Diss.--Tübingen. / Bibliography: p. [115]-128.

Diss.--Tübingen. / Bibliography: p. [115]-128.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Glasgow, 1957. / Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Köln, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (p. vii-xxii).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Köln, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (p. vii-xxii).

Thesis (LLD)-University of Pretoria, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

This thesis studies the evolution of the war prerogative in England from 1600-2010. It traces the historical theory and practice of the war prerogative and proposes reform of the constitutional arrangements for its exercise. It addresses three key questions. First, what have writers on political and constitutional theory said about the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, and, in particular, what justifications have been advanced for those arrangements? Secondly, in practice, has the executive in fact possessed sole and exclusive powers over war and the deployment of force, or have Parliament and the courts had a role to play in their exercise and scrutiny? Thirdly, are there better ways to organise our constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative, to enable a more substantive role for Parliament (particularly the House of Commons) in its exercise and scrutiny? On the first question, I show that orthodox theoretical and political discourses have continuously asserted the executive’s exclusive power over war, but the justifications advanced for that arrangement have changed over time. Those changes reflect the varying influence of different political theories at different times. On the second question, I find that, contrary to orthodox theoretical and political discourses, Parliament has played an active and substantive role in the exercise and scrutiny of the war prerogative. The courts have refused to intervene in the exercise of the war prerogative, but have been more ready to intervene in cases involving the exercise of powers incidental to the war prerogative. On the third question, I argue that reform of the constitutional arrangements for the war prerogative is necessary and desirable. I recommend the use of ‘institutional mechanisms’, which are small-scale rules and institutional arrangements, within existing institutions, which aim to promote certain normative goals. In particular, I propose a statute which would impose conditions on the executive’s exercise of its war prerogative. I argue that these proposals show that, through careful institutional design, democratic values, national security and operational efficiency can each be reconciled and promoted.

Standard explanations of judicial behaviour (i.e. legal, rational-choice, attitudinal, and institutional models) are overly static and exogenous, interested in instances of sudden change in judicial behaviour, as triggered by appointments, legal reforms, or shifts in the political context. While these models are useful in understanding the external incentives affecting judicial behaviour, they are unsuitable for explaining sustained judicial empowerment beyond temporary strategic calculations. In response, recent 'ideational' approaches, especially studying constitutional courts, highlight the importance of judges' ideas about their role - not their ideologies or policy preferences - in instilling a mission, rather than an incentive-oriented view of the judicial function. Yet, despite their more dynamic approaches, those methods have overlooked how ideational change in the 'outside' world translates into change 'inside' this type of courts. Due to those limitations, this study proposes a complementary explanation of judicial empowerment: a theory of informal mandates and endogenous empowerment. Viewed through this lens, change and variation in judicial empowerment within and across cases are explained by the construction, expansion, and endurance - or absence and collapse - of collective internal understandings of the court's role and mission. Such understandings are developed as legal doctrines and articulated under broader informal mandates by 'mission leaders'. Gradually, these informal mandates can expand and gather majority support from strategic partnerships formed between 'mission leaders' and 'supporting leaders' - usually justices with high seniority. The more these informal mandates expand and endure inside the court, the less exogenous factors and strategic incentives over-determine its behaviour in the long-run. Judicial empowerment, thus, is better understood as a process that develops and expands gradually, endogenously, and informally, with a mission-oriented purpose. The theory is applied in the constitutional tribunals of Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay from 1990 to 2016. These countries have similar rule-of-law conditions, but their constitutional tribunals differ considerably in the strength and endurance of their informal mandates and, as a result, have attained different levels of judicial empowerment.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral--Nagoya Daigaku) under the title: Gasshūkoku ni okeru Kenpō kaishaku hōhōron no saikōsei.