The conversation to which my dissertation belongs is that which preoccupied John Rawls in Political Liberalism, namely: (1) how it is possible that a religiously and morally pluralistic culture like ours lives cooperatively from one generation to the next, and (2) The extent to which religious or moral convictions are appropriate bases for political action. My three-essay dissertation is about aspects of this investigation that affect minority or non-mainstream religious and cultural groups, since legal institutions, and theoretical models of them (such as Rawls’s and Ronald Dworkin’s) are in many ways ill-suited to accommodate their ways of life. In the first essay, I consider Rawlsian obstacles to developing a religiously impartial conception of “substantial burdens” on religious free exercise within First Amendment jurisprudence. I apply this question to federal cases in which Native American tribes sought to prevent government uses of land that would be, they claimed, catastrophic to their cultural survival and all citizens’ safety. I propose a jurisprudential model that places a heavier burden on judges to listen and perhaps translate such views, counting non-mainstream forms of reasoning as legally cognizable and sufficient to create a prima facie constitutional case, where current models would not. In the second essay, because few conceptions of justice require that law be cognizable and justifiable to everyone, I review liberal conceptions of what makes a cultural group or person “irrational” or “unreasonable.” With a focus on public education, and cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins in mind, I argue that approaches to “unreasonableness” from the likes of Rawls, Charles Larmore, Jonathan Quong, and Stephen Macedo are well-intentioned but unduly restrictive, insofar as they tend to, by definitional fiat, exclude citizens who embody widely recognized civic virtues, or who at least pose no threat to a stable democracy. In doing so, I argue that they instantiate the sort of social circumstance that Herbert Marcuse calls one-dimensionality. In the third essay, I consider whether a meaningful and practical model for “group rights,” which would include the right of peoples to preserve their cultures, can be developed within American jurisprudence. This argument is largely inspired by a paper from political scientist Vernon van Dyke, and considers overcoming challenges to this notion wrought by contemporary forms of liberalism and vehement public disagreement over recent, pertinent Supreme Court decisions involving associational rights, like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and Citizens United v. FEC.

A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.

In 1966, the High Court of Uganda legitimised the new nation's first coup d'etat. After two decades of civil war, Ugandans enacted their first popular constitution in 1995. However, the judiciary's dominant positivist ideology, Matovu's ghost, still haunts the new legal order. The author sets out this ideology's presumptions and then critiques them against an alternative, pluralist map of laws in Uganda. / The constructive analysis of recent case law (or lack thereof) that follows shows how this ideology undermines the constitution's promises of equality and freedom. This pluralist methodology is also essential to explain contemporary crises like the Lord's Resistance Army, arms proliferation in Karamoja and Museveni's "no-party" rule. In conclusion, exorcising Matovu's ghost is a priority for Ugandans and the process deserves considered thought for legal scholars advocating the "rule of law" or interventions by the International Criminal Court.

This thesis focuses on the treatment of insanity in the criminal law and its implications for the concepts and mechanisms of legal accountability. In order to address this issue, I examined the historical background of the insanity defense and five specific cases that demonstrate the complications arising from insanity’s present legal condition. From this case study I drew the conclusion that, because liability to punishment requires particular internal conditions, criminal responsibility is the proper measure of legal accountability for insane persons. Ultimately, my research demonstrated that insanity occupies a unique position in both the theory of crimes and the theory of punishment and that a trial by jury is not the most appropriate way for adjudicating issues of insanity. In each of these spheres, judges consider how mental conditions relate to criminal responsibility and the role that juries play shrinks as the content of guilt shifts to criminal responsibility. For this reason, I conclude that judges are the best candidates for addressing insanity and its effect on criminal responsibility.

In this thesis, the concept of the procedural aspect of the Rule of Law will be distinguished from what I argue are conceptions that are falsely promulgated as concept. The different aspects of the Rule of Law—form, substance, and procedure— are helpful in making the distinction between concept and conception. Examining procedure within the Rule of Law is particularly important, and I define a broader set of requirements of the concept of the procedural aspect of the Rule of Law. This concept is applied to understand the Indian conception of the Rule of Law, a particularly interesting case that brings out questions about culture and economic capacity. Ultimately, I argue that this broader set of requirements is better suited to evaluate the realization of the Rule of Law in all contexts.

No description available.

This thesis has three objectives. Its primary objective is to examine, and critically evaluate, the theoretical accounts offered by Hans Kelsen and Joseph Raz to explain the temporal continuity and discontinuity of legal systems. In particular, it evaluates the explanatory power of those accounts by combining an abstract analysis of the accounts in principle and an evaluation based on systematically applying them to one concrete, historically circumstanced instance: the legal systems of British derivation in Australia between 1788 and 2001. The thesis thus tests each account’s factual fit: how adequately it corresponds to, accords with, and persuasively makes sense of, the facts – including complex social facts, attitudes and normative standards – for which it purports to offer an account. Second, the thesis aims to demonstrate, more generally, the utility of applying theoretical accounts to a particular historical instance to complement abstract analysis. Third, the thesis aims to advance the understanding of the evolution of Australian legal systems between 1788 and 2001. These three objectives are achieved through the critical exposition and reconstruction of the accounts, their development and enrichment where refinement is appropriate, their application to the specific context of Australia and their evaluation, individually and in comparison.

To interpret is to seek understanding. This formulation hides as much as it reveals and I propose to unpack it. I argue that interpreting is only a part of what legal theorists and practitioners do. In Part I, I attempt an ‘in vitro’ analysis and present the bare concept of interpretation: interpretation is an activity that needs an object; interpreting is reasoning about meaning when there is a possibility of mistake about that meaning. Part II focuses on two domains of interpretation: musical performance and adjudication. I rely on Joseph Raz’s account of interpretation as explanation or display and identify the former domain as a paradigm of display and the latter as a paradigm of explanation. Both are examples of interpretation for others and involve a claim to theoretical authority on the part of interpreters. But, unlike musicians- who interpret only works of music- judges interpret a great variety of objects. Musical interpretation is identified by its object, whereas legal interpretation is not. Legal interpretation is explanation of legal meaning. I then discuss the tenets of the minimalist view of legal interpretation: (i) legal rules are not interpretable and legal texts are not primary objects of legal interpretation; (ii) there is a difference between interpretative authority (a form of theoretical authority) and legal authority (a form of practical authority) and interpretative conclusions can be theoretically authoritative without being exclusionary reasons for action; (iii) Interpreting and adjudicating are different activities. Interpretation explains, adjudication resolves. Legal interpreters do not produce legal rules: they are required to be guided by them.

This thesis is about the legitimacy of political authority in general and international legal institutions (ILIs) in particular. It is divided into two parts with three chapters corresponding to each part. The first part presents an account of legitimate political authority that is based on Joseph Raz's service conception of authority but also makes some important modifications to it. The central claim of the first part is that the legitimacy of political authorities in general, as measured by the standard of Raz's Normal Justification Thesis, depends in a crucial way on the ability of the subjects to get involved –more so than Raz is prepared to admit– in the activities that are relevant in the political domain. The thesis offers a general account of legitimate political authority, i.e. one that is valid for any type of political authority. The second part, however, examines the implications of this account for the legitimacy of ILIs. These are non-state authorities, such as the World Trade Organisation or the International Criminal Court, that deal with problems of global political relevance. Because of this global approach, the subjects of ILIs (i.e. those whose reasons are to be served by the ILI) are not confined to the boundaries of regions or states, but distributed across the world. ILIs operate by creating, interpreting, and applying public international law. Despite some striking differences between ILIs and other types of political authority (particularly states), I argue that they all ought to be measured by the same standard of legitimacy, namely the Normal Justification Thesis. But I also argue that the requirements for meeting this standard of legitimacy may vary according to the type of political authority (especially with regard to the requirement of democracy).

This doctoral thesis aims to provide an answer to the question of why the criminal law should be concerned with the emotional response of the offender. Emotions have important instrumental aptness, such as the capacity to reveal a person's values to himself. Emotional obligations can exist within friendship, and even between strangers when the basic duty of respect has been breached. Emotions therefore have important roles to play in connection to wrongful acts between fellow citizens. The emotions that are the most relevant to the committing of a wrong are guilt and shame. The thought content of guilt is responsibility for a wrong, while the thought content of shame focuses on a weakness of the self. In response to a wrong, guilt feelings distance the wrongdoer from the moral falsehood that was implicit in the offence, restoring relations with society. Shame might have similar beneficial effects, but it might also tie the wrongdoer closer to a personal weakness (which is only indirectly related to the wrong) and might therefore weaken the relationship with himself and society. Preventing undesirable behavior is an aim of criminal law. Good criminal law should aim to persuade offenders to endorse the legal rule that was flouted by the offence. The law is not a suitable basis for citizen's emotional obligations, but emotions are particularly capable of allowing an offender to properly recognise certain reasons for obeying the law, such as moral reasons and reasons of respect for law. Guilt feelings in a setting of victim-offender mediation are very promising in this respect, while shame and humiliation run the risk of distancing the offender from his regard of himself as a moral person and society at large.