Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1975. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-78).

This thesis has explored the relationship between the seven strong characters in The Lion in Winter and the dialogue through which Goldman reveals them. Each character is examined with the use selected sections of the dialogue to support the assertions.The second and third chapters discuss the procedures and evaluation of the production The Lion in Winter in Ball State University's Studio Theatre on February 14-17, 1973. Included in these sections are the director's ideas, problems, solutions, and suggestions.The appendices contain the production book and all the designs which were necessary to produce The Lion in Winter. In addition, photographs of the actual production are included.

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 151-164).

高基存. / 呈交日期: 2004年8月. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻 (p. 181-188). / Cheng jiao ri qi: 2004 nian 8 yue. / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / Abstracts also in English. / Gao Jicun. / Lun wen (Zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (p. 181-188).

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Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

Socrates teaches in the Meno that in order for a belief to be justified, an appropriate relation must ‘tie down’ the belief to its (apparent) truth. Alvin Goldman’s position of externalism holds that for a belief to be justified, an appropriately reliable process must have obtained. One need not be aware of this reliable process. Conversely, Laurence BonJour’s brand of internalism holds that this relation between a belief and its (apparent) truth is just what the cognizer needs to be aware of in order for that belief to be justified. This work examines their debate, with particular interest paid to BonJour’s case of Norman: a clairvoyant who forms a belief via this ability but has no evidence for or against the belief or his own clairvoyance. Using this case, I propose an ‘epistemological spectrum’ wherein the insight of externalism is appreciated – what Robert Brandom deems the Founding Insight of Reliabilism – that a reliably produced belief bears some epistemic legitimacy, while retaining the insight of internalism: that objective reliability cannot offset subjective irrationality. This is done by classifying cases wherein only the obtainment of a reliable process occurs as epistemically rational, though not justified. Ultimately I reconcile the virtues of both positions, and propose that Goldman’s brand of full blooded externalism was generated by following an intuitional illusion by way of affirming the consequent.

We assume that the central focus of epistemology is propositional knowledge (S knows that P). However, since some true beliefs are true by accident, the central question raised by epistemologists is: What becomes a mere true belief into knowledge? There are several answers to this question, many of them conflicting with each other. Among the answers we find two perspectives that compete with each other as the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, namely, the internalist and externalist perspectives. For the epistemological externalism mind the external factors in the formation of belief. The research aims to discuss some issues that connect externalism a proper way of thinking about truth and what we do when we take a belief to be true. The theoretical discussion will use the externalist perspective of Alvin Goldman seeking a normative theory of justification, assuming that a belief is caused by a reliable process. Goldman, for example, states that the explanation of justified belief is necessary for knowledge and is closely related to it. Asserts that the term "justified" is an evaluative term and any correct definition or synonym for "justified" would also be an evaluative term. Thus, Goldman seeks a normative theory of justification for such a search to specify the conditions for substantive epistemic belief. However, he said conditions should be a non-epistemic, that is, necessary and sufficient conditions that do not involve any epistemic notions. Goldman complains that most of the time it is assumed that someone has a justified belief because that person knows that the belief is justified and know what is the justification. This means that justification is an argument or a set of reasons that can be given in favor of a belief, but it just tells us that the nature of justified belief with regard to what a person might say if asked to defend or justify belief. Instead, Goldman thinks that a belief is justified only by some process or property that makes it justified. / Partiremos do pressuposto que o foco central da epistemologia é o conhecimento proposicional (S sabe que P). Entretanto, uma vez que algumas crenças verdadeiras são verdadeiras por acaso, a questão central formulada pelos epistemólogos é a seguinte: O que converte a mera crença verdadeira em conhecimento? Existem diversas respostas para essa questão, muitas delas conflitantes entre si. Entre as respostas encontramos duas perspectivas que competem entre si quanto às condições necessárias e suficientes para o conhecimento, a saber, as perspectivas internalista e externalista. Para o externalismo epistemológico importam os fatores externos na formação da crença. A pesquisa procura discutir algumas questões que conectam o externalismo a uma adequada maneira de pensar sobre a verdade e o que fazemos quando tomamos uma crença como sendo verdadeira. Como referencial teórico utilizaremos a perspectiva externalista de Alvin Goldman que busca uma teoria normativa da justificação, pressupondo que uma crença é originada por um processo confiável. Goldman, por exemplo, afirma que a explicação da crença justificada é necessária para o conhecimento e está intimamente relacionada a ele. Assevera que o termo justificada é um termo valorativo e qualquer definição correta ou sinônimo de justificada seria também um termo valorativo. Assim, Goldman busca uma teoria normativa da justificação, para tal procura especificar as condições substantivas para a crença epistêmica. Contudo, afirma que tais condições deverão ser condições não epistêmicas, isto é, condições necessárias e suficientes que não envolvem quaisquer noções epistêmicas. Goldman critica que na maioria das vezes se assume que alguém tem uma crença justificada porque essa pessoa sabe que a crença é justificada e sabe qual é a justificação. Isso significa dizer que a justificação é um argumento ou um conjunto de razões que podem ser dadas a favor de uma crença, mas isso simplesmente nos diz que a natureza da crença justificada diz respeito ao que uma pessoa poderia dizer se fosse solicitada a defender ou justificar sua crença. Ao contrário, Goldman pensa que uma crença só é justificada através de algum processo ou propriedade que a torna justificada.

Submitted by Luiz Felipe Poli Guanais (fguanais@hotmail.com) on 2014-12-04T21:20:32Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Luiz Felipe Poli Guanais.pdf: 620638 bytes, checksum: 02d37cff8a2c05c0d78f721b513a6b18 (MD5) / Rejected by JOANA MARTORINI (joana.martorini@fgv.br), reason: Luiz, bom dia. Seu trabalho não está de acordo com as regras. Por gentileza entrar em contato no telefone 3799-7892. on 2014-12-05T11:28:59Z (GMT) / Submitted by Luiz Felipe Poli Guanais (fguanais@hotmail.com) on 2014-12-08T18:14:11Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Luiz Felipe Poli Guanais.pdf: 938612 bytes, checksum: 5e47fb061492e1f2070ebe6b698fa28f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by JOANA MARTORINI (joana.martorini@fgv.br) on 2014-12-08T19:02:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Luiz Felipe Poli Guanais.pdf: 938612 bytes, checksum: 5e47fb061492e1f2070ebe6b698fa28f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-08T19:03:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Luiz Felipe Poli Guanais.pdf: 938612 bytes, checksum: 5e47fb061492e1f2070ebe6b698fa28f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-11-25 / O objetivo do presente trabalho foi, face ao grau de integração da economia brasileira, testar o poder explicativo do Modelo Goldman Sachs sobre os retornos esperados por um investidor estrangeiro no mercado nacional, ao longo do período 2004-2013. Em um primeiro momento, foi testado o grau de integração da economia brasileira para o período 2004-2013, buscando entender o contexto em que o Modelo Goldman Sachs foi empregado. Posteriormente, para o teste do modelo, calcularam-se os betas dos fatores de risco dos ativos analisados (risco de mercado e risco país) e procedeu-se à regressão com dados em painel dos retornos esperados sobre os betas desses ativos. Verificou-se que o risco país não se mostrou estatisticamente significante para a explicação dos retornos esperados, o que indica que é adicionado de maneira ad hoc pelos praticantes de mercado para o cálculo do custo de capital próprio de acordo com o Modelo Goldman Sachs. Assim, embora haja evidências de uma relação positiva e significante entre risco sistemático e retorno, os resultados para o risco país demonstram que o Modelo Goldman Sachs não se mostrou satisfatório para a explicação dos retornos esperados no mercado brasileiro ao longo dos últimos dez anos. / Considering the degree of integration of the Brazilian economy, this paper seeks to test the explanatory power of the Goldman Sachs Model for the expected returns by a foreign investor in the Brazilian market during the past ten years (2004-2013). It begins by testing the degree of integration of the Brazilian economy during this period, in an attempt to better understand the context in which the model has been used. In sequence, the risk factor betas (market risk and country risk) of the sample stocks were estimated and a panel regression of expected stock returns on these betas was performed. It was found that country risk is not a statistically significant explanation of expected returns, indicating that it has been added in an ad hoc fashion by market practitioners to cost of equity calculations. Thus, although there is evidence of a positive and significant relationship between systematic risk and return, the results for country risk demonstrate that the Goldman Sachs Model was not a satisfactory explanation of expected returns in the Brazilian market in the past ten years.

Goldman [Gol86] introduced a Lie algebra structure on the free vector space generated by the free homotopy classes of oriented closed curves in any orientable surface F . This Lie bracket is known as the Goldman bracket and the Lie algebra is known as the Goldman Lie algebra. In this dissertation, we compute the center of the Goldman Lie algebra for any hyperbolic surface of finite type. We use hyperbolic geometry and geometric group theory to prove our theorems. We show that for any hyperbolic surface of finite type, the center of the Goldman Lie algebra is generated by closed curves which are either homotopically trivial or homotopic to boundary components or punctures. We use these results to identify the quotient of the Goldman Lie algebra of a non-closed surface by its center as a sub-algebra of the first Hochschild cohomology of the fundamental group. Using hyperbolic geometry, we prove a special case of a theorem of Chas [Cha10], namely, the geometric intersection number between two simple closed geodesics is the same as the number of terms (counted with multiplicity) in the Goldman bracket between them. We also construct infinitely many pairs of length equivalent curves in any hyperbolic surface F of finite type. Our construction shows that given a self- intersecting geodesic x of F and any self-intersection point P of x, we get a sequence of such pairs.