Thesis (Ph. D.) -- Ohio State University, 2004. / Includes vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 333-342). Also available via Internet from the Ohio Library and Information Network electronic theses public database. Adobe Acrobat reader required. Address as of 1/3/2006: http://www.ohiolink.edu/etd/send-pdf.cgi?osu1086202227.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 200-203).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, August, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 300-334)

No description available.

Canadian ground troops took an active part in United Nations operations during the Korean War. Although the Army's contribution of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group was small by First and Second World War standards, only the Republic of Korea, the United States and Great Britain fielded larger contingents. The core of the 25th Brigade consisted of three infantry battalions. They contained most of the Brigade's effective manpower, and bore the brunt of the fighting. Despite the infantry's pre-eminent role in Korea, their experiences up to now remain forgotten. This thesis examines the ordeal of Canadian combat soldiers in the Far East and shows how they suffered horrendous, often unnecessary, hardships at the hands of an indifferent high command. From the outset, Canadian infantrymen were neither properly trained nor equipped for the combat conditions they encountered. Battlefield performance and combat motivation suffered accordingly. The infantry's problems extended into other areas. Insufficient indoctrination left soldiers poorly prepared for the non-combat aspects of service in the Far East, leading some to question the purpose of Canadian involvement in Korea. Medical preparations were also inadequate, making soldiers susceptible to a variety of infectious diseases. In the combat zone, little regard was shown for soldiers' welfare. Infantrymen lived like beggars without even the most basic comforts and amenities, relying on alcohol to assuage the discomforts of life in the field. Clearly, the Canadian infantry was plagued by problems in Korea. These problems shaped the experiences of Canadian combat soldiers, making their Far Eastern tours far more difficult and dangerous than they need have been. / Graduate

This study is an operational and tactical study of a battle fought by the U. S. 1st Marine Division near "the Punchbowl," an extinct volcano of military value in the Taebaek Mountains of Korea, from late August through mid September 1951. That engagement was to be the last 1st Marine Division offensive of the Korean War. This battle, for Yoke and Kanmubong Ridges, has received little coverage from historians. That it is all but forgotten is surprising, since it was one of the hardest fought for United States Marines in the war. The casualties were high, and Americans did not understand why so many had to die for a war that seemed to already be set to conclude by negotiations. This study tells the story of that battle more completely than ever before, and assesses its significance to the course of the Korean War.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "August 1997." Includes bibliographical references. Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 10/28/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Lewis/lewis.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Airpower played an important supporting role in the Korean War, and as General of the Army Douglas MacArthur pursued victory in the war and President Harry S Truman's objectives altered throughout the first year of the conflict, tension arose between the two men. One issue in these frictions was the restriction of airpower. Not only MacArthur, but also his admiring subordinate Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer commanding the Far East Air Forces, and Fifth Air Force commander Major General Earle E. Partridge opposed the restrictions which had been imposed on airmen from the outset of the conflict. Stratemeyer did so partly because of his loyalty to MacArthur, who wanted latitude in coping with the situation in the field and defeating the Communist enemy. Partridge did so because he thought they endangered his personnel and limited the effectiveness of airpower in the war. These commanders had a fundamentally different opinion from Washington regarding the likelihood of overt Soviet intervention in the war, and because they did not think the Korean War would become a world war, they were more willing than Washington to prosecute the war more aggressively. MacArthur's conflict ended with his removal in April 1951, and Stratemeyer (who suffered a heart attack weeks afterward) continued to advocate for forceful American foreign policy in Asia during his retirement. Partridge eventually earned four stars and long after the war likewise continued to disfavor the restrictions which had been put in place. Between oral history interviews in 1974 and 1978, however, Partridge reconsidered the issue of restrictions. He expressed that the Korean War had been a considerable challenge without a wider war, implying that restrictions had perhaps been important.

Thesis. 1978. M.S.--Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dept. of Civil Engineering. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ENGINEERING. / Bibliography: leaves 97-100. / M.S.

Inaug.-Diss.--Bonn. / At head of title: Geschichte. Vita. Bibliography: p. 241-256.