Dedication to a Process argues that while judicial review is a justified decision-making procedure in a democratic scheme of government on instrumentalist grounds, it will always come at a politico-moral cost. Chapter One surveys Thomas Christiano’s egalitarian conception of democracy to establish a scheme of democracy upon which to ground this analysis. This chapter argues that under Christiano’s account of the normative grounds of democracy, which is rooted in the fundamental social justice principle of public equality, there are necessary limits to democratic authority. When these limits are exceeded, there is a results-based argument available that can justify the use of judicial review from a Razian perspective, however, this manner of decision-making comes at the concession of a significant politico-moral value that is bound up with democratic authority: intrinsic justice. Chapter Two analyzes Ronald Dworkin’s constitutional conception of democracy to determine if there is a way to pay down the cost of judicial review. This chapter will argue that a purely content-based analysis like the one Dworkin is suggesting with his holistic scheme of democratic authority may be able to avoid the loss of intrinsic justice. However, if we are more concerned not with content but with who the authoritative voice is on constitutional matters, as is the case with Christiano’s modular scheme of democratic authority, then we must revert to the conclusion reached in Chapter One. Chapter Three considers Wil Waluchow’s theory of Community Constitutional Morality to rule out the possibility that judges appealing to a community’s positive normative commitments as a kind of customary constitutional law can be grounded in public equality, thereby retaining democratic authority and avoiding the politico-moral cost established in Chapter One. This chapter will argue, however, that despite passing the Public Equality Test mechanically, there is an important value argument to be made that locates intrinsic justice within characteristically democratic institutions such as the legislature and that any compromise of the democratic process must result in a politico-moral loss if we are indeed dedicated to the process. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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In recent decades, a debate has arisen within analytic philosophy concerning the nature, validity and possible uses of Kantian transcendental arguments. This thesis examines two of the main questions within this debate: (i) what is a transcendental argument, and (ii) could there be a successful transcendental argument. The first chapter surveys some recent attempts at definition. A general lack of consistency in the literature makes it impossible to reach any precise conclusion about what a transcendental argument is, but a two-fold working definition is proposed on the basis of two identifiable general approaches to this question. The second chapter looks at two forms of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world in order to set up in a Kantian way the two epistemological problems to which transcendental arguments have been proposed as solutions. One problem concerns how it can be known that the external world exists; the other concerns conceptual relativism and the possibility of transcendental justification of a particular conceptual scheme. The third chapter examines and expands upon Stephan Korner's forceful argument to show that transcendental arguments are impossible. This argument counts decisively against the possibility of a transcendental solution to the problem of conceptual relativism, but does not touch arguments to demonstrate that we have knowledge of the existence of the external world. The fourth chapter examines several transcendental arguments which attempt the latter demonstration, beginning with Kant's Refutation of Idealism and then turning to some recent variations on this argument. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Ce mémoire se concentre sur le problème de la régression épistémique. Il s’agit d’un problème très important puisqu’il remet en question la possibilité de la justification. Nous nous intéresserons aux détails de ce problème, ainsi qu’aux réponses qui lui sont offertes. Traditionnellement, deux réponses sont concurrentes : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. La première propose d’arrêter la régression à un fondement, alors que la seconde propose de s’intéresser à la cohérence partagée par les croyances. Toutefois, le but de notre mémoire est de présenter et de défendre une troisième solution : l’infinitisme. Introduite dans les années 1990 par Peter Klein, l’infinitisme est une des plus récentes théories de la justification et, malgré son intérêt, elle est encore très peu défendue. Cette théorie propose de résoudre le problème de la régression en basant la justification des croyances sur des séries infinies et non répétitives de raisons. Cette idée est intéressante, car l’infinitisme renverse le problème d’origine, puisque les régressions infinies sont généralement perçues comme étant un problème pour la connaissance et la source du scepticisme. Notre objectif est de montrer que l’infinitisme est la meilleure solution possible au problème de la régression. Pour ce faire, nous faisons la synthèse des principaux arguments pour l’infinitisme. Cela nous permettra de distinguer trois types d’infinitisme pour ensuite retenir un de ces types, une forme impure d’infinitisme, comme étant le meilleur. Finalement, nous confronterons l’infinitisme à ces critiques pour montrer qu’il s’agit d’une théorie de la justification qui est réellement viable. / This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.

Ce mémoire se concentre sur le problème de la régression épistémique. Il s’agit d’un problème très important puisqu’il remet en question la possibilité de la justification. Nous nous intéresserons aux détails de ce problème, ainsi qu’aux réponses qui lui sont offertes. Traditionnellement, deux réponses sont concurrentes : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. La première propose d’arrêter la régression à un fondement, alors que la seconde propose de s’intéresser à la cohérence partagée par les croyances. Toutefois, le but de notre mémoire est de présenter et de défendre une troisième solution : l’infinitisme. Introduite dans les années 1990 par Peter Klein, l’infinitisme est une des plus récentes théories de la justification et, malgré son intérêt, elle est encore très peu défendue. Cette théorie propose de résoudre le problème de la régression en basant la justification des croyances sur des séries infinies et non répétitives de raisons. Cette idée est intéressante, car l’infinitisme renverse le problème d’origine, puisque les régressions infinies sont généralement perçues comme étant un problème pour la connaissance et la source du scepticisme. Notre objectif est de montrer que l’infinitisme est la meilleure solution possible au problème de la régression. Pour ce faire, nous faisons la synthèse des principaux arguments pour l’infinitisme. Cela nous permettra de distinguer trois types d’infinitisme pour ensuite retenir un de ces types, une forme impure d’infinitisme, comme étant le meilleur. Finalement, nous confronterons l’infinitisme à ces critiques pour montrer qu’il s’agit d’une théorie de la justification qui est réellement viable. / This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.

Une question demeure récurrente : les divisions qui subsistent depuis le XVIè siècle entre Catholiques, Luthériens et Réformés sont-elles autant d’ordre anthropologique que théologique ? Cette problématique paraissant pouvoir être soutenue, il convenait alors de déterminer les différends anthropologiques, de les analyser et de se demander s’ils sont une entrave à la Κοινωνία. L’étude de la situation au XVIè siècle a permis de conclure que les concepts anthropologiques portés par une philosophie existentielle ont joué un rôle important dans la rupture au sein de l’Église d’Occident. Le retour sur la pensée de Pannenberg, Moltmann, Rahner, théologiens de trois confessions différentes, autorise à dire qu’au XXè siècle la vision de l’homme a toujours une incidence sur les concepts théologiques, mais les différences sont de moins en moins séparatrices et deviennent souvent des dons à partager. L’analyse de dialogues œcuméniques a mis en évidence que les différends anthropothéologiques ont été partiellement réconciliés et font l’objet d’accords, voire d’une déclaration commune sur la Doctrine de la Justification. Aujourd’hui, un défi reste à relever celui d’une déclaration sur le Ministère en vue du partage à la même table eucharistique. Une démarche de consensus différencié serait une aide à la recherche d’une pleine communion. / An issue has been ever recurring : are the discords which have been going on since sixteenth century between Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists as much anthropological as theological ? As this question can be supported it seems suitable to determine these anthropological disagreements, analyse them and wonder whether or not they are obstacle to the Κοινωνία. A study concerning the situation during the XVIth century has allowed to conclude that the anthropological concepts conveyed by an existential philosophy have played a mojor role in the severing within the Western Church. The return on the thoughts developed by Pannenberg, Moltmann and Rahner, theologians of three different confessions, allows us to tell that in the XXth. century man’s vision has always an incidence on the theological concepts but are less and less separative and are often gifts to be shared. The analysis of ecumenical dialogues have clearly shown that theanthropological disagreements have been partly reconciled and are now subject to consensus, even a joint declaration on the doctrine of justification. Today we have to take up a challenge about a declaration on the ministry in order to share the body of Christ at the same table. A differing consensus method could be a help to find a complete communion.

Thesis (DTh)--Stellenbosch University, 2005 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study considers the doctrine of the forensic imputation of Christ's righteousness in both the Great Awakening and the Korean revivals through the six revivalists from the view of the Reformation doctrine oiforensic justification: Jonathan Edwards, Timothy Dwight, Sun-Ju Kil, Ik-Doo Kim, Yong-Do Lee, and Sung-Bong Lee. The key question is whether they maintain the Reformation doctrine of the forensic imputation of Christ's righteousness, affirming the sola fide-sola gratia language of the Reformers such as Martin Luther and John Calvin. The prime concern facing the six revivalists is the question of the status of humanity and the necessity of Christ's righteousness for forensic justification. It is of the utmost importance to see that justification by faith alone is fully embedded in the understanding of union with Christ. Jonathan Edwards stood firmly against any attempt to shrink God's free grace down to the size of human works in justification, following closely the Reformation doctrine of the forensic imputation of Christ's righteousness. Edwards elucidated Adamic and Christologicalforensic union in terms of divine constitution. He firmly held that through union with Christ Christ's alien righteousness is legally transferred or reckoned to the believers. Timothy Dwight, standing in a quite different tradition, rejected Edwards's notion of justification that justification is an absolute unmerited gift of God, apart from human works. Dwight affirmed neither prevenient grace nor justification in the Reformation terms of solajide, sola gratia, sola scriptura, solus Christus, sola Deo Gloria, a iustitia aliena (an alien righteousness), and a iustitia extra nos (a righteousness apart from us). By stressing the power of the human will, Sun-Ju Kil clearly thought that justification is exclusively an act of human beings. Kil's view of the act of faith alone made all the difference in imputation, connecting the wicked to the righteousness of Christ. Ik-Doo Kim also departed from the Reformation doctrine ofJorensic justification in failing to present the implications of Christ's imputed righteousness. Kim's doctrine of the power of prayer determined his view of justification. Kim's notion of repentance centered on the act of faith through prayer, which made Luther's solajide a human work or accomplishment in the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Yong-Do Lee placed his understanding of the justification of the wicked within the setting of the principle of oneness with Christ, with which he laid the foundation for the double exchange of life in his theology. Lee did not recognize a necessary connection between justification and the free grace of the sovereign God. Although Sung-Bong Lee found considerable depth in the imputation of Christ's righteousness in comparison with the three Korean revivalists, he failed effectively to distinguish between justification and sanctification. Lee's decisive proposal of union with Christ cannot be identified as the Reformation doctrine offorensic imputation. This study suggested that the five revivalists except Jonathan Edwards were unwilling to favor the Reformation doctrine offorensic justification regarding original sin, alien righteousness, union with Christ, and the forensic imputation of Christ's righteousness to the wicked. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie studie word die forensiese siening van die leer van die regverdiging tydens die Amerikaanse Great Awakening en die Koreaanse revivals, in die teologie van Jonathan Edwards en Timothy Dwight enersyds, en Sun-Jul Kil, Ik-Doo Kim, Young- Do Lee en Sung-Bong Lee andersyds, ondersoek. 'n Kemkwessie is die vraag of hierdie opwekkingspredikers en teoloe getrou bly aan die Reformatoriese leer van die toerekening van Christus se geregtigheid soos dit tot uitdrukking kom in die aksent op solajide - sola gratia by Maartin Luther en Johannes Calvyn. Sentraal is die vraag na die staat van die mens en die noodsaaklikheid van Christus se geregtigheid vir forensiese regverdiging. Dit is van die grootste belang om te verstaan dat regverdiging deur die geloof aileen, onlosmaaklik verbonde is met die verstaan van ons eenheid met Christus. In aansluiting by die Reformatoriese leer van die forensiese toerekening van Christus se geregtigheid, verset Jonathan Edwards hom teen enige poging om deur goeie werke God se vrye genade te kompromiteer. Edwards verstaan Adamitiese en Christologiese forensiese eenheid in terme van goddelike konstitusie. Hy hou vas aan die oortuiging dat op grond van die gelowiges se eenheid met Christus, laasgenoemde se geregtigheid juridies oorgedra en toegereken word aan eersgenoemde. Timothy Dwight staan binne 'n heeltemal ander tradisie en verwerp Edward se opvatting van regverdiging as 'n totaal onverdiende gawe van God onafhanklik van menslike werke. Dwight onderskryf nog die leer van die voorafgaande genade, nog die Reformatoriese leer van die regverdiging in terme van sola jide, sola gratia, sola scriptura, solus Christus, soli Deo Gloria. Ook aanvaar hy nie die iustitia aliena (vreemde geregtigheid) en die iustitia extra nos ('n geregtigheid buite ons) me. As gevolg van sy aksent op die krag van die menslike wil is dit duidelik dat Sun-Ju-Kil regverdiging eksklusiefverstaan as 'n menslike daad. Sy siening van die daad van geloof aIleen maak 'n groot verskil deurdat die goddelose daardeur verbind word met Christus se geregtigheid. Doo-Kim wyk ook afvan die Reformatoriese leer van forensiese regverdiging aangesien hy nie daarin slaag om die implikasies van Christus se toegerekende geregtigheid uit te spel nie. Sy leer van die krag van gebed bepaal sy siening van die regverdiging. Sy opvatting van berou word gedra deur sy aksent op geloof-deur-gebed waardeur die sola fide soos geleer deur Luther, verander word in 'n menslike prestasie wat die imputasie van Christus se geregtigheid tot gevolg het. Yong-Do Lee verstaan die regverdiging van die goddelose binnne die beginsel van ons eenheid met Christus wat as basis dien vir die "dubbele ruil" in sy teologie. Hy sien nie 'n noodsaaklike relasie tussen regverdiging en die soewereine, vrye genade van God nie. Hoewel Sung-Bong Lee in vergelyking met die ander drie, heelwat diepte vind in die toerekening van Christus se geregtigheid, slaag hy nie daarin om duidelik te onderskei tussen regverdiging en heiliging nie. Sy deurslaggewende voorstel ten opsigte van die gelowiges se eenheid met Christus, kan nie vereenselwig word met die Reformatoriese leer van forensiese imputasie nie. Die gevolgtrekking van hierdie studie is dat, met die uitsondering van Jonathan Edwards, hierdie opwekkingspredikers en teoloe onwillig was om die Reformatoriese leer van die forensiese regverdiging met betrekking tot erfsonde, eenheid met Christus, en die forensiese toerekening van Christus se geregtigheid aan die sondaars, te onderskryf.