Thesis (PhD) -- AUT University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references. Also held in print (2 v. leaves : ill. ; 30 cm.) in the Archive at the City Campus (T 306.42 GRE)

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 55).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 79-82).

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Duquesne University, 2009. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-95) and index.

Thesis (M.I.S.) - University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermarizburg, 2009. / Full text also available online. Scroll down for electronic link.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005. / Thesis directed by Michael DePaul for the Department of Philosophy. "July 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 173-182).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 206-231). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-178).

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a decision support system to prioritize needs that are anchored in an organization. We build on a systems-thinking approach and develop a weighted additive index which considers different viewpoints of organizational stakeholders. First, we briefly review the literature about identifying and prioritizing needs from various scientific disciplines. Then, we use boundary critique to identify critical stakeholders that lead to three different viewpoints in the decision support system. The internal view reflects needs that members of the organization find important and urgent to be satisfied. The external view considers knowledge of outsiders, i.e. who do not work in the organization but are acquainted with it (e.g. experts, customers, facilitators). The systemic view considers system inherent interrelations of needs as perceived by decision makers in the organization. These stakeholder views get assessed by different dimensions, which are subsequently combined and weighted. Based on a method to identify needs, we apply this index in an case study conducted in Austria and discuss implications for theory and practice.

The starting point of the thesis is an acceptance of the principles of a moderately naturalized epistemology which allow for the traditional questions of epistemology, especially that of empirical justification, to be addressed in a recognizable way. It is argued that naturalism construed in this way is not compatible with scepticism regarding empirical knowledge, at least as far as the justification condition goes. Five general consequences of a moderately naturalistic position are deduced. It is shown how these general conclusions lead to a modest foundationalism, that is, they imply the corrigibility of all empirical beliefs and the basic status of some. The sensory character of basic beliefs is argued for, as is the claim that basic beliefs are not about the character of experience but about physical facts in the subject's immediate environment. The way in which an empirical belief is brought about (its 'dependence relations') is then examined. The important conclusion, for a theory of justification, to be drawn from this examination, is that sensory beliefs depend on no other beliefs but themselves for their empirical justification. This points to the fact that, if they are justified for their subjects, they must be self-evident and prima facie justified. Before explicating the nature of prima facie justification, the general requirements for a satisfactory theory of epistemic justification are set out. Such a theory must account for the reasonableness of the agent in believing as she does; it must accommodate deontological aspects and explain how justified belief is distinguishable from unjustified belief; and it must provide some objective link between the justified belief and its likely truth. It is shown that the theory of prima facie justification of sensory beliefs which emerges from a naturalized epistemology, satisfies these requirements, and that a conception of prima facie justification which ignores naturalistic constraints cannot explain immediate justification. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)