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Cold war in Asia: an appraisal of American intervention in the Korean conflict陳慧兒, Chan, Wai-yi. January 1994 (has links)
published_or_final_version / History / Master / Master of Philosophy
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Cold war in Asia : an appraisal of American intervention in the Korean conflict /Chan, Wai-yi. January 1994 (has links)
Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 258-270).
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The Truman-Macarthur conflict : a case study of the Korean War and the militarization of American foreign policy, 1950-1951Clemens, George S. January 1997 (has links)
On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as Commander of United Nations forces in Korea. Since the dismissal, contemporaries of the Truman-MacArthur era and historians have tried to make sense of Truman's momentous decision to relieve one of America's greatest military heroes. While a great number of studies have devoted attention to the controversy, few if any have placed the Truman-MacArthur conflict within the context of the unprecedented militarization of American foreign policy that took place during the early cold war. This study departs from the traditional "blame-casting" that has dominated Truman-MacArthur scholarship in the past and concludes that General MacArthur was a casualty who was dismissed because he failed to grasp the global nature of the post-World War II American foreign policy agenda.Chapter One analyzes the literature dealing with the Truman-Macarthur controversy and illustrates why historical scholarship has failed to grasp the larger forces at work in American foreign policy while MacArthur was UN Commander in Korea. Chapter Two traces the tumultuous events of the controversy from the outbreak of war in Korea to MacArthur's April 11 dismissal. Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Senate hearings that followed MacArthur's dismissal, illustrates the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's testimony, and explores the broader, global issues the Truman Administration faced in transforming its foreign policy while General MacArthur failed to grasp the nature of this transformation. / Department of History
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The Actions and Operational Thinking of Generals Stratemeyer and Partridge during the Korean War: Adjusting to Political Restrictions of Air CampaignsSambaluk, Nicholas Michael 05 1900 (has links)
Airpower played an important supporting role in the Korean War, and as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur pursued victory in the war and President Harry S Truman's objectives altered throughout the first year of the conflict, tension arose between the two men. One issue in these frictions was the restriction of airpower. Not only MacArthur, but also his admiring subordinate Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding the Far East Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force commander Major General Earle E. Partridge opposed the restrictions which had been imposed on airmen from the outset of the conflict. Stratemeyer did so partly because of his loyalty to MacArthur, who wanted latitude in coping with the situation in the field and defeating the Communist enemy. Partridge did so because he thought they endangered his personnel and limited the effectiveness of airpower in the war. These commanders had a fundamentally different opinion from Washington regarding the likelihood of overt Soviet intervention in the war, and because they did not think the Korean War would become a world war, they were more willing than Washington to prosecute the war more aggressively. MacArthur's conflict ended with his removal in April 1951, and Stratemeyer (who suffered a heart attack weeks afterward) continued to advocate for forceful American foreign policy in Asia during his retirement. Partridge eventually earned four stars and long after the war likewise continued to disfavor the restrictions which had been put in place. Between oral history interviews in 1974 and 1978, however, Partridge reconsidered the issue of restrictions. He expressed that the Korean War had been a considerable challenge without a wider war, implying that restrictions had perhaps been important.
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A weak link in the chain: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Truman-MacArthur controversy during the Korean War.Sager, John 05 1900 (has links)
This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.
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