International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 22-25, 2001 / Riviera Hotel and Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / Today there are many security solutions available which can facilitate both protection and sharing of telemetry data. While the technologies behind these solutions are maturing [1] [2] [3], most products lack a consistent and coherent paradigm for enforcing who is able to access the secured data, what is done with it, and insuring it can be recovered if the person who secured it is disabled.

In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is more widely used. Users run their services in parallel on the same hardware and process information with different confidentiality levels every day. Running parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Computers need to rely on a trusted root to protect the data from malicious entities. Intel proposed the Software Guard eXtension (SGX) to create a trusted execution environment (TEE) within the processor. SGX allows developers to benefit from the hardware level isolation. SGX relies only on the hardware, and claims runtime protection even if the OS and other software components are malicious. However, SGX disregards any kind of side-channel attacks. Researchers have demonstrated that microarchitectural sidechannels are very effective in thwarting the hardware provided isolation. In scenarios that involve SGX as part of their defense mechanism, system adversaries become important threats, and they are capable of initiating these attacks. This work introduces a new and more powerful cache side-channel attack that provides system adversaries a high resolution channel. The developed attack is able to virtually track all memory accesses of SGX execution with temporal precision. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate our attack to recover cryptographic AES keys from the commonly used implementations including those that were believed to be resistant in previous attack scenarios. Our results show that SGX cannot protect critical data sensitive computations, and efficient AES key recovery is possible in a practical environment. In contrast to previous attacks which require hundreds of measurements, this is the first cache side-channel attack on a real system that can recover AES keys with a minimal number of measurements. We can successfully recover the AES key from T-Table based implementations in a known plaintext and ciphertext scenario with an average of 15 and 7 samples respectively.

Public key encryption plays a vital role in securing sensitive data in practical applications. The security of many encryption schemes relies on mathematical problems related to the difficulty of factoring large integers. In particular, subgroup problems in composite order groups are a general class of problems widely used in the construction of secure public-key encryption schemes. This thesis studies public-key encryption schemes that are provably secure based on the difficulty of subgroup or other integer factorisation related problems in the standard model. Firstly, a number of new public-key encryption schemes are presented which are secure in the sense of indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attack in the standard model. These schemes are obtained by instantiating the two previous paradigms for chosen-ciphertext security by Cramer and Shoup, and Kurosawa and Desmedt, with three previously studied subgroup membership problems. The resulting schemes are very efficient, and are comparable if not superior in terms of efficiency when compared to previously presented instantiations. Secondly, a new approach is presented for constructing RSA-related public key encryption schemes secure in the sense of indistinguishability against chosenciphertext attack without random oracles. This new approach requires a new set of assumptions, called the Oracle RSA-type assumptions. The motivating observation is that RSA-based encryption schemes can be viewed as tag-based encryption schemes, and as a result can be used as a building block in a previous technique for obtaining chosen-ciphertext security. Two example encryption schemes are additionally presented, each of which is of comparable efficiency to other public key schemes of similar security. Finally, the notion of self-escrowed public-key infrastructures is revisited, and a security model is defined for self-escrowed encryption schemes. The security definitions proposed consider adversarial models which reflect an attacker's ability to recover private keys corresponding to public keys of the attacker's choice. General constructions for secure self-escrowed versions of ElGamal, RSA, Cramer-Shoup and Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption schemes are also presented, and efficient instantiations are provided. In particular, one instantiation solves the 'key doubling problem' observed in all previous self-escrowed encryption schemes. Also, for another instantiation a mechanism is described for distributing key recovery amongst a number of authorities.

The number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is rising and Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks are still widely used in IoT networks. Security protocols such as Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2) are still in use in most Wi-Fi networks, but Wi-Fi Protected Access 3 (WPA3) is making its way as the new security standard. These security protocols are crucial in Wi-Fi networks with energy and memory-constrained devices because of adversaries that could breach confidentiality, integrity, and availability of networks through various attacks. Many research papers exist on single Wi-Fi attacks, and the strengths and weaknesses of security protocols and Wi-Fi standards. This thesis aims to provide a detailed overview of Wi-Fi attacks and corresponding mitigation techniques against IoT Wi-Fi networks in a comprehensive taxonomy. In addition tools are mentioned for each Wi-Fi attack that allows, e.g., professionals or network administrators to test the chosen Wi-Fi attacks against their IoT networks. Four types of attack (categories) were defined, Man-in-the-Middle (MitM), Key-recovery, Traffic Decryption, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. A set of Wi-Fi attack features were defined and decribed. The features included the security protocol and security mode, the layer (physical or data-link) that an attack targets, and the network component interaction required to allow a Wi-Fi attack to execute successfully. In total, 20 Wi-Fi attacks were selected with relevance to IoT in Wi-Fi networks based on some criteria. Additonally, each Wi-Fi attack consist of a description of possible consequences/results an adversary can achieve, such as eavesdropping, data theft, key recovery, and many more. Flow charts were also added to give the reader a visual perspective on how an attack works. As a result, tables were created for each relevant security protocol and the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers to create a overview of mitigations and available tools for each attack. Furthermore, WPA3 was discussed on how it solves some shortcomings of WPA2 but has vulnerabilities of it own that lie in the design of the 4-way and dragonfly handshake itself. In conclusion, development and proper vulnerability tests on the Wi-Fi standards and security protocols have to be conducted to improve and reduce the possibility of current and upcoming vulnerabilities.