Using international data (15,786 obs.) from industrial companies from 28 countries over an 11-year period (2003–2014), this research contributes to the area of institutional heterogeneity, CEO compensation and investment opportunities. More precisely, we use three perspectives in order to investigate whether investment opportunities explain CEO compensation structures. We compare (i) U.S. and non-U.S. firms, (ii) Common law and Civil law firms, and (iii) firms operating with similar cultural characteristics. Overall, after controlling for firm governance and board characteristics, we find that investment and growth opportunities in terms of book-to-market ratio, research and development (R&D), and capital expenditures (CAPEX) explain the percentage equity and non-salary CEO compensation. These findings suggest that firms with higher information asymmetries associated with their growth opportunities pay CEOs higher incentive-based compensation.

Chapter 1 develops a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and derivatives in which a large trader can sometimes profitably acquire securities and the corporate control rights inherent therein for the sole purpose of reducing the corporation's value and gaining on a net short position in the corporation created through off-setting derivatives. At other times, the large trader profitably takes a net long position in the corporation and exercises its control rights to maximize the corporation's value. This strategy is profitable if and because other market participants cannot observe the large trader's orders and hence cannot predict how the control rights will be exercised. In effect, the large trader is benefitting from trading on private information about payoff uncertainty that the large trader itself creates. This problem is most likely to manifest in transactions that give blocking powers to small minorities, particularly out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeouts, and is bound to become more severe when derivatives trade on an exchange rather than over-the-counter. Chapter 2 investigates in parallel the cross-country determinants of crime and punishment in the largest possible sample of countries with data on homicides, victimization by common crimes (ICVS), incarceration rates, and the death penalty. While models with a small number of plausible covariates predict much of the variation of homicide and incarceration rates between major developed countries, they predict only one seventh of the actual US incarceration rate. Chapter 3 probes into the pervasive correlations between legal origins, modern regulation, and economic outcomes around the world. Where legal origin is exogenous, it is almost perfectly correlated with another set of potentially relevant background variables: the colonial policies of the European powers that spread the "origin" legal systems through the world. The chapter attempts to disentangle these factors by exploiting the imperfect overlap of colonizer and legal origin, and looking at possible channels, such as the structure of the legal system, through which these factors might influence contemporary economic outcomes. It find strong evidence in favor of non-legal colonial explanations for economic growth. For other dependent variables, the results are mixed. / Economics

Recent research suggests that financial system development is important for economic development and for reducing financing constraints of firms (Levine, 2005). Consequently, researchers started investigating the factors that determine financial system development. A group of factors that have been identified are institutional factors. Many researchers have investigated the theoretical and empirical links among historical institutional factors, current institutional factors, and financial system development (Beck and Levine, 2005). There are, however, few studies that have investigated extensively the theoretical and empirical links among institutional factors and financial system development within the African context. Africa provides an interesting context to empirically validate and refine many of the theories that have been postulated to explain the relationships among historical and current institutional factors and financial system development. This is because Africa is in the process of developing its institutions and reforming existing ones and offers an opportunity to examine the impact of institutional factors on financial system development in nascent contexts. Therefore, this dissertation investigated the following research question: To what extent are institutional factors determinants of financial system development in Africa? To answer this research question, this study empirically evaluated the effects on financial system development of historical institutional factors that have been identified by four theories: legal origins theory, disease endowment theory, religion-based theory, and ethnic fractionalisation theory. Moreover, current institutional factors identified by the law and finance theory as possible determinants of financial system development were empirically examined. Furthermore, the links among historical and current institutional factors were empirically studied. The results show that the disease endowment variables are the only historical institutional factors that explain cross-country variation in financial system development in Africa. Additionally, this study finds that the institutional enforcement quality and efficiency of the judicial system are the only current institutional factors that explain cross-country variation in financial system development in Africa. Current institutional factors such as the efficiency of the legal property system and the quality of the credit information infrastructure do not appear to have effects on financial system development. Moreover, the institutional enforcement quality seems to be one of the possible channels through which disease endowment affects financial system development in Africa. This study also reveals that there are few statistically significant links among historical and current institutional factors within the African context. To my knowledge, this is the first study to show some of these empirical links among historical institutional factors, current institutional factors, and financial system development for the African context. The main conclusion of this dissertation is that institutional factors seem not to be determinants of financial system development in Africa to a large extent. In essence, institutional factors appear to matter for financial system development in Africa, but not as much as might have been expected judging from many calls for institutional reforms from the World Bank and others. The theoretical and policy implications of the findings of this dissertation are discussed, and future areas of research are also proposed.

Cette thèse étudie le rôle des institutions dans la compréhension du processus de déforestation dans les pays en développement. L'approche retenue est celle de la nouvelle économie institutionnelle qui définit les institutions comme le cadre incitatif d'une économie, qui structure les interactions économiques des individus. Le cadre institutionnel est donc un élément à part entière du système économique, qui agit sur l'environnement humain à travers la modulation des incitations des agents. A ce titre, les institutions jouent donc un rôle majeur dans le processus de conservation ou de conversion des forêts. L'analyse de ce rôle est la problématique centrale de cette thèse et s'articule autour de trois grandes parties: (1) le rôle de la persistance des institutions ou rôle de l'histoire dans la compréhension de celui des institutions, (2) le rôle de la demande de bonne gouvernance, et (3) le rôle des institutions comme élément catalytique conditionnant l'effet de causes plus directes de la déforestation. La première partie conclut sur le rôle majeur de la prise en compte des legs légaux et coloniaux pour expliquer l' effet des institutions sur la déforestation. La seconde partie explique le rôle majeur de la demande de bonne gouvernance pour préserver la forêt, en étant un substitut (complément) d'une mauvaise (bonne) offre de bonne gouvernance. Enfin, la troisième partie de la thèse suggère de comprendre les institutions comme un facteur catalytique de la déforestation qui permet de comprendre l' effet des causes directes de celle-Ci telles que la productivité agricole des fermes de l'Amazonie Légale, ou les comportements stratégiques entre communes du Paraná dans la création de parcs municipaux. / This thesis investigates the role of institutions on deforestation within the framework of the New Institutional Economics. This theory states that institutions can be defined such as the incentive systm wich shape economic interactions throughout the modulations of the incentives of agents. This way, institutions are at stake in the process of deforestation and the analysis of this role is the core of this thesis, articulated around three parts : the role of institutional persistence (1), the importance of the deman for good governance (2) and the implications of institutions and governance system as an underlying framework shaping proximate causes of deforestation (3). The first part stresses the importance of taking into account colonial and legal legacies to understand the role of institutions on deforestation. The second part explains the leading role of the demand for good governance. the third part proposes two micro-Economics applications in Brazil. The role of institutions and governance systmem on forest cover is defined as a catalytic role precipitating the effect of proximate causes on deforestation such as agricultural productivity in the Legal Amazon, or strategic behaviors between counties in the creation of municipal conservation units in the state of Paranà.

My doctoral thesis examines the broad question of whether appropriately designed institutions and policies can address the short- and long-term consequences of determinants of human capital which are "immutable'' by nature or are perceived as such. I consider three different types of immutable determinants of human capital: male versus female biology; colonization; and traditional norms of gender roles. In Chapter 1, I examine whether, and how, change in political regime type affects excess male infant mortality. Analyzing data on more than 3 million live births from sub-Saharan African countries, I exploit within-mother variation in political regime type to find that excess male infant mortality significantly decreases following a transition to democracy. I identify competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and political participation as the features of democracy that matter most. Examining causal mechanisms, I find that democracy fosters the provision of health inputs, including maternal education, tetanus immunization, breastfeeding, and normal birth weight, all of which have stronger health benefits for boys than for girls, despite being found to be ex-ante "gender-neutral'' in my setting. In Chapter 2, I examine how colonial reproductive laws interact with market incentives to shape long-term fertility behavior in Africa. Exploiting the arbitrary division of ancestral ethnic homelands and the resulting discontinuity in institutions across the British-French colonial borders, I find that women in former British areas are more likely to delay sexual debut and marriage, and have fewer children. However, these effects disappear in areas close to sea, where market access and the opportunity cost of childbearing appear to be high irrespective of the colonizer identity. This heterogeneous impact of colonial origins extends to measures of local economic development and household welfare. Examining causal mechanisms, I argue that the fertility effect of colonial origins is directly linked to colonial population policies and reproductive laws and their impact on the use of modern methods of birth control. I find little evidence that the fertility effect of British colonization operates through education or income. While British colonization is linked to higher female education levels, this occurs mainly close to the sea while the fertility effects do not. Again, while income levels differ, the fertility gap between British and French colonies opened prior to 1980, while the income gap opened-up after 1990. This chapter highlights the heterogeneous nature of the colonial origins of comparative fertility behavior and economic development, and implies that economic incentives may overcome historical determinism. In Chapter 3, I examine the interplay between legal origins and pre-colonial cultural norms of gender roles in determining female economic empowerment in sub-Saharan Africa. Taking advantage of the arbitrary division of ancestral ethnic homelands across countries with different legal origins, I directly compare women among the same ethnic group living in civil law countries and common law countries. I find that women in common law countries are significantly more educated, are more likely to work in the professional sector, and are less likely to marry at young age. However, these effects are either absent or significantly lower in settings where ancestral cultural norms do not promote women's rights and empowerment. In particular, I find little effect in bride price societies, patrilocal societies, and societies where women were not involved in agriculture in the past.