Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005. / Thesis directed by Michael DePaul for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-182).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, MA, 2002. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [84]-86).

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Abilene Christian University, 2006. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-87).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-178).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-134). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 196-204) and index.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2008. / "May 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 132-147). Online version available on the World Wide Web.

No description available.

This thesis defends an interpretation of the argument that Immanuel Kant calls his Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. It is divided into four chapters. The subject of the first chapter is the aim of Kant's Deduction of the Categories. It is argued that what Kant has set out to find is an answer to the question how it is that the Categories are able to serve as representations of objects. This chapter also includes a detailed account of what Kant thinks is required for a concept to serve as a representation of an object. The subject of the second chapter is the strategy of Kant's Deduction of the Categories. It is argued that what Kant thinks he needs to do in order to deduce the Categories is to show that an object must conform to the Categories if we are to make a judgment about this object. The third chapter is concerned with the central claim of Kant's Deduction of the Categories, viz. the Principle of the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception. It is argued that this principle consists in the claim that if we are to make a judgment about an object then we must be able to achieve a special sort of consciousness - specifically, the consciousness of what Kant calls the necessary unity of synthesis. The fourth and final chapter of the thesis is concerned with Kant's justification for the Principle of the Original Synthetic Unity of Apperception. It is argued that Kant's commitment to this principle is based on his recognition of a key fact about an act of judgment, viz. the fact that in making a judgment about an object, part of what we think is that our representations ought to be connected in a particular way.