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In this article, problems users are having searching for known works in current online public access catalogs (OPACs) are summarized. A better understanding of AACR2R/MARC 21 authority, bibliographic, and holdings records would allow us to implement the approaches outlined in the IFLA Functional Requirements for Bibliographic Records to enhance, or â FRBRize,â our current OPACs using existing records. The presence of work and expression identifiers in bibliographic and authority records is analyzed. Recommendations are made concerning better indexing and display of works and expressions/manifestations. Questions are raised about the appropriateness for the creation of true catalogs of clientserver technology that deliver records over the Internet.

The paper suggests extensions to SKOS Core to make explicit where concepts in a knowledge organization system have changed from one version of the system to another.

Most epistemologists agree that epistemic justification is required for knowledge. This requirement is usually formulated in one of two ways: (JR1) S knows that p only if S is justified in believing that p. (JR2) S knows that p only if S's belief that p is justified. Surprisingly (JR1) and (JR2) are generally regarded as synonymous formulations of the justification condition. In Chapter 1, I argue that such a synonymy thesis is mistaken and that, in fact, (JR1) and (JR2) specify substantively different requirements. (JR1) requires that the person be justified, whereas (JR2) requires that the belief in question be justified, and intuitively, these constitute different requirements. Thus, it is concluded that (JR1) and (JR2) employ inherently different kinds of epistemic justification in their respective analysantia. I dub them "personal justification" and "doxastic justification", respectively. The remainder of the dissertation is devoted to demonstrating both the legitimacy and the importance of the personal/doxastic justification distinction. For example, the distinction helps account for the divergent intuitions that regularly arise regarding justificatory evaluations in demon-world contexts. In Chapters 2 and 3 I provide analyses for doxastic and personal justification. Chapter 2 spells out an externalist reliabilist account of doxastic justification which safely avoids demon-world counterexamples. Chapter 3 advances an internalist coherence account of personal justification. In defending this coherence theory, I argue that all foundation theories are false and that the regress argument on which they are predicated is unsound. In Chapter 4, I propose an analysis of ordinary knowledge which only requires doxastic justification. Nevertheless personal justification plays a negative, undermining role in the analysis. I then demonstrate that this analysis of knowledge is immune to typical Gettier examples. It also remains unscathed by Harman's beefed-up Gettier cases. Finally, I consider a stronger analysis of knowledge requiring both doxastic and personal justification. Though the latter analysis proves too strong for ordinary knowledge, it remains interesting as an analysis of a more intellectualistic kind of knowledge. The final chapter examines the internalist/externalist controversy and demonstrates that this controversy is yet another manifestation of the personal/doxastic justification conflation.

Many accounts of epistemic justification are initially plausible as accounts of justifiably coming to believe a proposition, but fail as accounts of continuing to believe a proposition. In this essay, I examine candidate theories of ongoing justification, arguing that those along both coherentist and foundationalist lines are inadequate. First, I argue that coherentism doesn't work by dividing such accounts into negative and positive theories. Negative coherentism fails because of its dependence on the principle of epistemic conservatism, against which there are decisive objections. Positive coherentism is also rejected because one can be justified in continuing to believe a proposition even if one's doxastic corpus fails to entail or make probable or in any way evidentially support the belief. Foundationalism is then considered. According to one sort of foundationalist, an agent is justified in continuing to believe a proposition only if she remembers the original justificatory basis of her belief. This sort of foundationalism suffers a fate similar to that of positive coherentism; it entails that many beliefs, which clearly are justified, are unjustified. Another kind of foundationalism, one that treats memory as a justification conferring process, is considered. This version is inadequate as it fails to account for the historical nature of justification and fails to account for the justification of unactivated mnemonic beliefs. In the essay's final chapter, I argue that the failure of both foundationalism and coherentism indicates that internalistic accounts are hopeless. Finally, a theory of ongoing justification along reliabilist lines is suggested, elaborated, and defended.

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