Normative economic theory provides justification for at least partially centralized renewable energy provision due to the large, positive externalities associated with renewable energy production. However, the United States is one of the few countries without centralized renewable energy policy. Instead, the federal government actively chooses decentralized renewable energy provision by using fiscal transfers to support subnational renewable energy development. This dissertation explores why U.S. legislators choose decentralized renewable energy provision by asking two primary questions. First, what is the motivation for using federal fiscal transfers for decentralized renewable energy output considering what we know about positive spillovers and market failure associated with decentralized renewable energy production? Second, do fiscal transfers for decentralized renewable energy provision increase renewable energy production at the local level? The theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four posits why policymakers choose decentralized renewable energy provision. The chapter argues that the current political price associated with a specific policy issue affects legislators’ choices regarding good provision. I hypothesize that when the political price associated with vying for centralized good provision is high, legislators are incentivized to choose decentralized good provision. Chapter Five applies this theory to empirically evaluate the choice to decentralize renewable energy provision. The chapter examines whether the current political price of renewable energy policy affects the likelihood of a legislator proposing decentralized funding for renewable energy provision. I hypothesize that legislators will propose funding to support decentralized renewable energy development when the political price associated with renewable energy policies is high at a given time. The results show that when the political price of renewable energy policy is low, a policymaker is less likely to use grants to support renewable energy projects, finding support for the hypothesis. Chapter Six empirically evaluates the effectiveness of renewable energy grants at the local level to further understand the theoretical model proposed in Chapter Four. I hypothesize that receiving a renewable energy grant increases renewable energy output at the local level. The results support this hypothesis by showing that receiving a renewable energy grant is associated with significant and positive increases in solar energy production. These findings provide further insight into legislative decision-making and the role of renewable energy grants in renewable energy development in the U.S.

This study evaluates the fitness of political parties for the democratisation of the European Union. At the national level political parties have successfully functioned as transmission belts between voter’s preferences and political outcomes in representative democracies. Some scholars have therefore argued that an increase in party competition at the European level could make the European Union more democratic; other scholars claim that European political parties are too weak to fend off public pressure, which would arise from an increase in political competition. Since cohesive voting behaviour of political parties is the basic prerequisite for a functioning representative democracy, this study analyses how the transnational party groups of the European Parliament are able to generate voting cohesion. Drawing on rational institutionalist theories of political parties and theories of collective action, the study outlines two competitive scenarios for explaining party group voting cohesion in the European Parliament. In the party group disciplinary scenario, the party group leadership is able to enforce voting cohesion through its disciplinary powers. The national party discipline scenario predicts that party group voting cohesion is dependent on the voluntary cooperation of the national party delegations. The empirical analysis of party disciplinary effects in the European Parliament corroborates the party group disciplinary scenario. The party group leadership of the two largest party groups is able to discipline it is members for disloyal voting behaviour. The findings do, however, also show that the party group leadership is not able to sanction national party delegations if they fail to toe the party group line. The study concludes that it will be difficult for the party groups to maintain voting cohesion, if public pressure on Members of the European Parliament increases through a more open form of political contestation at the European level. The responsibility for a successful democratisation of the European Union through party competition, therefore, lies in the hands of national political parties.

Parliamentary research services provide parliamentarians with qualified and politically neutral knowledge on day-to-day basis. Because this is an understudied phenomenon, the aim of the study is to investigate how parliamentarians use research services from the perspective of evidence based policy making. The study was conducted with semi-structured interviews with Swedish parliamentarians and party employees of the Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Swedish Democrats. An interview was also conducted with a representative from the Swedish Research Service. The results show that the Swedish Research Service, as an incremental knowledge producer, is used by parliamentarians to reduce insecurity, get cues and assessments and to appear legitimate. It has also been shown that there is a difference between the parties regarding search activities. The study contributes to the policy sciences by introducing an ideal type on how parliamentarians use parliamentary research services in the policy process.