Originally presented as the author's postdoctoral Thesis--Universität Münster, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [405]-465) and index.

This thesis examines the topic of conflict of norms in European Union (EU) law and the legal reasoning of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), arguing that the framework of conflict of norms provides conceptual insight into justification and the role of value choices in legal reasoning. After examining the theory of conflict of norms, which seems to have been relatively under-studied generally and especially in EU law, it examines three particular aspects of norm conflict resolution in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and EU law: conflict of interpretative norms, especially the opposition between conserving and innovative interpretation; conflicts of human rights norms, looking in particular at the idea of a hierarchy of rights and of specificationism in the articulation of rights; and conflicts of competence norms. It concludes that the scope exists for a fuller justification of the choice of norms in the legal reasoning of the ECJ and generally in EU law and offers a perspective on how the values articulated by the EU suggest particular approaches to norm conflict resolution by the ECJ in its decision-making in these fields, in particular, a greater resort to lex specialis and originalist or historical interpretation, in contrast to its current method.

The Trust in law within the case law of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic Abstract The main topic of the diploma thesis is an attitude of the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic towards the principle of trust in law presented in its case law. The thesis is stratified into three major sections. The first part is focused on the Constitutional Court as one of the fundamental constitutional institutions - in the beginning of the thesis highlights its substance and explains why it's case law is worth studying in detail. Considering the main topic, some aspects described in this first part are analyzed through the optics of trust or credibility. Firstly, the significance of constitutionality protection and the history of constitutional judiciary are studied shortly. Further, this part inspects the position of the Constitutional Court within our constitutional system. Also, the relationship between the Constitutional Court and general courts is studied and separate chapter is dedicated to the legislation of the Constitutional Court's executive mechanisms. Moreover, the problematics of case law as a theoretical concept and controversial questions which are regarding the case law analysed in the literature are mentioned. The first part is concluded by investigating the criticized aspects of...

The thesis is a comparative legal analysis of environmental principles in environmental law. Environmental principles are novel concepts in environmental law and they have a high profile in environmental law scholarship. This high profile is promoted by two factors – the high hopes that environmental law scholars have for environmental principles, and the increasing prevalence of environmental principles in legal systems, particularly in case law. This thesis analyses the latter, mapping doctrinal developments involving environmental principles in two jurisdictions and court systems – the courts of the European Union and the New South Wales Land and Environment Court. This doctrinal mapping has both narrow and broad aims. Narrowly, it identifies the legal roles in fact taken on by environmental principles within legal systems. Broadly, and building on this assessment, it responds to scholarly hopes that environmental principles (can) perform a range of significant roles in environmental law, including solving both environmental problems and legal problems in environmental law scholarship. These hopes are based on assumptions about environmental principles that have methodological weaknesses, including that environmental principles are universal and that they fit pre-existing models of ‘legal principles’ drawn from other areas of legal scholarship. The thesis exposes these methodological problems and concludes that environmental principles are not panaceas for pressing and perceived problems in environmental law. It does this by showing that the legal roles of environmental principles, which are significant in environmental law and its current evolution, can only be understood by closely analysing the legal cultures in which they feature. This is a conclusion for environmental law scholarship generally – while environmental issues and problems may be urgent and often global, legal analysis of the law that applies to those problems requires close engagement with legal systems and cultures, as they are and as they develop.

This thesis examines the views of freedoms of press and speech held by the twelve earliest justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Sedition Act of 1798 raised their earliest First Amendment questions including the breadth of those freedoms and of seditious libel. The thesis discusses three aspects of the early justices' views, which add to existing studies. First, the context of those justices' views was growing challenges to the restrictive Blackstone and Mansfield definition of freedom of press as only freedom from prior restraint (licensing) and as not also freedom from subsequent restraint such as seditious libel prosecution. Those challenges were reflected in broad language protecting freedoms of press and speech, and in the absence of language stating that the English common law of rights or of seditious libel was left unaltered. That crucial context of growing challenges has not been detailed in existing literature. (Chapter 3.) Second, the views of each early justice on press and speech are chronicled for the period 1789-1798. That discloses express commitments to those freedoms, which are absent from existing literature, and no adoption of the Blackstone definition before the 1798 crisis. (Chapters 4-5.) Third, the cases and reasoning of the six sitting justices upholding the Sedition Act of 1798 are chronicled and assessed, along with the views of the six remaining justices. That reveals that most remaining justices and also a significant minority within the Federalist party rejected the Sedition Act. Yet positions on the Sedition Act have been only cursorily discussed for four sitting justices and have been overlooked for the other eight justices, as well as for the Federalist party's minority, for the critical period 1798-1800. (Chapters 6-7.) The thesis proposes reasons for that divergence between the pre-1798 commitment of all justices to freedoms of press and speech, and the support given by most sitting justices to the Sedition Act, in contrast to apparent opposition by most remaining justices. The primary reasons are their opposing positions on several connected issues: the extent of rights to dissent, the challenges to the Blackstone definition and to seditious libel, the effect of new state and federal constitutions on seditious libel and on common law rights, strength of attachment to freedoms of press and speech and to seditious libel, and most sitting justices' changes of position to embrace the Blackstone definition. The thesis calls into question conventional views in existing literature on each of those three aspects. First, Levy and others express the dominant view that freedom of press in state declarations of rights and the First Amendment 'was used in its prevailing common law or Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints and a subjection to subsequent restraints for licentious or seditious abuse,' so that contrary evidence 'does not exist,' and that 'no other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798' existed. Instead, opposition to the essence of seditious libel had been mounting over the decades. Second, the early justices are usually portrayed as having nothing to say about freedoms of press and speech before 1798. Instead, nearly all exhibited commitment to those freedoms before that crucial year, though half the early justices upheld the Sedition Act during 1798-1800. Third, the Federalist party, the early justices, and the states except Virginia and Kentucky are all usually described as unanimously supporting the Sedition Act. Instead, the Federalists divided over the Act, and the early justices did as well, with an unrecognized but significant minority of the party, and nearly half of the early justices, opposing the Sedition Act, as did several additional states.

What are the possible bases for the authority of the Australian Constitution? Why should people and judges ever obey the text of the Constitution? The developing tools of analytical jurisprudence assist in answering these questions. Despite its currency, the concept of "sovereignty" provides little assistance in understanding how law provides reasons for action. The concept of authority is more useful. The text of the Australian Constitution has authority in that it provides presumptive reasons for action, overruled when they appear sufficiently erroneous on a cursory examination. The Constitution is part of the Australian legal system. A legal system is normally identified partly by moral norms. These moral norms themselves require that legal systems also be identified where possible by reference to the directives of a previous de facto authority - even when that previous authority no longer has power to make new legal norms. A legal system will be "legitimate" if any improvement to be achieved by revolution would be outweighed by the uncertainty revolution creates. Against this theoretical background, various theories about the Constitution's authority can be assessed. Although the enactment of the Constitution by the Imperial Parliament provides the Constitution with legal authority, it does not confer moral legitimacy. Contrary to a growing judicial and academic consensus in Australia, the Constitution's legitimate authority is not derived from the "will of the people". Nor is it derived from the Constitution's Founders. The will of the people cannot be identified reliably, and wound not provide sufficient reasons for action. The Constitution does embody a federal compact between the colonies. Because it is worthwhile to keep political promises, the polities of the States should fulfil this compact, even though the compact only imposes weak obligations on the Commonwealth. Other possible bases for the Constitution's authority are also inadequate. These include claims that judges are bound to apply the Constitution because their authority is based upon it; that the Constitution embodies "associate obligations", and that the Constitution isa commitment to protect individual rights and democracy. Instead the Constitution has legitimate authority principally because it coordinates individual action towards desirable goals. The Australian Constitution settles the location of authority by authority.

Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-24T19:10:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 LAÍS GRAMACHO COLARES.pdf: 1070473 bytes, checksum: d02019e3f721773206b86ecff2a40fe9 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2014-07-24T19:11:18Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 LAÍS GRAMACHO COLARES.pdf: 1070473 bytes, checksum: d02019e3f721773206b86ecff2a40fe9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-24T19:11:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 LAÍS GRAMACHO COLARES.pdf: 1070473 bytes, checksum: d02019e3f721773206b86ecff2a40fe9 (MD5) / A relação jurídica tributária é caracterizada pelas peculiaridades do seu objeto, o tributo. Esta relação pode ser composta por um sujeito passivo direto, que é aquele que integrou também a hipótese de incidência da norma que cria a obrigação tributária, como pode ser composta por um sujeito passivo indireto, em decorrência de outra hipótese normativa. Esta última norma tem por consequência alterar o polo passivo da relação tributária, caracterizando o fenômeno da responsabilidade tributária em sentido estrito. Tanto para a previsão da hipótese de incidência, como para a eleição dos sujeitos passivos diretos ou indiretos, o poder de tributar deve obedecer a determinadas limitações constitucionais, entre elas os princípios e, em especial, o princípio da isonomia tributária. Em decorrência deste princípio, a lei não pode fazer discriminações entre os sujeitos sem que obedeça a um critério jurídico que justifique esse tratamento desigual, em razão de se encontrarem em situações jurídicas distintas. O principal critério para essa diferenciação no Direito Tributário é o princípio da capacidade contributiva, que vai além de uma capacidade econômica do sujeito passivo, para retratar uma aptidão para contribuir com base em objetivos e valores constitucionais. Este critério norteia desde a previsão da hipótese de incidência, com a escolha de um pressuposto de fato e eleição do sujeito passivo, até a limitação do montante, para que o tributo não atinja o patrimônio essencial do sujeito passivo. No presente trabalho, elegeu-se as normas tributárias de responsabilidade por sucessão empresarial, para averiguar a observância do princípio da isonomia, no momento da eleição dos sujeitos passivos indiretos (responsáveis) e, portanto, na discriminação entre os possíveis sujeitos passivos para esta relação jurídica. Assim, pode-se verificar que o índice de capacidade contributiva que se observa nas operações empresariais decorrentes de fusão, incorporação ou extinção da pessoa jurídica de direito privado é o da continuidade da atividade empresarial. No entanto, no caso de alienação do estabelecimento empresarial ou fundo de comércio, o critério eleito pela norma é o tempo que o alienante tem para iniciar uma atividade empresarial no mesmo ou em outro ramo. O índice temporal não expressa capacidade contributiva nem qualquer outro critério que espelhe o estímulo ou desestímulo de um objetivo constitucional para justificar o tratamento diferenciado a contribuintes que se encontram em situações semelhantes. Desta forma, a norma tributária que prevê a responsabilidade em decorrência da alienação de estabelecimento empresarial ou fundo de comércio ofende o princípio constitucional da isonomia, por não utilizar um critério de diferenciação entre os possíveis sujeitos que possa ser justificado juridicamente.

O trabalho versa sobre a disciplina relativa à tutela de urgência no controle concentrado de constitucionalidade, especialmente em seus desdobramentos de natureza processual, seu tratamento legal, doutrinário e jurisprudencial. Enfoca inicialmente a jurisdição constitucional brasileira, contexto no qual se insere o controle concentrado de constitucionalidade e visa a analisar a natureza jurídica e os efeitos decorrentes da concessão da antecipação dos efeitos da tutela jurisdicional no bojo dos procedimentos. Estudo baseado em dados doutrinários e jurisprudenciais circunscrito às ações concentradas em que se afigura possível o emprego de medidas liminares, a saber, a ação direta de inconstitucionalidade genérica, a ação declaratória de constitucionalidade e a argüição de descumprimento de preceito fundamental / The work approaches the issues related to urgency injunctions on the constitutional judicial review, specially those related to its process, as well as to its doctrine, precedents and legal treatment. Initially, it focuses on the brazilian constitutional jurisdiction, framework on which the constitutional judicial review is inserted, and it intends to analyze the juridical nature and effects caused by anticipation of effects of jurisdictional injunctions on legal proceeding. Study supported on juridical doctrine and precedents related to lawsuits on which seems feasible the employ of urgency injunctions, such as the generic direct action of unconstitutionality and the claim of violation of fundamental rule of law

The objective of this Master's thesis is to analyse the term of "rule of law" and its Chinese variations (fazhi 法治 , fazhi 法制 , yifazhiguo 依法治国 ) since establishment of the People's Republic of China until present, with the emphasis on contemporary understanding of the concept, affected by political environment. The concept of the rule of law is presented throughout analysis of collected works of influential political leaders, namely Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping, reflected in official documents crucial to the legal system, such as the Constitution. Each historical period represents a different stance on the conception of rule of law and position of legal system, which results in analysis of current situation with a prospective future attitude to this issue. Keywords: rule of law, constitutional rule, Communist Party of China, China

Recent policies in England and Wales and the United States have recognised for the first time enforcement mechanisms for victims of crime under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) in the United States as well the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime in England and Wales (the Code). Although very different from one another, these policies ostensibly aimed to provide a stronger commitment to victims’ rights, by recognising an accessible, timely and impartial process that recognises accountability and provides individual remedies in cases of breaches. This thesis engages in a careful in-depth analysis of these mechanisms and their implementation based on elite qualitative interviews, case law analysis and a multidisciplinary examination of the relevant literature. It argues that on the whole, these mechanisms have presented a number of limitations, and thus in many respects cannot and have not delivered accessible, and timely means to respond to victims’ rights breaches. Most importantly, it demonstrates that for certain types of breaches and in certain contextual settings, these mechanisms have recognised only limited or no redress at all for breaches. This research takes the available victims’ literature further by arguing that many of these promises have been closer to rhetoric than reality and providing a more nuanced portrait of the substantial difficulties and limitations that relate to these enforcement mechanisms. In effect, these limitations can be understood in light of the nature and structural components of these selected mechanisms, as well as the ways they have been implemented by the main actors involved in these processes and the different contexts under which the different types of breaches take place. Finally, despite their limitations, when compared to one another, each mechanism can be considered a better option for access, timeliness and redress – depending on context and the type of breach. Following from this analysis, a complementary approach is developed which can facilitate and increase opportunity for redress for a wider range of situations. It is important to bear in mind however the limits of the complementary approach; namely, that it only includes elements inspired from the two mechanisms examined in this thesis and that there are several limitations that relate to transplants and policy transfers.