Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis traverses the complexities and entanglement of theoretical and practical processes in a Post-structural age. Through the deconstruction of stable systems of knowledge and thought, this age has become synonymous with uncertainty. In an attempt to navigate a time of continual change, Foucault proposes a toolkit. Foucault advocates deconstruction, critical engagement and reflection. In addition to these tools, this thesis moves through genealogical, mapping, archaeological and glass (blowing) methodologies. My practice cannot be separated from theory, it is excavated concurrently. Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari open up knowledge systems in an effort to uncover alternative thought trajectories and create a space in which complexity can exist. Knowledge circulating in this space is not fixed, it manifests in moments. My practical project, Fleeting Certainty, also aims to create an open space. It does not culminate in one, autonomous work, but is rather an archive of moments. Viewers will also be equipped with a toolkit of light and lenses with which to create moments of their own. Therefore moments will generate continuously. These theoretical and practical processes do not culminate in a coherent conclusion. There is a pause, a comma, but there are many more trajectories or lines to follow. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis deurkruis die ingewikkeldhede en verstrengeling van teoretiese en praktiese prosesse binne ’n Post-strukturele tydperk. Hierdie tydperk het, deur die dekonstruksie van stabiele stelsels van kennis en denke, gelykstaande aan onsekerheid geword. In a poging om ’n tydperk van voortdurende verandering te verken, stel Foucault sekere hulpmiddels voor. Foucault bepleit, dekonstruksie, kritiese betrokkenheid en besinning. Benewens hierdie hulpmiddels, maak hierdie tesis gebruik van genealogiese, karterings-, argeologiese en glas (blaas) metodologieë. Die praktiese komponent van my werk hou ten nouste verband met die teoretiese en kan nie van mekaar geskei word nie. Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari stel kennisstelsels oop in ’n poging om alternatiewe gedagtegange te ontbloot en skep ’n ruimte waarin kompleksiteit kan bestaan. Kennis wat in hierdie ruimte bestaan, is nie vas of bepaald nie, maar kom in oomblikke voor. My praktiese projek, Fleeting Certainty, poog ook om ’n ‘oop’ ruimte te skep. Die projek loop nie uit op een selfstandige werk nie, maar dien as ’n versameling of argief van oomblikke. Kykers sal ook toegerus word met hulpmiddels in die vorm van lig en lense waarmee hulle oomblikke van hul eie kan skep. Oomblikke sal dus voortdurent geskep word. Hierdie teoretiese en praktiese prosesse loop ook nie op ’n samehangende gevolgtrekking uit nie. Daar is ’n pouse, ’n komma, maar daar is baie meer bane of lyne om te volg.

Though artificial intelligence scientists frequently use words such as "belief" and "desire" when describing the computational capacities of their programs and computers, they have completely ignored the philosophical and psychological theories of belief and desire. Hence, their explanations of computational capacities which use these terms are frequently little better than folk-psychological explanations. Conversely, though philosophers and psychologists attempt to couch their theories of belief and desire in computational terms, they have consistently misunderstood the notions of computation and computational semantics. Hence, their theories of such attitudes are frequently inadequate. A computational theory of propositional attitudes (belief and desire) is presented here. It is argued that the theory of propositional attitudes put forth by philosophers and psychologists entails that propositional attitudes are a kind of abstract data type. This refined computational view of propositional attitudes bridges the gap between artificial intelligence, philosophy and psychology. Lastly, it is argued that this theory of propositional attitudes has consequences for meta-processing and consciousness in computers.

This thesis presents the historiographical concerns guiding the work of Christopher Dawson, Roman Catholic historian, sociologist, and philosopher of history, in terms of a science of human being, which is adequate to conceptualize human activity in time. The author attempts to show that Dawson rejects the modern, empirical paradigm, both for its secularity and its reconceptualization of the relation between time and human activity in history. A conceptual continuity Dawson sees between the work of modern empirical thinkers G.W.F. Hegel, Karl Marx, and Friedrich Nietzsche, and its consequences for understanding history as a teleological process, or the progress of Reason, consciousness, Spirit, self-overcoming, etc., is treated in the first section. Dawson's account of the natural conditions of human knowing, and its relation to his theory of culture, is treated in the second section. And in the final section, Dawson's understanding of the relation between religion and culture is presented.

Mind and World is written in a Wittgensteinian spirit. It is a work whose aim is to address a specific philosophical discomfort. John McDowell diagnoses a tension between the urge for what he describes as 'minimal empiricism' and its apparent impossibility. Minimal empiricism is defined as the idea that constraint is exercised on our thought by the world through experience. In his view, minimal empiricism stands in tension with the fact that conceptually unstructured impressions can have no rational bearing on our beliefs and judgements. This tension forces an oscillation between two equally unattractive positions: the Myth of the Given and coherentism. McDowell's aim is to dissolve this apparent tension which he sees as resting on the more basic assumption of a dualism between reason and nature. Through his invocation of 'second nature' he aims to present a naturalised Platonism in which man's occupation of the space of reasons can be seen as an aspect of his animal nature, not as something essentially alien to us. The thesis starts by outlining McDowell's attempt to escape the oscillation he detects between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. In Chapter One, the content of Mind and World is briefly laid out. The underlying dualism of reason and nature on which the oscillation is said to rest is considered and the resources he employs in his attempt to escape it discussed. These resources include his metaphysical rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. The second chapter reinforces the first by isolating and defining a number of key concepts in McDowell's picture. The material discussed here is largely drawn from works other than Mind and World. Three key assumptions are isolated: the rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding, the de re nature of singular thought and the fully conceptual nature of experience. These assumptions are shown to play a pivotal role in his philosophy by considering his work on Aristotle and Descartes. McDowell aims to provide a 'therapeutic dissolution' of the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. In order to be successful it must meet (at least) three criteria which emerge from his writings. These criteria are discussed alongside attempts by other philosophers to escape the oscillation that McDowell detects. The third chapter develops, in broad outline, the argument of the thesis. Two lines of thought are traced from the three central elements of McDowell's view identified in the second chapter. The first stems from his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding, whilst the second arises from the object-dependence of singular thought. The picture in Mind and World incorporates what Julian Dodd has termed a 'modest identity theory of truth'. Put simply, an identity theory states that facts are true propositions, and the theory is modest if facts are taken to be composed of senses. McDowell himself explicitly accepts that his picture is committed to a modest identity theory, though its exact nature is unclear from his writings. McDowell's semantic externalism appears to provide an account in which singular senses are object-dependent. Thoughts are composed of these senses, and so are dependent on objects in the world for their content. One would expect that facts too (which are true possible thoughts) would be object-dependent. After all they are composed of object-dependent entities, namely senses. Such a position encourages the idea that objects are explanatorily independent of facts. In Kit Fine's terminology, propositions about objects 'ground' propositions about senses. However, this idea stands in tension with McDowell's rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. He claims that the world is composed of facts and that reality does not exist beyond the conceptual realm. Such a position suggests that objects exist only derivatively from their role in facts: "objects figure in the world by figuring in facts, which are true thinkables" [McDowell (1999a) p94. My italics]. In other words, that propositions about facts 'ground' propositions about objects. Since 'grounding' is an asymmetric notion, there is a tension in McDowell's picture which needs to be resolved. Chapter Four examines McDowell's Kantian account of objects. Objects are derived from facts. McDowell is not committed to a substantial semantic externalism in which, when we investigate whether our terms have a reference, we look at the world to see whether there is an object corresponding to our sense of the term. Instead, McDowell's semantic externalism is truistic: once a sense appears in a fact, no further questions can be asked about the reference of the term. The sense's figuring in a true possible thought ensures that there is a reference. There can be no sense without reference because objects are derived from facts (which are true possible thoughts). The conception of objects that McDowell offers, however, fails to sustain important common-sense realist intuitions. Looked at as an account of empirical objects (rather than formal objects, such as mathematical ones), there are deficiencies which can be brought out. His account can be challenged on the grounds that it is unable to allow that sapient and sentient environments have a common ontology. The discussion is framed as a dialogue between a common-sense realist and a McDowellian thinker. This provides for responses to the reasoning to be considered at every appropriate point. These responses are, in the end, not sufficient to allow his account to meet the realist intuitions. He has therefore failed to provide an account based on mere reminders of common-sense truisms. His account of objects is revisionary and must be either replaced or defended by positive arguments. The quietist's claim that only negative arguments are needed to defend his position is undermined once the position abandons common-sense realism. In Chapter Five the focus shifts back to the overall argument laid out in Chapter Three. It might be thought that McDowelPs particular conception of objects is a peripheral error. If this were the case, since his basic account has not been shown to abandon common-sense realism, his revisionary conception of objects could simply be dropped. This line of thought is countered. I present the arguments of two commentators to show the strength of my objection. Mark Sainsbury argues that McDowell should not maintain a substantial form of semantic externalism if he stands firm to his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. Ruth Millikan argues that McDowelPs commitment to a substantial form of semantic externalism stands in tension with his account of sense, which is a central element in his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding. The tension which concerns these commentators needs to be addressed. The conception of objects considered in Chapter Four is required. It provides McDowell's explanation of how his rejection of sideways-on accounts of understanding is consistent with his semantic externalism. The final chapter concludes the argument of the thesis. It is shown that McDowell's theory (as it stands) fails to meet his therapeutic aspirations. In particular he has failed to meet two of the three therapeutic requirements attributed to him in Chapter Two. His conception of objects is revisionary and his picture does not avoid the appearance of an insurmountable problem in world-directed thoughts. Its failure to provide for common-sense realism means that he can no longer avail himself of the quietist strategy which disavows the need to provide positive arguments for its conclusions. Therapeutic dissatisfaction with his picture is the result. The argument of this thesis is then located within a broader philosophical landscape.

The principal aim of this work is to ascertain a clear understanding of Clarke's moral theory, one which has suffered from neglect and misunderstanding. The assumption that his 'rational intuitionism' is given little if any epistemological grounding, is shown to be erroneous. This is done by drawing on his extensive work in the Letter to Dodwell and its Defenses. The secondary aim of this thesis is to show the relevance of Clarke's work to contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind, moral theory, and moral theology. The thesis has four parts. In Part I, the works of Clarke, relevant to his moral theory, are introduced. His influence in the eighteenth century is brought out, both in Britain and on the Continent. As regards his influence in moral theory, he is the likely goad that moved Hume to formulate 'Hume's Law,' that ought cannot be derived from is. Part II is an analysis of Clarke's philosophical work on the nature of the 'rational and moral agent.' His views are ascertained, clarified, and presented as the epistemological foundation of his moral theory. One conclusion that follows from this material is that the influential work of Clarke is sharply at odds with the 'historiographic orthodoxy' that views British thought about the problem of knowledge to be progressive refinements of Locke's anti-innatism. The Defences are directed to Anthony Collins, a deist and late disciple of Locke. There are also three major historical corrections that follow from the study of Clarke's work on the nature of mind. Two ideas that are usually attributed to Joseph Butler are actually Clarke's conceptions, e.g. the distinction between 'the strict' and 'the abstract'(or 'loose') concepts of personal identity, and the notion that memory does not constitute personal identity but rather presupposes and entails it. One other idea, usually attributed to Thomas Reid, is more properly credited to Clarke, namely, the theory of agent-causation. All three of these concepts are extremely important in contemporary philosophy of mind and theory of action. They constitute the epistemological ground of Clarke's moral theory. In Part III the moral epistemology uncovered in Part II is linked with Clarke's more well known views found in the Discourse. His usually nebulous concept of 'fitness' is assessed and defended against the major criticisms of Hume (in Treatise 3.1.1) and Hutcheson. His often degraded analogy between morals and mathematics is defended, and his views are distinguished from those of Thomas Burnet, another anti- Lockean writer. In Part IV, the moral theory proposed by Clarke argues for an employment of reason and revelation. It comes under sharp and extensive criticism from the deist Matthew Tindal. His criticisms, however, employ an either/or fallacy that is wholly inadequate as a refutation of Clarke's moral theology. A comparison of key ideas in the moral theologies (metaphysics) of Leibniz and Clarke is made, and the principle of imitation of the holiness of God is found to be the coherent and full expression of Clarke's moral theology.

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts / The Epistemological Realist (ER)project, recently initiated by John McDowell in Mind and World and Hilary Putnam in his 1994 series of Dewey Lectures, is an extremely promising one. This project aims to show how a 'commonsense realism' about the world and our relationship to it can be made tenable in a philosophical climate increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. At least part of the reason for the prevalence of anti-realism is the unsatisfactory way in which realism has traditionally been developed. Epistemological Realism departs from Traditional Realism in at least three key areas: (a) its account of how perception enables empirical knowledge, (b) its account of perception itself and (c) its account of how our empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. The ability of the ER theorist to give perfectly satisfactory accounts of (a)-(c) does much to reinstate 'commonsense realism' as a philosophically respectable position. Epistemological Realism 'commonsense realism' Traditional Realism antirealism perception empirical knowledge reality John McDowell Mind and World Hilary Putnam / AC2017

Argumentive writing is not an easy skill to master. Students from middle school through college demonstrate weaknesses. In particular they fail to take a dialogic perspective, emphasizing their own position without considering addressing alternatives. Research has shown that engaging in dialog with peers is effective in enhancing students’ argumentive thinking and writing. The present study examines whether college students (n=30) show similar benefits when asked to engage individually in a dialogic argumentive writing task. They were asked to construct a dialog between two people holding opposing positions on an issue. Students in a comparison group (n=30) were asked to write an essay on the same issue. Subsequently students in both groups were asked to write a brief TV script conveying their view. Differences in students’ argumentive skills produced in the dialogs and essays were examined. Results showed that the dialog group more frequently included opponent-directed statements (sum of Critical single evaluation, Compare, Integrate other, and Integrate own/other) and integrative statements (sum of Integrate own, Integrate other, and Integrate own/other) in their writing, compared to the essay group. Differences in students’ writing of their TV scripts were also examined. On this assessment, the effect of the dialog largely disappeared, with students in both the essay and dialog groups focusing largely on their own position. Students’ level of epistemological understanding was also examined – that is, whether they regarded knowledge claims as largely facts (absolutist level), opinions (multiplist level), or judgments subject to scrutiny in a framework of alternatives and evidence (evaluativist level). Level of epistemological understanding was assessed immediately after the writing task to determine if constructing a dialog influenced students to take on a more evaluativist perspective in which the need for comparison of multiple perspectives is recognized. Students who had constructed a dialog were more often assessed to be at the multiplist or evaluativist levels of epistemological understanding (and never at the absolutist level), compared to students who had written an essay rather than constructed a dialog. Although the benefit of the dialogic writing task largely did not generalize to the more self-focused TV script writing task, these findings indicate that promoting a dialogic perspective, even without engaging in dialog with an actual person, can be beneficial in supporting argumentive thinking and writing and mature epistemological understanding.

What Stephen Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump demonstrates to be the case in early modern scientific culture is no less true of the experimental ethic of Jewish feminists today: epistemology and politics are inseparably linked and are projected onto the material of everyday life. In this study of transnational Jewish theopolitics and biopolitics, I show how women enlist their reproductive bodies to develop new forms of spiritual leadership, medical expertise, and religious knowledge and authority as they work to reshape American Judaism. I situate Jewish feminist claims to authenticity and authority within the entangled networks of bio-capital, nationalisms, the logics of classical liberalism and religious subjectivity, and scientific and Rabbinic moral economies. By contextualizing Jewish feminisms in technoscience’s politicization of the sexual body and Christianity’s elevation of the spirit over material, I elucidate how sexual, religious, and epistemic hierarchies structure formations of American religion. This dissertation contributes to growing literatures on religion and science; gender, secularism, and spirituality; transnational American studies; and feminist approaches to medicine and the body. While previous studies on religion and science have highlighted the inseparability of the categories in Euro-American Protestant history or showcased the participation of Jewish men in the development of modern science, this project draws on the “lived religion” methodology to move beyond the activities of elites in institutional spaces. In doing so, it shows how knowledge production happens in intimate, holy places and is structured by sacred and bodily cycles. By stretching the temporal and spatial boundaries of the study of American Judaism, this dissertation reveals how interconnected feminist projects are remaking Judaism as an American religion.

本論文旨在探討有關提升批判性思考的學習效能。本文主要分為兩大部分：第一部分為批判性思考的技巧及態度建立量表，並以此量表分析香港中五學生在批判性思考的技巧及態度，及其兩者在學業成績組別和性別之間的關係。第二部分為探討交錯練習（interleaved practice）和同組練習（blocked practice）對提升批判性思考技巧的效應。從第一部分的結果分析顯示，男生在批判性思考的態度上優於女生；第一學業成績組別的學生在批判性思考技巧上優於第二及第三學業成績組別的學生。從第二部分的結果分析發現，無論使用交錯練習抑或同組練習，均能顯著提升批判性思考的整體技巧，而在批判性思考技巧中的解釋部分，同組練習的結果又較交錯練習為佳。整體而言，交錯練習及同組練習兩種學習模式皆能有效提升批判性思考技巧的能力，而兩者的效果相約，並無顯著的差別。 / This thesis aims to explore the learning effectiveness on promoting critical thinking competence. The first part of the thesis shows the establishment of the measuring tools of both critical thinking dispositions and critical thinking skills. The use of the tools, dispositions, skills, gender and banding of Form Five students in Hong Kong were then collected and analyzed. The second part of the thesis is to explore and compare the effectiveness between interleaved practice and blocked practice on critical thinking skills. From the results of the first part, boys scored better than girls on critical thinking dispositions; while Band One students scored better than Band Two and Band Three students on critical thinking skills. From the results of the second part, both interleaved practice and blocked practice enhanced the overall performance of critical thinking skills significantly. In the explanation component of critical thinking skills, it is found that blocked practice were more effective than interleaved practice. In sum, both of the methods can enhance the critical thinking skills with similar effect. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 張錦華. / Thesis (Ed.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2015. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 167-181). / Abstracts also in English. / Zhang Jinhua.

本論文旨在闡釋費希特之超驗哲學的知識論面向。處理這問題的過程除了闡釋部份外還會涉及兩個觀點。第一個觀點是透過歷史的角度來揭露費氏的早期知識學(Wissenschaftslehre)所處置的理論哲學脈絡，而第二個觀點則是從一個當代角度去考察費氏的早期知識學作為一知識論策略的本質並檢討當代對其哲學以基礎論(foundationalism)及反基礎論(anti-foundationalism)作評斷的考察方式。對費氏理論集中闡釋的部份則成為樞紐把兩觀點貫穿起來。第一個觀點的作用在於透過把費氏的理論放置於其獨特的、特殊的背景下理解來防止時代錯置的判斷(anachronism)，而這樣也為我們提供理解費氏哲學的恰當途徑。這對闡釋費氏的理論有關鍵的理解作用而不只具有歷史意義。而第二個觀點雖然較易傾向時代錯置，但可以透過當代的資源和方法來為問題作翻新的處理。這做法有助突顯闡釋中隱藏的、未被充份處理的問題，而透過處理這些問題可側面地補充闡釋。因此本論文主要有三大部份。第一部份著重解釋在甚麼意義下費氏知識學趨生於三個哲學家雅各比（而從他關聯到斯賓洛沙）、康德 和 萊茵霍爾德(K. L. Reinhold)的理論脈絡並試圖作出回應。明白這點則不難理解第二部份之主張費氏所提出的三個基本原則其用意其實是要把人類知識基礎建於人類自發性之上。第三部份（即上述所指的對當代觀點的處理）則會指出把費氏理論詮釋成反基礎論是不準確和誤導的，他的理論反而指向一抗拒這種二分法的統一性。 / This thesis aims at explicating the epistemological aspects of Fichte's transcendental philosophy from a historical perspective that exposes the theoretical philosophical context in which Fichte's early philosophical project Wissenschaftslehre is embedded, as well as from a contemporary perspective that examines the nature of Fichte’s epistemological strategy and reviews the examination of it in foundationalist and anti-foundationalist terms. The first perspective prevents anachronism by situating the theory within the unique particular background, which also gives us a proper access to the philosophy of Fichte. The latter perspective, though could be prone to anachronism, gives the problematic a refreshment by bringing in contemporary resources and devices to review the theory. An explication of Fichte's three fundamental principles and an analysis of the third as the culmination of foundation make up the hinge that connects both perspectives. The first perspective is an essential prologue to the explication, its significance lies not in merely giving out information of the historical development, but in making the theory itself intelligible; the second perspective considers an issue that is hidden in the explication but not yet sufficiently addressed, and in addressing this perspective I provide a review of the review, through which the explication can be supplemented. / Hence it should be obvious that the thesis consists of three parts and how they are connected. The first part sets up the historical background through which the epistemological relevance of Fichte is to be appreciated. Three philosophers are given extra weight for this purpose Jacobi (and through him Spinoza as well), Kant, and Reinhold. It is in the face of a particular set of issues resulting from their interaction that Fichte's theory of knowledge emerges to resolve. With this in mind, we will find that Fichte's proposal of the fundamental principles is a strategy to ground the foundation of knowledge on human spontaneity, as spontaneity is found to be the necessary condition for the third principle and the third principle the necessary condition for the coordination of the first two principles which Fichte takes as hardly disputable. Based on this understanding, we shall see that Rockmore’s suggestion to understand Fichte's theory of knowledge as a kind of anti-foundationalism is inaccurate and misleading, instead it rather points to a theoretical tendency that resists such dichotomy. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Tse, Chiu Yui Plato. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2013. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 108-112). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Acknowledgement --- p.1 / Introduction --- p.2 / Chapter One: --- p.6 / The Relevance of the Absolute to the Foundation of Knowledge / The Epistemological Relevance of the Absolute --- p.7 / Jacobi’s Spinozakritik: The Skeptic Consequence of “Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit“ --- p.12 / Jacobi’s Kantkritik --- p.16 / Reinhold’s Principle of Consciousness and Beyond --- p.29 / Chapter Two: --- p.35 / Part I / The Three Fundamental Principles: With an Explanation of a Common Phenomenon of Consciousness / The I-Talk --- p.38 / The First Principle --- p.42 / The Second Principle --- p.44 / The Third Principle --- p.46 / The Absolute I and the Forgotten --- p.49 / Part II / An Analysis through a Dialectics of Contradictions --- p.52 / Step A --- p.53 / Step B --- p.55 / Step C --- p.58 / Step D --- p.60 / Step E --- p.65 / Chapter Three: --- p.74 / The Conflict between Foundationalist and Anti-foundationalist Interpretation / The Problem --- p.75 / Tom Rockmore’s Anti-foundationalist Interpretation --- p.79 / Problem of Daniel Breazeale’s Response --- p.87 / Klaus Hammacher a Leap towards Certainty --- p.92 / Conclusion --- p.101 / Bibliography --- p.108