Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 258-270).

Thesis (M.A.)--Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Airpower played an important supporting role in the Korean War, and as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur pursued victory in the war and President Harry S Truman's objectives altered throughout the first year of the conflict, tension arose between the two men. One issue in these frictions was the restriction of airpower. Not only MacArthur, but also his admiring subordinate Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding the Far East Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force commander Major General Earle E. Partridge opposed the restrictions which had been imposed on airmen from the outset of the conflict. Stratemeyer did so partly because of his loyalty to MacArthur, who wanted latitude in coping with the situation in the field and defeating the Communist enemy. Partridge did so because he thought they endangered his personnel and limited the effectiveness of airpower in the war. These commanders had a fundamentally different opinion from Washington regarding the likelihood of overt Soviet intervention in the war, and because they did not think the Korean War would become a world war, they were more willing than Washington to prosecute the war more aggressively. MacArthur's conflict ended with his removal in April 1951, and Stratemeyer (who suffered a heart attack weeks afterward) continued to advocate for forceful American foreign policy in Asia during his retirement. Partridge eventually earned four stars and long after the war likewise continued to disfavor the restrictions which had been put in place. Between oral history interviews in 1974 and 1978, however, Partridge reconsidered the issue of restrictions. He expressed that the Korean War had been a considerable challenge without a wider war, implying that restrictions had perhaps been important.

This study is an operational and tactical study of a battle fought by the U. S. 1st Marine Division near "the Punchbowl," an extinct volcano of military value in the Taebaek Mountains of Korea, from late August through mid September 1951. That engagement was to be the last 1st Marine Division offensive of the Korean War. This battle, for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges, has received little coverage from historians. That it is all but forgotten is surprising, since it was one of the hardest fought for United States Marines in the war. The casualties were high, and Americans did not understand why so many had to die for a war that seemed to already be set to conclude by negotiations. This study tells the story of that battle more completely than ever before, and assesses its significance to the course of the Korean War.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of East Asian Languages & Civilizations, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

This thesis presents a qualitative analysis of the Marine experience in the Korean War with air power. Evidence suggests that Marine Close Air Support in the early months of the Korean War was superior to Navy and Air Force CAS. The Marine Corps collected interviews during the war, which support this conclusion. Interviews were taken with pilots, commanders, tactical air coordinators, forward air controllers, mechanics, infantrymen and other front line soldiers who experienced the CAS in the opening months of the war. Many factors contributed to this qualitative difference including; training, doctrine, control system, and type of planes used. This qualitative difference amounted to the superiority of Marine CAS in the opening months of the Korean War. / Department of History

Purpose: This work examines the transition in aerial warfare that took place during the Korean War (1950-1953). Before the conflict, air power was conceived of primarily an instrument of unlimited, or total, warfare. Yet Korea, and all subsequent air wars, have been limited. The transitional nature of the Korean air war has not yet been adequately explored by historians. Methods: The story of this shift is presented in two parts, the first examining the doctrines of the United States Air Force (USAF) immediately before the Korean War, the second comparing them to the USAF’s actual campaigns in Korea. This focus on the USAF reflects both its status as the principal air service in Korea and its influence on the theories and doctrines of all air arms in the post-World War Two era. The USAF’s planning immediately before the Korean War focused on its role in a possible total war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was thus unprepared and ill-equipped for the limited war in Korea and had to improvise its operations there. Findings: The inability of the USAF to conduct an unlimited war in Korea frustrated many Americans, who could not understand the political considerations that limited the conflict, seeing only that the USAF, the world’s most powerful air arm, was prevented from using all of its resources. While the resulting controversy contributed to a change of administration in the United States, it had less of an effect on the USAF. After the Korean War ended, its leadership continued to focus on unlimited war, dismissing the conflict as an aberration from which little about the operation of aircraft in war could be learned. Conclusions: The failure to recognize the lessons of the Korean War has had serious consequences. There have been no total wars since 1945; every air war of the past sixty years has been limited. Limited warfare is defined by restrictions on air power. The USAF and other air arms were slow to adapt to the changing conditions. The Korean War was a more significant event in the history of aerial warfare than is generally appreciated.

Thesis -- School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Academic year 2002-2003. / Title from title screen (viewed 4 March 2008). "March 2007." Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88).