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The celebrated 'veil-of-ideas' argument is a skeptical argument that moves from a certain epistemological doctrine about perception to a general negative conclusion concerning our thoughts about external material objects. Indeed, the argument concludes not only that we do not know, but that neither could we know nor even reasonably believe, any of the thoughts that we may possibly entertain concerning external material objects. The epistemological doctrine about perception referred to in the argument has been in fashion since Descartes and states that the nature of perceptual knowledge in general is inferential. / In this thesis, we will attempt to defuse this argument by calling into question the epistemological doctrine upon which it relies. This method of defusing the argument appeals to some of the reasoning to be found in the writings of J. L. Austin and, more recently, John McDowell. The following is a rough outline of how we will proceed. First, we will briefly look at the skeptical argument in question. Second, we will examine the mainstay of the epistemological doctrine, the Argument from Illusion, and argue that without the appeal to a certain view about the nature of appearance, this argument is ineffective. Third, we will adduce reasons for rejecting this view of appearance and put forward an alternative. This alternative requires us to construe knowledge in fallibilist rather than infallibilist terms. Thus, finally, we will examine the fallibilist and infallibilist conceptions of knowledge.

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This work examines some of the epistemological and ontological conditions of the deep self-knowledge that is demanded by the Delphic motto gnothi seauton (know thyself!). The guiding questions are: what is the 'self' that deep self-knowledge is of? What are we such that we can ask deep and puzzling questions about our life-plans, our self-conceptions and the meaning of our lives? Can we know ourselves as we really are, or only under a certain description which conceals as much as it reveals? What is the nature of the relation between self-knowledge and (personal or inner) reality? The central thesis that is defended is that a person is to a certain extent a self-defining and self-forming being by virtue of his self-knowledge; fundamental changes in how he knows himself, and conceives his way of life, his life-history, emotions, final ends, death etc. particularly in light of fundamental practical questions ('Who am I?' 'What should I do with my life?') necessarily occasion changes in what he is. What he is at any one moment in his life is in part constituted by his self-knowledge. To account for the complex 'inter-relation' between self-knowledge and its object, and the possibility of self-formation, a broadly Kantian theory of constituting activity is developed, as well as a theory of the empirical 'under-determination' of self-knowledge. The peculiarity of self-knowledge is that the knower is the known, and that he is active (meaning-giving, or sinn-gebung) with respect to the object known (himself); the object of knowledge and the knowing subject change and extend their range together. This complicates some of the claims of realism and the correspondence theory of truth: self-knowledge is not a matter of the strict conformity of beliefs or conceptions to an independent, determinate and unchanging reality. In Kantian terms, the object of self-knowledge conforms to the conditions of knowledge. This broadly Kantian approach is brought to the analysis of Hampshire and Sartre's theories, which are studied as illustrations of the general ontological and epistemological conditions of self-knowledge. Hampshire's Spinozist theory of reflexive knowledge, which emphasizes the importance of rationality and the understanding of the causes of one's mental states, is contrasted with Sartre's existentialist theory, which emphasizes the importance of choice, and the non-theoretical understanding of one's way of being. Sartre, who is critical of the foundational status generally given to rationality and knowledge, rejects deliberation, detachment, self-observation, reasoned self-criticism and the other rational activities that Hampshire and Spinoza consider essential for self-knowledge. Other issues that are discussed include the problem of truth conditions in deep self-knowledge, the agent-observer dualism in self-inquiry, the relational model of the self, and Iris Murdoch's critique of Hampshire and Sartre.

The present experiment was designed to investigate the effects of staging (the sequencing of information) and readers' prior content knowledge on the on-line processing and acquisition of procedural text information. An "expert model" of the procedure was used to manipulate text staging as well as to evaluate readers' processing and comprehension of the procedure. / The experimental design consisted of four experimental groups, with six subjects in each group. Subjects at two levels of prior knowledge, experts and novices, were randomly assigned to read one of two differently staged texts, hierarchical and enactment. Various properties of the frame model were used to predict subjects' performance. The experimental design was a mixed between-within subjects repeated-measures multivariate design. / Statistical analyses of data obtained from subjects' reading times and verbal protocols coded against the expert model provided support for a frame construction model of text processing where readers use a top-down application of grammar rules for selectively processing high level procedural information as it becomes available. Both text staging and prior content knowledge affected readers' comprehension on-line. It appears as though these processes are highly automatic since prior content knowledge had limited significant on-line effects.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-175).

Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from file title page. George W. Rainbolt, committee chair; Jessica Berry, Steve Jacobson, committee members. Electronic text (43 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Jan 18, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: Dwight Boyd.

Thesis (M.Ed.) -- University of Adelaide, Dept. of Education, 1976. / Typescript (photocopy).