Competitive pressure and desire for success drive enterprises in general to involve in knowledge acquisition and dissemination activities that are becoming increasingly significant in the rapid changing and globalising economic world. In addition, with the increased mobility of information and the global labour force, knowledge and experience can be transferred instantaneously around the globe; thus, any advantage gained by one company can be eliminated by comparative improvements overnight. Therefore, the only comparative advantage a particular company will face will be its process of innovation – combining market and technology know-how with the resourceful talents of knowledgeable labour to solve a constant stream of competitive problems- and its ability to derive value from information. In this context, internal and external knowledge acquisition, intra-firm knowledge dissemination and management decisions taken in response to the significant information generated and subsequently filtered became the key factors of entrepreneurial success. This thesis explores how market orientation, learning orientation and entrepreneurial orientation systematically contribute to and are sources of competitive advantage in growth-oriented SMEs. The objective of this study was to investigate the likelihood of a growth-oriented enterprise established in Atlantic Canada to be involved in knowledge acquisition and dissemination activities and to succeed conditional on numerous internal and external factors. A ‘mixed-methods’ research approach was used in this study, comprised of: 1) a web-based questionnaire to study the knowledge management process and other aspects of entrepreneurial success and 2) ‘semi-structured’ interviews with a sample of the responding entrepreneurs. The findings suggest that knowledge management practices: external acquisition, intra-firm dissemination and responsiveness, do vary across the levels of entrepreneurial performance among the Atlantic Canadian SMEs investigated in the study. Having a market orientation and investing in human resources of the firm were found to be critical drivers of innovation leading to potential competitive advantage.

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論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部,1994. / 參考文獻: leaves [1-2] (second group) / 張美德. / Chapter 1. --- 導論 / Chapter 1.1 --- 知覺問題在知識論中的重要性 / Chapter 1.2 --- 印度哲學知識問題之起源 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 哲學的起始階段 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- 非吠陀傳統哲學的萌芽 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- 吠陀傳統哲學的發展 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- 彌曼差學派 / Chapter 1.2.5 --- 正理學派 / Chapter 1.2.6 --- 早期的瑜伽行派 / Chapter 1.2.7 --- 陳那開展的新因明 / Chapter 2. --- 彌曼差學派知識論中的知覺問題 / Chapter 2.1 --- 知識的來源 / Chapter 2.2 --- 現量的性質 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- 兩個層次的現量 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- 知覺知識的定義與圼現的內容 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- 知覺知識的判準 / Chapter 2.3 --- 正確性與不正確性並非對立 / Chapter 3. --- 正理學派知識觀的知覺知題 / Chapter 3.1 --- 四種不正確知識 / Chapter 3.2 --- 正確知識的四個來源 / Chapter 3. 3 --- 現量的條件和對象 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- 感覺器官及其對象 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- 不能言說的現量 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- 無誤的現量 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- 決定的現量 / Chapter 3.4 --- 現量與比量的相同作用 / Chapter 4. --- 佛教瑜伽行派之量論 / Chapter 4.1 --- << 瑜伽師地論>> 的三種量 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 比量 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- 正教量 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- 現量的三類反面條件 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- 四種現量 / Chapter 4.2 --- 陳那對量論的改革 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- 說真現量 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- 說似現量 / Chapter 5. --- <<集量論 >>對別派之評與三糸的異同 / Chapter 5 . 1 --- <<集量論 >>對別派之批評 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- 彌曼差學派 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- 正理學派 / Chapter 5. 2 --- 知覺的活動禾口效用 / Chapter 5 .3 --- 知覺知識的判準

附篇: 康德的道德學說: p. 1-24(3rd group). / 論文(碩士)--香港中文大學,1972. / Fu pian: Kangde de dao de xue shuo: p. 1-24(3rd group). / Manuscript. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 導論 --- p.1-14 / Chapter 1.0 --- 理論的先驗綜合 --- p.15-18 / Chapter 1.1 --- 先驗的意義 --- p.19-31 / Chapter 2.0 --- 關于分析的與「綜合的」判分的可能性 --- p.31-50 / Chapter 3.0 --- 關于分析命題的性格及分析綜合的判分標準 --- p.51-52 / Chapter 3.1 --- 邏輯的進路 --- p.52-58 / Chapter 3.2 --- 語言學的進路 --- p.58-73 / Chapter 3.3 --- 對于邏輯的進路和語言學的進路的一個總結 --- p.73-76 / Chapter 3.4 --- 知識論的進路 --- p.76-91 / Chapter 3.5 --- 对以上三個進路的總結 --- p.91-96 / Chapter 4.0 --- 關于先驗後驗與分析綜合的結合 --- p.96-114 / Chapter 5.0 --- 對康德的先驗綜合判斷的可能性的表述 --- p.115-116 / Chapter 5.1 --- 時間和空間 --- p.116-131 / Chapter 5.2 --- 悟性範疇 --- p.131-157 / Chapter 5.3 --- 圖式和悟性原理 --- p.157-195 / Chapter 5.4 --- 關于本章所述的概念的總結和批評 --- p.195-205 / Chapter 6.0 --- 關于物理學的若干發展 / Chapter 6.1 --- 機械的世界觀 --- p.206-212 / Chapter 6.2 --- 機械觀的沒落 --- p.213-217 / Chapter 6.3 --- 相對論的觀念 --- p.217-233 / Chapter 6.4 --- 關于量子論 --- p.234-240 / Chapter 7.0 --- 關于先驗綜合的辯論 / Chapter 7.1 --- 在自然科學方面 --- p.241-282 / Chapter 7.2 --- 在几合學方面 --- p.283-309 / Chapter 7.3 --- 在數學方面 --- p.310-327 / Chapter 8.0 --- 對于理論的先驗綜合的總結 --- p.328-333 / Chapter 9.0 --- 实踐的先驗綜合 / Chapter 9.1 --- 侕學大體 --- p.334-355 / Chapter 9.2 --- 侕學中的先驗綜合 --- p.355-369 / Chapter 9.3 --- 關于實踐的先驗綜合的總結 --- p.369 / 附篇：康德的道德學說 --- p.i-xv / 參攷書目´ؤ完 --- p.xiii-xxiv

Thesis. 1979. M.Arch.A.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Architecture. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Bibliography: leaves 106-111. / by K. Michael Hays. / M.Arch.A.S.

This dissertation explores a number of interrelated metaphysical and epistemological issues regarding pleasure, suffering and their apparent value and disvalue, thematically tied together by the broad idea that pleasant and unpleasant experiences are, respectively, experienced as good and bad. More specifically, I try, firstly, to advance the debate regarding the nature of pleasure by arguing for what I shall call the "Self-Experiential View" - the view that pleasant experiences are pleasant in virtue of being experienced as good. Secondly, I assess the merits of the "Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis" - the natural conjecture, expressed by a number of authors, that our especially intimate experiential relationship ("acquaintance") with the evaluative features of our hedonic experiences grounds a particularly robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs, which makes them less vulnerable to sceptical doubt. In chapter 1, I lay some groundwork for the ensuing discussion, by introducing a number of background claims which help to motivate these two theses. Moreover, I isolate two specific important ways of unpacking the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis and clarify some central concepts which feature prominently in the subsequent chapters. In chapter 2, I defend the "Self-Experiential View." I proceed by addressing a number of objections which have been levelled against the view in the literature, and locate it in relation to the views which currently dominate the debate regarding the nature of pleasure. In chapter 3, I assess and ultimately reject the first important version of the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis singled out in chapter 1, the "Naïve Realist Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis," which states that Naïve Realist acquaintance with pleasure's evaluative nature grounds a distinctive, especially robust kind of epistemic status enjoyed by our hedonic-evaluative beliefs. In chapter 4, I assess the "Introspective Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis", the attempt to vindicate the Hedonic-Evaluative Acquaintance Thesis by extending an acquaintance account of phenomenal introspective justification to the hedonic-evaluative case. By carefully unpacking a range of different candidate conceptions of introspective acquaintance, I home in on what I consider the most appealing acquaintance account of phenomenal introspection, and argue that it should not be extended to the hedonic-evaluative case, which means that this proposal also fails. A brief concluding chapter summarises the key conclusions of the dissertation and highlights some questions raised in the course of my discussion which would seem to warrant further investigation.

My dissertation is about the moral epistemology of a theory of injustice. The orthodox paradigm maintains that we require an ideal theory of a perfectly just society in order to justify the principles for dealing with injustice. In contrast, I show that a theory of injustice is not dependent on ideal theory and develop a pragmatic realist alternative by critically engaging with the work of Elizabeth Anderson. My approach is pragmatist in stressing the importance of testing our principles against actual experience of their practical consequences, but it is realist in holding that justification must take into account the unjust motivations and actions of other agents. Whether racial integration is an imperative of justice depends on the extent to which unjust opposition to it means that conflicting courses of action have a better chance of mitigating racial injustice.

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