, mais de l'oeuvre dans son ensemble: les développements de la première partie proposent de voir cette absence fondatrice comme le principe originaire de l'écriture de Pierre Michon, « [I]a part noire sur laquelle, contre laquelle et grâce à laquelle éclate la gloire de l'écrit ». La seconde partie aborde un versant plus technique ou formel de l'oeuvre michonienne, en questionnant les problèmes de la poétique de l'auteur, « rhétorique de l'hésitation » qui fonde sa technique narrative sur le doute et l'ambivalence. La foi variable de l'auteur-narrateur a notamment pour effet de bousculer les normes et les idées reçues, ce dont résulte un travail de brouillage des genres qui donne lieu à des formes littéraires inédites. Ainsi Jean-Pierre Richard propose de considérer les Vies minuscules comme une « autobiographie oblique et éclatée », et Dominique Viart tient les textes de l'auteur pour des « fictions critiques » qui intègrent, de manière arbitraire et non exclusive, un travail de recherche et de narrativisation de l'archive. Autre élément à souligner dans ce métissage des registres et des genres, l'intertexte judéo-chrétien vient mettre en rapport l'écriture profane de l'homme de lettres avec l'autorité des Saintes Écritures. Mais avant tout, la seconde partie se penche sur la question des filiations littéraires, laquelle se donne à lire comme la contrepartie, la réponse peut-être ou, à tout le moins, la conséquence logique de l'absence fondatrice où l'écriture puise à la fois sa force, son énergie et sa raison d'être. Du modèle écrasant incarné par Rimbaud à la libération accordée par Faulkner, le parcours littéraire de Pierre Michon est semé des mêmes achoppements que ceux auxquels sont confrontés ses narrateurs et leurs biographés : doute, hésitation, ambivalence, honte des origines et sentiment d'indignité par rapport à la Lettre, au « corps du roi » qu'une basse extraction rend aussi désirable qu'inaccessible. En nous appuyant sur les perspectives théoriques de Melanie Klein au sujet de la notion de réparation, nous verrons comment, et dans quelle mesure, la pratique de Michon obéit au fantasme autobiographique d'une écriture réparatrice fondée sur le « désir de renverser [l']indignité en son contraire », avec « rien que de la volonté violente de dire, qui fait par miracle quelque chose avec rien [... ] fait une forme dans laquelle s'installe, en plus, du sens ». ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Absence du père, Autobiographie oblique, Écriture justificatrice, Écriture réparatrice, Filiations littéraires, Généalogie fantasmatique, Honte des origines, Intertexte religieux, Pierre Michon, Rhétorique de l'hésitation.

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be <em>justified</em> in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable.

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-80).

This study examined the issues of the interpretation, transmission and appropriation of the doctrine of justification by faith alone within the context of the Lutheran Church in Nigeria, Gongola Diocese. Using contextualization as my main tool in this exploration, I argue that intercultural communication holds the key to unlocking how effectively and appropriately these three engagements with theology are executed within the context of this study. The Lutheran church and indeed most Protestant denominations assert that justification by faith alone is the cardinal doctrine of Christianity. Scholars are however concerned that there is great level of ignorance among members and misappropriation of justification by faith alone in the lives of members of these denominations. Many reasons were advanced as being responsible for this, some of which include: its absence from the preaching agenda of Protestant pulpits, and inadequate teaching from the church, its clergy and theological educators. Other reasons are its failure to be shown to be clearly applicable to lived experiences of the people in their contemporary challenges. The message of justification by faith alone has not been adequately translated into people's social, and religious-cultural world views. The LCCN as an institution subscribes to Luther's teachings as expressed in his writings and taught by the Lutheran Church globally. However, the LCCN is faced with the problem of how to transmit the meaning of justification by faith alone to its members. This study therefore sought to investigate the underlying factors for this development. The question that the study wished to answer was: How does the interpretation of justification by faith alone by the Lutheran Church of Christ in Nigeria (as an institution) enhance its understanding and appropriation by members and serves as a guide in this study? In attempting to answer this question three theories were used as framework with which to test the church's interpretation of this doctrine. These theories are: 1) gospel and culture in dialogue; 2) translatability, and 3) contextual theological education programmes for the training of both clergy and laity. This is an empirical qualitative study and was structured into eight chapters. Participants in this study were categorized into five groups: church leaders, seminary lecturers, clergy, seminary students, and lay members. Through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with participants, relevant data was generated and analysed manually. The study found that the LCCN's interpretation of justification by faith alone is detached from the religious and cultural world view of its members; this has in turn created a conflict in how it is understood and appropriated in their lived experiences. The message of justification by faith (the gospel) has not been allowed to engage in dialogue with the culture of the people, rather culture is perceived as evil or something to be avoided. Thus, I argue that this failure on the part of the missionaries and the indigenous leadership of the LCCN to employ intercultural communication in transmitting the message of justification by faith alone is the major cause of the problem. Most of the participants including the leaders of the church acknowledged that the church, the seminary and the clergy have not been faithful in transmitting the appropriate message of justification by faith alone. The conclusion of this study therefore, is that the LCCN's interpretation of justification by faith alone does not enhance its understanding and appropriation by members. This thesis proposes that the Lunguda practice of ntsandah provides an entry point for a proper informed interpretation of justification by faith alone. For this to be possible, the gospel and culture must engage in dialogue through viable a contextual theological education programme for the training of both clergy and the laity. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.

The purpose of this research was to examine how non-Aboriginal Canadians might respond if the label genocide is used to describe the historical mistreatment of the Aboriginal Peoples’ of Canada. In two studies, I manipulated the perception of Residential Schools as genocide by informing (or not informing) undergraduate student participants that some people believe what happened should be labeled genocide. I also assessed the potential moderating role of knowledge by either measuring participants’ pre-existing knowledge of Residential Schools or manipulating how much participants learned about Residential Schools through a passage. Overall, participants’ reactions to the label depended on what they knew about Residential Schools such that participants with a superficial level of knowledge responded defensively to a description of Residential Schools as genocide, while participants with no knowledge or high levels of knowledge responded positively. Findings provide theoretical insight into how knowledge affects perpetrator group members’ reactions to historical harms.

This thesis is about the arguments and the methods that can sustain the epistemic support that comes from intuitions regarding hypothetical cases vis-à-vis theories of intuition. In the past twenty years, philosophical intuitions have received new attention, spurred by fashionable experimental philosophy that empirically tests philosophers’ intuition-engendering hypothetical cases with experimental methods. The results purportedly show that intuitions are unreliable, subject to demographic variation, and error-prone. In response, philosophers have presented various theories of philosophical intuition and explanations of how intuitions are situated in the justificatory apparatus of philosophical methodology. Three types of theories prevail in the literature, each a plausible option for the explanatory sustenance of intuitions’ epistemic efficacy. Selfevidence theories depend on the understanding of the intuited proposition. Intellectual seemings theories depend on the content of the intuited proposition. Judgment theories depend on our normal capacities for making judgments. Judgment theories divide further into disposition-to-believe theories and capacity theories. I argue that, beyond objections and unique epistemic burdens that each theory faces regarding the methodologies underpinning their conception and defense, no one theory of intuition can be reasonably accepted over the others. The centrality of intuitions’ use in philosophical methodology and in philosophers’ ways of thinking and reasoning, giving an argument that supports intuitions as conferrers of epistemic status, which does not itself appeal to intuitions, is a precarious endeavor. I consider various methods to avoid engaging question-begging premises and epistemic circularity. However, none are successful when the theory at hand is characteristically a priori and countenances only intuitions that confer epistemic status. In response to the ill-fated caricature of philosophical intuitions epistemic-statusconferrers, I present my own survey evidence concerning philosophers’ conception of intuition-use in philosophical method. Surprisingly, professional philosophers are more inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of discovery more so than they are inclined to think that intuitions operate in the context of justification. The upshot of these survey results motivates my preferred account philosophical intuitions wherein philosophical intuitions are bifurcated into epistemic (justificatory intuitions) and epistemically-related (intuitions of discovery) roles. In the light of the objections I pose regarding the proper grounding of intuitions, revising the standard conception of philosophical intuitions requires two sorts of moves in the debate. First, one must offer a proviso for sources of justification that do not epistemically depend on intuitions for the ability to confer epistemic status. This allows one to justify a theory of intuition without appeal to intuition or epistemic regress. Second, one must give an explanation for and build on the recognition that intuitions are bifurcated into justificatory and discovery roles. The added clarity of filling out the nature of bifurcation allows for a more accurate characterisation of philosophical intuitions in the methods of philosophy. Furthermore, that intuitions operate in discovery roles offers an explanation for philosophical innovation and progress.

Hierarchies are a ubiquitous form of human social organization. I hypothesized that one reason for hierarchies’ prevalence might be that core motivational needs for order and control make hierarchies psychologically appealing—because of the structure they offer—relative to other, less structured forms of social organization. This hypothesis is rooted in compensatory control theory (Kay et al., 2008), which posits that individuals have a basic need to perceive the world as orderly and structured. Therefore, personal and external sources of control are substitutable, inasmuch as they both serve the superordinate goal of believing that the world operates in an orderly fashion. An initial study confirmed that hierarchies are perceived as more structured and orderly relative to egalitarian arrangements. In five subsequent experiments, I threatened participants’ sense of personal control to increase their need to rely on external structure. Participants who lacked control perceived more hierarchy occurring in ambiguous social situations (Study 2) and preferred hierarchy more strongly in business contexts (Studies 3-4). Two studies tested my account that hierarchies are appealing because of their structure. Preference for hierarchy was higher among individuals high in Personal Need for Structure (PNS), and control threat increased preference for hierarchy even among low-PNS participants (Study 4). Importantly, framing a hierarchy as unstructured reversed the previous effects, so that participants who lacked control now found hierarchy unappealing (Study 5). A final study found that hierarchy-enhancing careers were more appealing after control threat, even when those jobs were low-status (Study 6). I discuss how the compensatory control account for the allure of hierarchies complements and extends other influential theories of hierarchy maintenance, such as Social Dominance Theory and System Justification Theory.