Inaug.-Diss.--Giessen. / Lebenslauf. "Literatur": p. v-ix.

A revision of the author's thesis, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen. / Bibliography: p. [305]-338.

Inaug.-dis.--Strassburg. / "Uebersicht der citierten litteratur": p.[vii]-xiii.

Thesis--Faculté de droit de Paris. / Includes bibliographical references.

The aim of the thesis is to address the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict between the Court of Justice and national courts with constitutional jurisdiction. It seeks to determine how the principle of primacy of EU law works in reality and whether the jurisprudence of the courts under analysis supports this concept. In so doing, the goal is to determine if the theory of constitutional pluralism can explain and guide the application of the principle of primacy of EU law in the jurisprudence of constitutional conflict. The analysis has been carried out on two levels. First, by exploring sovereignty claims by the courts under analysis, as well as reconciliatory vocabulary they employ to manage and contain constitutional conflict. Second, by further studying the three areas of constitutional conflict - ultra vires review, identity review, and fundamental rights review - to provide more nuance in the analysis of the way the Court of Justice has expanded the self-referential system of the Treaties; the different limits that constitutional adjudicators have placed on the principle of primacy as a result; and what possible solutions they envisage in the event of a constitutional conflict. All the courts under analysis have employed the vocabulary of mutual respect and self-restraint as principles guiding the resolution of constitutional conflict. Constitutional conflict is managed through incremental and permanent contestation and accommodation of their opposing claims to sovereignty (the auto-correct function of constitutional pluralism) that results in the uniform interpretation and application of Union law, but keeping in line with conferral as its defining principle. The analysis demonstrated the existence of a heterarchical constellation - the potential of all the courts involved for being ranked in a number of different ways at different times - grounded in mutual respect and self-restraint.

Thesis (LL. M.)--York University, 2000. Graduate Programme in Law. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 227-235). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ56167.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the procedural democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Court of Justice has been instrumental in the construction of the European Union. Through its interpretation of the Treaty of Rome since the 1960s, it has constituted a legal system distinctive in kind. In contrast to orthodox instances of the political community – international organisations and the nation-state – the EU exemplifies no general type. Its legal, constitutional, political, economic and social infrastructures are part of a complex and pervasive web of overlapping jurisdictions that goes some way beyond the ordinary international organisation (by virtue of constitutional principles such as direct effect and citizenship), but not quite as far as the nation-state (e.g. sovereignty contestation). This being the case, its interlocutors have long since understood that the EU is in a state of transformation – it is itself a project and a process, the end result of which (finalité) is unknown. As such, many questions have been asked about the legitimacy of this process; and, given the Court of Justice’s (in)famous generative role within this process, the Court also finds itself the subject of such scrutiny. The legitimacy of the Court of Justice has been the focus of attention from both academics and practitioners. Most of that attention has been on the Court’s jurisprudence and jurisdiction – scrutinising the legal reasoning of cases; or questioning the limits of its constitutional functions according to axiomatic conceptions of, for example, the separation of powers doctrine. By contrast, less attention has been paid to the democratic legitimacy of the Court of Justice, and much less in relation to the Court’s institutional design. The subject-matter of the analysis in this thesis is the Court’s structures and processes, such as: the composition and appointments processes for members of the Court; the mechanisms that give access to various kinds of participants (such as locus standi and third-party intervention); and the use of judicial chambers. Procedural democratic legitimacy, moreover, has two dimensions: intrinsic and instrumental. The intrinsic is a measure of the democratic credentials of the Court as a discrete decision-making authority (such as representativeness and democratic participation); whereas the instrumental is concerned with the ways in which the Court contributes to the overall democratic legitimacy of the EU. In this thesis, the structures and processes of the Court of Justice are examined in light of both of those criteria. In contrast to prevailing approaches of constitutional theorists – who tend to treat these criteria as functions that are quite discrete, and their performance as mutually exclusive – an important theoretical contribution of this thesis is to develop an analytical framework that allows for the inherent synergies and tensions that exist between intrinsic and instrumental criteria to be factored into analyses of the democratic legitimacy of constitutional courts.

No description available.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Erlangen.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1901. / Reproduction of original from Harvard Law School Library. "Bibliography": p. [62]-63.