The central and pivotal doctrine of the Imamate in the Twelver Shii creed maintains that the Imams are endowed with the exclusive prerogative to assume the authority and functions of the Prophet in both the temporal and religious domains. This is so by virtue of explicit designation (nass) received by each Imam from his predecessor to act as custodian, protector and expositor of divine teachings. Unfavourable political circumstances during the 'Umayyad and 'Abbasid dynasties forced the Imams to adopt a quietist attitude and to opt for accommodation with the illegitimate authorites. The inaccessibility of the Imams and their inability to guide their followers in distant places resulted in delegation of certain functions of the the Imams to the 'ulama' to guide the community. The prolonged occultation of the twelfth Shii Imam led the jurists to arrogate to themselves the right to act as his indirect deputies (na'ib al-Imam). Establishment of Imami Shiism as the state religion by the Safavids in the early sixteenth century, the victory of the Usuli school over the Akhbaris and the formulation of the institutions of marja'iya and a'lamiya paved the way for Ayatullah Khumayni to lay the grounds for the jurist's assumption of all-comprehensive authority (al-wilaya al-mutlaqa) by extrapolating arguments from tradition reports. The combination of the marja'iya and leadership (rahbar) of the Islamic State in the person of Ayatullah Khumayni had the potential of marshalling the Shii 'ulama' and masses to support for a political cause. However, bifurcation of these two roles in the 1989 revised Constitution of Iran forebodes the separation of the secular and the religious spheres.

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The shu’ubiyya movement originates from the early days of Islam. Its main purpose was to challenge the Arabic elite by showing prominent abilities in non-Arabic groups. The movement disappeared in the eleventh century. In the twentieth century a new wave of shu’ubiyya thoughts reappeared called neo-shu’ubiyya. The twist however was that it was used by the Arabs as derogatory term against their rivals. One accused as a shu’ubiyya was Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution. He never proclaimed to be shu’ubiyya yet the Arabic elite still used it against him. This study compares Ayatollah Khomeini’s speech Message to the Pilgrims from the 1980s with the shu’ubiyya member Ibn Garica’s risala from the eleventh century in al-Andalus. The purpose of the study is to question that Ayatollah Khomeini can be seen as a true shu’ubiyya. By examining their messages the study tries to understand how the shu’ubiyya discourse has evolved in fields such as the sacred, traditions, history and the surrounding world. The result shows that part of Ayatollah Khomeini’s argumentation is similar to that of Ibn Garcia, but that his main purpose deviates too much to be called shu’ubiyya. Ibn Garcia tries to turn the Arabic “us against them” upside down and show how superior the non-Arabs are in comparison. He argues that this should allow the non-Arabs to join the Arabic culture. Ayatollah Khomeini has no desire to enter the Arabic discourse instead he asks all Muslims to unite in his new discourse for the greater god of Islam. The claims of the Arabic elite that Iran is the enemy in a “us against them” scenario is not true according to Ayatollah Khomeini. He tries to change the established view of the Iranian as “them”, and instead make all Muslims “us” and the Americans “them” by showing their evil interactions in the middle east. He wants all Muslims to join together by the core of Islam. The trend goes from a more cultural approach to be completely theological.

The gathered texts and letters from Ali Ibn Abi Talib, found in the book Nahjul Balagha,constitute one of the most important writings of Shiite Islam, next the hadits and the Quran.Imam Ali´s ethics and moral approach in Nahjul Balagha, is considered by imam Ali, to beseen as a guideline for both individual purposes as for any kind of governance. The esotericteachings, about truth and justice in Nahjul Balagha, should therefore probably have been of agreat concern to Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution.This essay will from an deductive approach, on a relatively contemporary historic event, try toanalyze Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini´s interpreting on imam Ali´s texts and preaching inNahjul Balagha. The Islamic revolution, as the Islamic Republic of Iran, led by AyatollahKhomeini, was confirmed as both brutal and violent. My ambition in this essay, will there forconcern a possible interpreting on justice and political rule, from Ayatollah Khomeini and theIslamic Republic of Iran, on imam Ali´s teachings in Nahjul Balagha.

This work examines how two Islamist forces, the Islamic State and the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, use Islamic messages and themes in their propaganda and narrative in an effort to persuade others to their point of view. It does so through the lens of propaganda analysis and narrative theory, and focuses specifically on the efforts of these groups to create an imaginary "model Muslim" for persuadees to emulate, the use of religiously loaded terms, and the intertwining of government and Islamic themes to create Islamic messages with the intent to persuade.

A Revolução Islâmica pode ser entendida como um marco histórico, tendo em vista seu aspecto religioso e a mudança de paradigmas que trouxe para o estudo das Ciências. Seja no aspecto político, econômico ou social, a implantação da República Islâmica do Irã provocou uma mudança nas relações internas e também externas refletidas no sistema internacional. Esse estudo procura desenvolver um aspecto da Revolução Iraniana que muitas vezes não é tratado pelos especialistas, qual seja, a real viabilidade de a revolução expandir-se para outros países muçulmanos. Muitas vezes essa possibilidade é apresentada como uma meta política norteadora do governo iraniano, no entanto, sem que sejam analisadas as reais possibilidades para que se concretize. Nesse sentido, o objeto principal desse trabalho é apresentar a gradual ampliação da importância que os ulemás alcançaram na vida política iraniana a partir do final do século XIX e que desencadeou a Revolução (1978-79). Para que esse processo se tornasse viável, além das condições políticas propícias, foi necessário que os ulemás se apropriassem ainda mais da linguagem religiosa e a transformasse em instrumento político para mudar o status da população xiita, ou seja, de resignada para ativa. Ainda, além da alteração nessa postura dos ulemás frente à dominação do xá, houve a necessidade de que uma liderança desencadeasse o processo contestatório que levaria ao final da monarquia. Para tanto, a liderança do aiatolá Khomeini foi imprescindível e, ainda mais, o desenvolvimento da teoria do wilayat al-faqih, que nortearia a estrutura política do governo no pós-revolução. Contudo, mesmo diante de um panorama político que convergiu para a ocorrência da Revolução, esse estudo defende a tese de que a doutrina usulita abriu a possibilidade para a ijtihad e essa liberalidade foi muito bem utilizada pelo aiatolá Khomeini ao criar discursos políticos impregnados de elementos religiosos. Como resultado de seus discursos em Najaf (1970), surgiu o wilayat al-faqih. No entanto, o mesmo pragmatismo que possibilitou o entendimento particularizado da situação política iraniana e desencadeou a Revolução, hoje se apresenta como um impeditivo para sua expansão, tendo em vista que o atual Líder Supremo iraniano não goza do mesmo prestígio que o carismático Khomeini, tampouco os aiatolás iranianos têm interesse em delegar completamente suas prerrogativas religiosas a ele. Assim, quando essa pesquisa buscou entrevistar os atuais aiatolás que fazem parte do bloco governamental, intencionava mostrar que o wilayat al-faqih continua sendo o estabilizador da revolução, mas não tem condições para se tornar um modelo que agregaria outros estados, uma vez que, além do nacionalismo enraizado nos demais grupos xiitas do Oriente Médio, a ausência de uma liderança carismática faz com que o pragmatismo dos aiatolás impere. Com isso, mesmo que a intenção de Khomeini fosse utilizar o wilayat al-faqih para expandir a revolução, com sua morte houve o sepultamento dessa via. / The Islamic Revolution can be understood as a historical landmark in view of its religious aspect and the paradigm shift it brought to the study of Sciences. Be it on the political, economic, or social aspects, the implantation of the Islamic Republic of Iran triggered a turn in both internal and external relations reflected in the international system. This study aims to develop an aspect of the Iranian Revolution which is often not treated by specialists, that is, the actual viability of the revolution to expand itself to other Muslim countries. Frequently this possibility is presented as a guiding political goal for the Iranian government, however, without being analyzed the real possibilities for it to be realized. In this sense, the main object of this work is to present the gradual enlargement of importance that the ulama achieved in the Iranian political life starting from the end of the nineteenth century and which set off the Revolution (1978-79). For this process to become viable, in addition to the propitious political conditions, it was necessary for the ulama to appropriate even further the religious language and change it into political instrument to transform the status of the Shia population, namely from resigned to active. Yet, besides the alteration of the ulamas posture in face of the Shahs domination, there was a need for a leadership to trigger the contestatory process which would lead to the end of the monarchy. To this end, the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was indispensable and, even more, the development of the wilayat al-faqih theory, which would guide the political structure of the government at the post-revolution period. However, even though confronted with a political overview that converged to the occurrence of the Revolution, this study defends the thesis that the Usulis doctrine opened the possibility for the ijtihad, and this liberality was very well used by Ayatollah Khomeini by creating political discourses impregnated with religious elements. As a result of his discourses in Najaf (1970) the wilayat al-faqih came to existence. Nonetheless, the very same pragmatism that allowed the particularized understanding of the Iranian political situation and which triggered the Revolution presents itself today as a hindrance for its expansion, taking into account that the current Iranian Supreme Leader does not enjoy the same prestige such as the charismatic Khomeini, neither do the Iranian Ayatollahs have interest in delegating completely their religious prerogatives to him. Hence, when this research sought to interview the current Ayatollahs that are part of the governmental bloc, it purposed to show that the wilayat al-faqih is still the revolutions stabilizer, but has no condition to become a model which could aggregate other states, since that, beyond the nationalism rooted in the other Shia groups in the Middle East, the absence of a charismatic leadership causes the Ayatollahs pragmatism to prevail. With this, even if Khomeinis intention was to use the wilayat al-faqih to expand the revolution, with his death followed the burial of this idea.

A Revolução Islâmica pode ser entendida como um marco histórico, tendo em vista seu aspecto religioso e a mudança de paradigmas que trouxe para o estudo das Ciências. Seja no aspecto político, econômico ou social, a implantação da República Islâmica do Irã provocou uma mudança nas relações internas e também externas refletidas no sistema internacional. Esse estudo procura desenvolver um aspecto da Revolução Iraniana que muitas vezes não é tratado pelos especialistas, qual seja, a real viabilidade de a revolução expandir-se para outros países muçulmanos. Muitas vezes essa possibilidade é apresentada como uma meta política norteadora do governo iraniano, no entanto, sem que sejam analisadas as reais possibilidades para que se concretize. Nesse sentido, o objeto principal desse trabalho é apresentar a gradual ampliação da importância que os ulemás alcançaram na vida política iraniana a partir do final do século XIX e que desencadeou a Revolução (1978-79). Para que esse processo se tornasse viável, além das condições políticas propícias, foi necessário que os ulemás se apropriassem ainda mais da linguagem religiosa e a transformasse em instrumento político para mudar o status da população xiita, ou seja, de resignada para ativa. Ainda, além da alteração nessa postura dos ulemás frente à dominação do xá, houve a necessidade de que uma liderança desencadeasse o processo contestatório que levaria ao final da monarquia. Para tanto, a liderança do aiatolá Khomeini foi imprescindível e, ainda mais, o desenvolvimento da teoria do wilayat al-faqih, que nortearia a estrutura política do governo no pós-revolução. Contudo, mesmo diante de um panorama político que convergiu para a ocorrência da Revolução, esse estudo defende a tese de que a doutrina usulita abriu a possibilidade para a ijtihad e essa liberalidade foi muito bem utilizada pelo aiatolá Khomeini ao criar discursos políticos impregnados de elementos religiosos. Como resultado de seus discursos em Najaf (1970), surgiu o wilayat al-faqih. No entanto, o mesmo pragmatismo que possibilitou o entendimento particularizado da situação política iraniana e desencadeou a Revolução, hoje se apresenta como um impeditivo para sua expansão, tendo em vista que o atual Líder Supremo iraniano não goza do mesmo prestígio que o carismático Khomeini, tampouco os aiatolás iranianos têm interesse em delegar completamente suas prerrogativas religiosas a ele. Assim, quando essa pesquisa buscou entrevistar os atuais aiatolás que fazem parte do bloco governamental, intencionava mostrar que o wilayat al-faqih continua sendo o estabilizador da revolução, mas não tem condições para se tornar um modelo que agregaria outros estados, uma vez que, além do nacionalismo enraizado nos demais grupos xiitas do Oriente Médio, a ausência de uma liderança carismática faz com que o pragmatismo dos aiatolás impere. Com isso, mesmo que a intenção de Khomeini fosse utilizar o wilayat al-faqih para expandir a revolução, com sua morte houve o sepultamento dessa via. / The Islamic Revolution can be understood as a historical landmark in view of its religious aspect and the paradigm shift it brought to the study of Sciences. Be it on the political, economic, or social aspects, the implantation of the Islamic Republic of Iran triggered a turn in both internal and external relations reflected in the international system. This study aims to develop an aspect of the Iranian Revolution which is often not treated by specialists, that is, the actual viability of the revolution to expand itself to other Muslim countries. Frequently this possibility is presented as a guiding political goal for the Iranian government, however, without being analyzed the real possibilities for it to be realized. In this sense, the main object of this work is to present the gradual enlargement of importance that the ulama achieved in the Iranian political life starting from the end of the nineteenth century and which set off the Revolution (1978-79). For this process to become viable, in addition to the propitious political conditions, it was necessary for the ulama to appropriate even further the religious language and change it into political instrument to transform the status of the Shia population, namely from resigned to active. Yet, besides the alteration of the ulamas posture in face of the Shahs domination, there was a need for a leadership to trigger the contestatory process which would lead to the end of the monarchy. To this end, the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was indispensable and, even more, the development of the wilayat al-faqih theory, which would guide the political structure of the government at the post-revolution period. However, even though confronted with a political overview that converged to the occurrence of the Revolution, this study defends the thesis that the Usulis doctrine opened the possibility for the ijtihad, and this liberality was very well used by Ayatollah Khomeini by creating political discourses impregnated with religious elements. As a result of his discourses in Najaf (1970) the wilayat al-faqih came to existence. Nonetheless, the very same pragmatism that allowed the particularized understanding of the Iranian political situation and which triggered the Revolution presents itself today as a hindrance for its expansion, taking into account that the current Iranian Supreme Leader does not enjoy the same prestige such as the charismatic Khomeini, neither do the Iranian Ayatollahs have interest in delegating completely their religious prerogatives to him. Hence, when this research sought to interview the current Ayatollahs that are part of the governmental bloc, it purposed to show that the wilayat al-faqih is still the revolutions stabilizer, but has no condition to become a model which could aggregate other states, since that, beyond the nationalism rooted in the other Shia groups in the Middle East, the absence of a charismatic leadership causes the Ayatollahs pragmatism to prevail. With this, even if Khomeinis intention was to use the wilayat al-faqih to expand the revolution, with his death followed the burial of this idea.

Shi´ism intellectual history is the main subject in this bachelor thesis. Mainly the models of interpretation that arose on the basis of the doctrine of the twelfth imam, and how these have influenced politics. The Khomeini doctrine has been used as an example, and the task has been to put the doctrine into a liberation theological perspective. The definition of liberation theology that is used is from the famous liberation theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez. The paper is a presentation of the tradition of the twelfth Imam and will, as mentioned, treat a political doctrine that arose from it. It will present how Khomeini argued for his doctrine and how he claimed that this would lead to freedom of the people and the perfect society. The paper is an example of what can happen when a revolution succeeds with religion as it medium, and when the revolution is transformed from ideas to practice.

A large part of the Iranian population resented the west, in particular USA and Great Britain, during the Islamic revolution in Iran 1979. The people were also resenting the adverse effects of the trumped up frame made in Iran. The last shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was detested by many in Iran for its west-oriented regime. The resentment among many Iranians is a consequence of the violations of e.g. the lack of political and civil rights, there were no existing legal security in the society, there were no economic distribution and the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah violated the human rights. The resolution from an Iranian perspective for riot is not new, during the last centuries the abomination against the despotic kings have been existing varyingly and big riots have been raised.  The Islamic revolution in 1979 was new because the revolution added adverse effects of west, the population detested west and expressed it by protesting through demonstration.  The significance of the revolution in 1979 was also attributable to Islam. The statements and onsets that raised against west by the citizens of Iran was not merely support of the regime from the west, nevertheless to the same extent also for the western culture and civilization. The proponents of the Islamic revolution were Islamic in spirit, and were against western values, culture, and civilization.  The proponents claimed that the Iranians should not inquire for western civilization. The ideals projected went back in time, namely to the beginning of Islam. The recent government hoped to deviate from the regime of the shah, the new government should be comprised by the divine laws. The thesis will depict why Khomeinism was growing fiercly and in addition illustrate the religious and theological doctrines of Khomeini.

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