This thesis is about corporate attribution in private law. Unlike human persons, companies are artificial legal persons. They lack a physical body with which to act, and a mind with which to think. English law therefore developed the concept of attribution so that legal rules could be applied to companies. Attribution is the process of legal reasoning by which the acts and states of mind of human individuals acting for a company are treated as that of the company, so as to establish the company’s rights against and obligations owed to other parties. This thesis examines the rules of attribution across the private law of obligations, focusing on the law of contract, tort, unjust enrichment, and selected aspects of equitable liability. Three main arguments are made in this thesis. First, there is a sharp distinction between the rules of attribution and the substantive rules of private law to which they apply. The former belongs in the law of persons, and it concerns when the acts and states of mind of an individual can be attributed to a company. The latter belongs in the law of obligations. Second, the same rules of attribution should be, and have largely been used across the entire expanse of private law. Regardless of the area of private law in which the question of attribution arises, the same question is being asked, and so the law’s answer should be the same. Like should be treated alike. This is normatively desirable, because it ensures coherence across private law. Third, it is therefore possible to state the rules of attribution that apply in private law. The acts of an individual A will be attributed to the company C where they were (i) specifically authorised (‘specific authority’), (ii) where A performs an act within the class of acts that A has power to do on behalf of C, even if A is acting in breach of duty (‘actual authority’), or (iii) where A has either been placed in a position or been held out by C such that a reasonable person in the position of a third party would reasonably believe that A had the power to act for C (‘apparent authority’). A’s knowledge will be attributed to C where it is material to the class of acts that A had specific or actual authority to do on behalf of C. Although commonly thought to be a series of diverse, disparate rules found in different doctrines and different areas of law, the rules of attribution form a remarkably coherent, consistent whole across private law.

The presented thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive commentary on the status of companies and trusts in the area of private international law with special emphasis on the modern development of Czech law. Aforementioned instruments were chosen especially with respect to their frequented use for asset management purposes. The essential part deals with status of companies in the European Union along with the main discrepancy between member states in determining the connecting factors. Aside from defining a nature of company and the fundamental theories setting its personal status, the author puts forward a historical excursus into the jurisprudence of Court of Justice of the European Union in shaping the freedom of establishment for legal persons. The section concludes with the topic on mergers and conversions as vehicles enabling the cross-border transfer of company seats. The structure of the subsequent part reflects a high dependency of shape of trusts and trusteeships on national legislation. The chapter opens with introducing the term equity and goes on to basic attributes of British trust. These introductory parts are followed by the analysis of this instrument with respect to international treaties. The conclusion scrutinizes trusteeship as embedded in new Czech civil code, together with...

Le patriotisme économique relève davantage du discours politique que d’un concept juridique. Il fait référence aux comportements des citoyens, des entreprises et des États. Celui des États peut en substance être défini comme la défense par ces derniers de leurs entreprises stratégiques. Ainsi précisée, cette notion se traduit en pratique par l’institution de dispositifs nationaux de contrôle des investissements étrangers, par la stabilisation de l’actionnariat des entreprises stratégiques au travers des prises de participations des fonds stratégiques d’investissement, ou encore, par l’octroi de droits exclusifs ou spéciaux. De tels comportements peuvent contrarier les principes de la libre circulation - capitaux, établissement - et de la libre concurrence. Ces principes souffrent cependant de tempéraments qui laissent une certaine marge de manœuvre aux États, laquelle est cependant étroite. Cette étroitesse conduit ces derniers à être sans cesse inventifs pour défendre leurs entreprises. Le droit des sociétés offre de ce point de vue des outils pertinents pouvant servir ce dessein. Mais, la protection des entreprises stratégiques en dehors des exceptions ou dérogations prévues par le traité, qui traduit la persistance des replis nationaux, n’est pas sans relever les limites de l’opposition systématique aux patriotismes économiques nationaux. De plus, une telle faculté risque de fragiliser l’achèvement du marché intérieur. Pour ces raisons, il importe pour les autorités de l’Union européenne, d’engager une dynamique permettant de mieux prendre en compte les préoccupations patriotiques des États. Agrégée à un concept cohérent, à savoir le patriotisme économique européen, une telle démarche consisterait à instaurer une politique d’investissement commune qui sache conjuguer ouverture aux capitaux étrangers et préservation des secteurs stratégiques. Mais, l’efficacité d’une telle politique est relative. C’est pourquoi, on doit lui adjoindre un cadre autonome de contrôle des investissements en provenance des pays tiers. / Economic patriotism is more a political speech than a legal concept. It refers to behaviors of citizens, companies and governments. Concerning States, this concept can essentially be defined as defense of strategic companies. In practice, this notion is reflected by the institution of national systems of foreign investments control, by stabilizing the shareholding of companies through strategic investment funds, or by granting exclusive or special rights. These behaviors can antagonize the European Union law. However, this law allows exceptions that offer opportunities to States. But the flexibility of States is close. This narrowness leds them to be constantly inventive to defend their strategic companies. Business law allows such an approach. But the protection of strategic companies without the exceptions or derogations permitted by the treaty, which reflects the persistence of domestic markets partitioning, is not without showing the limits of systematic opposition to national economic patriotisms. In addition, such a power may weaken the completion of the internal market. For these reasons, it is important for the authorities of the European Union, to initiate a dynamic that can permit to take better account of the States patriotic concerns. Aggregate to a coherent concept, namely the european economic patriotism, such an approach will permit to establish a common investment policy that can combine openness to foreign investments and preservation of strategic sectors. But, the effectiveness of such a policy is relative. That’s why, it’s crucial to add to it an autonomous control framework for investments coming from non-member countries.