In Islamic Sharia law, prescription has been more commonly referred to as murūr al-zamān [the lapse of time]. It has been claimed that the abstract principle of the lapse of time only has the effect of barring a claim and that is not capable of creating and extinguishing the right itself. In the context of Islamic law, this concept of prescription is often ascribed only to the Hanafi and Maliki schools of Sharia law, and it has been claimed that such principle has not been recognized by the Hanbali School. Based on that, my reading shows that, under Saudi jurisdiction (which is principally based on uncodified Hanbali Sharia law), this hypothesis is a key problem as in practice there are many secondary Saudi laws in place applying prescription rules to bar civil actions. Thus, by arguing that such principle has not been recognized by Sharia law as applied in Saudi Arabia, the legality of such provisions would be in question, given the fact that all Saudi enacted laws must conform with Islamic law. Moreover, my analysis argues that in studies of Saudi Hanbali law, prescription has neither been discussed widely nor given serious independent consideration. In the context of Saudi and Hanbali law, issues of prescription have not only been marginalized and minimized, but also inaccuracies and mis-readings are often found in related academic literature. Drawing on findings across various disciplines, including studies of classical and modern Islamic law, as well as legal studies on Saudi and Arab laws, this study presents new readings of the issues of the existence and origins of the legal concept of civil prescription from the perspectives of the Saudi-Hanbali School of law. Moreover, it presents the first comprehensive survey of the extent of implementation of the rules of prescription in the Saudi civil regulations over the last eight decades. Finally, from both theory and practice aspects, the thesis attempts to conclude with a critical analysis of the single ‘negative’ perspective of prescription in both Islamic and Saudi law.

La décision conditionnelle constitue un objet délaissé de la recherche en droit administratif français. Injustement perçue comme une affaire privée de spécialistes du droit des actes administratifs unilatéraux, elle n’occupe les écrits des publicistes que dans la mesure où la réalisation de la condition porte atteinte à la garantie des droits acquis. Cette réserve explique pour partie la faible contribution de la doctrine à la construction d’une définition de la décision conditionnelle, autonome du droit civil des obligations, et les difficultés corrélatives à déterminer les contours de cette notion mal identifiée. Pourtant, les orientations prises par le juge administratif et, dernièrement, par le codificateur, rendent nécessaire la recherche d’une définition clarifiée de la décision conditionnelle en droit administratif français. Depuis longtemps, le juge administratif range la décision conditionnelle dans la catégorie des actes administratifs unilatéraux et met en œuvre les principes qui les gouvernent. Or, de son côté, la doctrine ne parvient pas à l’intégrer pleinement dans la catégorie de l’acte unilatéral ou du contrat.Le visage inhabituel qu’elle présente, aux yeux des juristes, force la réévaluation des classifications traditionnelles.La doctrine malmène ses catégories binaires, dans le but de souligner la particularité de cette décision unilatérale qui ressemble à s’y méprendre au contrat. Il en résulte une contradiction inévitable entre la présentation doctrinale de la décision conditionnelle et les données du droit positif. Pour la dénouer, il apparaît nécessaire de renouveler l’appareil théorique jusqu’alors mobilisé. En prenant appui sur les données pertinentes du droit positif, il a été possible de définir la condition comme une norme juridique à part entière, à la fois dépendante et distincte des autres dispositions de la décision, et dont la fonction se limite à moduler les effets dans le temps de la norme principale qu’elle prend pour objet. À travers ces éléments de définition, transparaît un régime juridique cohérent et unifié / Conditional decisions remain much overlooked in the legal scholarship on French administrative law. Wrongfully considered as the exclusive province of the specialist on unilateral administrative acts, conditional decisions have received the attention of public lawyers only in so far as they come to present a risk for the protection of aquired rights. This goes some way to explaining both the scarcity of doctrinal contributions to a definition of the concept of a conditional decision – autonomous from the paradigm of the obligations in French civil law –, and the difficulties encountered in trying to bring some clarity to the subject by attempting to determine precisely the boundaries of the notion. Nevertheless, recent turns taken by the administrative courts, and more recently by codifiers, do call for a clear and consistent definition. The case law has for long considered these legal acts as unilateral acts, thus subjecting conditional decisions to the corresponding legal principles. Despite this, the legal scholarship on the question has never managed to fully integrate conditional decisions in either branch of the main binary subdivision – contracts and unilateral acts –, ill-using both in order to stress the highly unusual character of the notion (for instance underlining the peculiar relevance of an analysis of this unilateral decision in contractual terms). This unusual object therefore forces us to reevaluate our traditional classifications, which otherwise systematically result in a severe inconsistency between substantive law and its doctrinal exposition. In order to do so, the theoretical tools and approaches used up to now must be renewed. This doctoral dissertation aims to reconcile the positive law and its doctrinal exposition, thus proposing a clear definition of the condition itself as a legal norm in its own right – both dependant on, and distinct from, the other provisions of the decision it is attached to – the function of which is to modulate the effects over time of the main decision. These proposed elements of definition come to reveal a unified and coherent legal status of the conditional decision in administrative law.