Zugl.: Magisterarbeit, 1992. / Zugl.: Magisterarbeit, 1992.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stony Brook University, 2008. / This official electronic copy is part of the DSpace Stony Brook theses & dissertations collection maintained by the University Libraries, Special Collections & University Archives on behalf of the Stony Brook Graduate School. It is stored in the SUNY Digital Institutional Repository and can be accessed through the website. Presented to the Stony Brook University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy; as recommended and accepted by the candidate's degree sponsor, the Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 249-253).

Inaug.-Diss.--Leipzig. / Vita. "Verzeichnis der benutzten Bücher": p. [5]-7.

Inaug.-diss.--Leipzig. / Vita.

Thesis--Leipzig. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1973. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Inaug.-diss.--Halle-Wittenberg. / Curriculum vitae.

Texte remanié de: Habilitationsschrift--Germanistik--Freie Universität Berlin, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 357-377.

ABSTRACT Kant says that space has no independently real existence. What he means is that apart from the human mind, space is not real. Of course, it is real to us, he argues—in fact, space is the very condition that makes possible an experience of objects in space. However, space and time are mere forms of human sensibility, and as such: That which is not sensed is neither spatial nor temporal. With regard to space, commentators have argued that although they are inclined to accept that space is a form of human sensibility—a subjective condition of thought or mode by which representations (empirical) are manifest in intuition—nevertheless, space might be a feature of a world that exists independent of the mind. These commentators accuse Kant of having neglected two possibilities: (1) that the representation of space is both subjective and objective at once—that is, a subjective condition of human sensible intuition yet an “objective” quality of a mind-independent reality; and (2) that although the representation of space in sensible intuition is subjective, as Kant suggests, it could be the case that things as they are in themselves exist in space, independent of human sensibility. The focus of the following chapters is first to consider Kant’s subjectivity thesis in its strongest sense—the view that space and time are mere forms of human sensibility. Second, I address the alternative to the view that things in themselves are nonspatial—the alternative that Kant is alleged to have neglected. Finally, I consider responses to “neglected alternative” proponents. For the underlying question is this: What would lead us to believe that although things appear to us in space (and time), that is, side-by-side with other things, that this is not really so? I argue that Kant gives us good reason to think that this is not so, provided we accept his arguments for the subjectivity of space.

Este ensayo busca evaluar la optimista afirmación de Leibniz según la cual el nuestro es el “mejor de los mundos posibles”. para ello, se intenta leerla a la luz del contexto original del cual se extrae dicha frase, es decir, adentrarse aunque sea brevemente en el sistema que Leibniz formuló para rastrear los motivos que lo llevaron a expresarse de ese modo. en suma, se intenta comprender no solo el sentido de dicha frase, sino (en contra de voltaire quizá) al propio Leibniz, o en todo caso, a su optimismo. Con eso en mente, primero se plantea la tesis leibniziana de la multiplicidad de mundos posibles (§1), para preguntarse luego por qué, de entre ellos, nuestro mundo habría de ser el mejor, lo cual conduce a examinar el principio de razón suficiente (§2). Al hacerlo aparece inevitablemente el tema de dios, lo cual motiva a su vez la pregunta de por qué dios eligió crear este mundo en particular en vez de otro (§3). Finalmente se vincula la armonía preestablecida con el optimismo.